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SYNOPSIS 
Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy is an attempt to 
explore the fundamental structure and significance of 
human existence. Through his penetrating phenomenon 
logical analysis, he has brought to light some of the 
unique regions of human existence. One of the unique 
discoveries of his analysis is the transcending 
character of human consciousness. The most Important 
role of hioman consciousness, according to Sartre, is 
its capacity to transcend into the imreal. This view 
helps us to understand the process of creation and 
also provides us insight for the appreciation of art. 
2 
The aim of this thesis Is to examine and analyse 
this peculiar role of human consciousness i.e. its 
transcendence into the unreal, and to evaluate the 
contribution of Sartre to Aesthetics delineating the 
fundamental character and role of art in human life 
and society. 
The area of research undertaken has been specified 
in the introduction of the work. It also includes the 
life and Intellectual development of Sartre. Its aim is 
mainly to frame the problem and to indicate the line of 
our study of the subject. 
In Ills analysis of existence, Sartre has dealt with 
various modes of being and their relation to consciousness. 
This analysis forms the foundation of his whole thought-
system. His theory of art could not be explained without 
having an adequate knowledge of his ontologlcal position. 
Chapter I is, therefore, devoted to a discussion to the 
development of existential thought followed by Sartre's 
phenomenologlcal persult of being and its different 
modalities. It is followed by a discussion of bad faith 
and its patterns so as to bring out Sartre's 'project of 
sincerity', i.e. authenticity lying at the roots of an 
authentic work of art. A brief discussion of Sartre's 
psycho-analysis has also been added so that his psycho-
analysis is distinguished from Freudian psycho-analysis. 
Theory of art has its own history. A brief survey 
of some old theories or interpretations of art was 
therefore necessary. These theories have been instru-
mental In developing the contemporary theories of art and 
have led Sartre to develop his existential interpretation 
of art. All these discussions form the content of the 
II chapter of this work. 
The study of the ontological and aesthetic position 
of Sartre has paved the way for an exposition of Sartre's 
theory of art* which is dealt with in the chapter III of 
this work. We could not, however, abruptly arrive at 
Sartre's theory of art without examining his theory of 
imagination, because his theory of art is essentially 
rooted in his concept of imagination. Sartre's phenomeno-
logical analysis of image has not only helped us to 
understand his view of the structure of consciousness, 
but it has provided us with a chance to examine the 
'imagining' in historical perspective, i.e. right from 
the Greeks upto the present time. It is followed by a 
detailed analysis of Sartre's interpretation of art. 
In chapter IV, we have tried to locate Sartre's 
concept of commitment, authenticity and freedom, which 
form the core of his theory of art, with reference to his 
creative writings. 
In order to see how far Is Sartre's theory of 
art in conformity with the works of art, we have devoted 
the 5th chapter to Sartre's analysis of some artists and 
their vrorks. 
Chapter VI is very brief, containing our critical 
estimation of the validity of Sartre's theory of art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sartre's Intellectual Developmentj 
(I), The leading figure of the existential movement and a 
noble laurette (though he declined to receive it), Jean-Paul 
Sartre, is considered to be the most popular and forceful 
exponent of the despair of post-war generation of Europe, His 
creative works portrayed man as a lonely being, burdened 
with terrifying freedom to choose his own meaning and to 
create it in a meaningless universe. His distinguished and 
dynamic figure overshadows most of the philosophic thinking 
and political activity of his era. A declared atheist but 
a thorough humanist and highly secular, he has 
to his credit,besides a number of important philosophic works, 
a number of plays, short stories and novels that are the best 
expressions of his existential experience and outlook at 
the highest creative level. 
A descendent of a well-to-do abd cyktuvated Petit bourgeois 
family which was in close friendly relations with Albert 
Schweitzer of Lambar*ene' (a noble laurette), Sartre was born 
in 1905 in Paris of a short lived union between a young forlorn 
girl and an errant naval officer, who was soon to die, when 
Sartre was only two years old. 
At a very young age Sartre was introduced to the world 
of books by his maternal grand father who was a school teacher 
though not of much repute. The grand father was a protestent 
and the rest of the family was catholic. This diversity and 
desparity confused faith of Sartre who could and up only as an 
atheist. With no father, Sartre had a tremendous feeling of 
superfluousness which he was later on to identify in the vdiole 
human existence. The seeds of rebellion were thus implanted in 
Sartre's soul at a very young age. 
The portrait which J.P.Sartre, the author, has drawn 
of the child Sartre in his 'words', is not simply a biographical 
sketch that connects certain anecdots or certain events but is 
a penetrating psychological study of the childhood of a to-be 
philosopher, writer and an artist. It is this study of the 
childhood of Sartre which halps us to understand his adult 
psyche. 
Though Sartre has been highly critical in his depiction 
of the atmosphere of his middle class milleua to which he 
belonged and whose all values he was to reject at a later 
stage, it was this very family where ideas, words and thoughts 
were assimilated by him. It is evident from all his writings 
about art and music. His grand father's dream of making 
Sartre a scholar and not a writer provided him the opportunities 
to develop and nourish his philosophical and artistic genius 
from a very young age. We are told that at the age of six 
Sartre started to write, not A B C , but the little comedies 
and ix)ems. He received his basic education at the i»enowned 
Ecole Normale Supe'rieure. In 1930 he started teaching philosophy 
at different schools. It was, however, in his studentship 
that he met the young and beautiful Simone de Beauvoir and the 
two, sharing the same interests and pre-occupations, becaae 
an examplary unmarried couple of the century. 
(II). Sartre wrote most of his philosophical worics either 
before the 2nd world war or during the war* After the liberation 
of France, i.e. after 19A6, he changed his position from a 
psychological and moralist writer to a political and social 
anrJLyst, mainly because of the exagencies of new social and 
political situation of the post-war world. 
He committed himself to political activity through his 
essays published in Les Tamps Moderns (Modern Times) the paper 
he himself edited later. His emphasis on commitment, social 
responsibility and the inevitability of violence in the persuit 
of freedom drew him to the left wing politics, although he 
never Joined the communist party of France. A passionate 
critic of France's War in Algeria, he rapudiated the then 
President of France, Charles de Gaulle's orders of compulsory 
military training. Though De Gaull charged all those who 
had not followed his orders for betrayal of the country; for 
•1 
Sartre, he said, "one does not put Voltaire on trial." 
Sartre was a vehement critic of the United States of 
America for her role in Vietnam. He played an important role 
as the head of the War Crimes Tribunal and condemned the leaders 
of the United States of America for violating the International 
law in Vietnam. He has, however. Justified Palegtanian terrorism 
against Israel though he was of the view that Israel had a 
right to exist. Breaking his life long principle of accepting 
any bourgeois honour, in 1976 he went to Israeli Embassy in 
Paris and accepted an honrary doctorate degree from the Hebrew 
University in Jeruslam. But he declared at the ceremony: 
"My acceptance of this little has a special 
significance. It expresses the friendship 
I have felt for Israel since its birth, and 
my desire to see that nation prosper in 
peace and security. But I consider that 
such a peace can only exist if the Israel's 
start talking with the Palestanians, for I 
am also concerned over the fate of the 
Palestanian people. In fact I feel all the 
more pro-Palestanian; in that I am pro-Israeli 
and vice-versa." 
Had this towering personality of the 20th century lived 
beyond April 15th, 1980, he would have moblised the world 
r-
. ) 
opinion against the Russian invasion in Afganistan, the U.S.A's 
aggression in Nicaragoa and condemnation of Iran-Iraq war for 
killing of innocent people, 
(III), The intellectual development of Sartre can be devided 
into three phases, viz, the phenomenological, the ontological 
and the Marxist phase. 
His interest in phenomenological psychology, which is 
considered to be the first phase of his philosophy, was respon-
sible for his four main works, viz: * Transcendence of Ego*. 
*A Sketch for the theory of Emotions*, *The Imagination' and 
*The Psychology of Imagination*. While describing the structure 
of consciousness in the works of this phase, Sartre comes very 
close to Husserl but deviates from him gradually and takes a 
position close to that of Heidegger. In this phase Sartre 
cultivated the psychological virtuosity and analytical penetration 
that he needed for his account in "Being and Nothingness" as 
the distinctive property of consciousness, its being and 
nothingness. He concludes, in •Words', that the capacity 
to imagine is not contingent character of consciousness. Far 
from being a contingent character of consciousness, it is 
consciousness itself insofar as it realizes its freedom. 
Consciousness is continuously transcending the real, the actual. 
This period paved way for his transition from phenomenolo-
gical psychology to his ontology which is considered to be the 
(; 
second and the roost important phase of his Intellectual 
development. It Includes hia all Important work "Being and 
Nothingness", and in defence of his philosophy, a paper on 
Existentialismj entitled "Existentialism and Humanism"* Since 
his first phase had led him towards a position which was akin 
to that of Heidegger, in his second phase also, he is so near 
to Heidegger*s thought that "Being and Nothingness" is sometimes 
considered an amplified restatement of the doctrines developed 
by Heidegger in his main work "Being and Time". In this work, 
Sartre rejects Husserl*s transcendental "I", because it cannot 
be understood as a being distinct from all other beings* He 
holds that there are only "phenomena", since our 'pre-reflective* 
or*non-reflective* involvement in things shows that there is 
no transcendental "I" that forms the part of the structure of 
our experience. 
Sartre*s third and the last phase of intellectual develop-
ment is marked by his restatement of Marxian thought presented 
In the "Critique of Dialectical Reason". Though criticising 
the contemporary Marxists, he accepts the peculiarity of human 
existence pointed out by Marx. In the preface of this work, 
Sartre says that i 
"Existentialism must find its place within 
the frame-work of Marxist philosophy, 
because I consider Marxism to be the unsur-
passable philosophy of our time, and because 
I look upon the ideology of existence and 
its * comprehensive* method as an enclave within 
Marxism Itself which at the same time embraces 
and rejects it."^ 
( IV) . S a r t r e ' s ana lys i s and l o g i c a l sys temat iza t ion of man's 
freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and h i s r ad i ca l reso lve against 
a l l the processes of dehumanization, e s sen t i a l ! sm, o b j e c t i -
v i z a t i o n , bad f a i t h and a l i e n a t i o n made him a renovmed 
wr i t e r and th inker throughout the world. His a l l phi losophical 
and l i t e r a r y works are but a desperate s t rugg le to p ro tec t 
the mysterious e n t i t y t h a t i s ca l led "freedom" of man and 
to r e s t o r e human c r e a t i v e facu l ty t i l l now suppressed by 
var ious systems on var ious p r e t e x t s . The freedom^ which 
Sar t re sought, i s n o t , however, merely the freedom t h a t gives 
man the capac i ty of saying »no», but i t i s freedom a t a c r ea t ive 
l e v e l which negates a l l the l i m i t a t i o n s put upon freedom. The 
capaci ty of negat ion does not lead mankind to darkness but 
br ings l i g h t i n the world. Sa r t re bel ieved that one must show 
darkness i n a l l i t s depths i n order to r e a l i z e urgent 
need for l i g h t . 
"No c h a r i t y or love l i f t s the gloom| the 
only glimmer of hope l i e s i n the r e l e n t -
l e s s pu r su i t of oppression i n whatever 
form i t occurs , human or even d i v i n e . " 
These views are not new to our age. At the dawn of 
the present cen tury , Gide, Unamuno, Ifeguy and even S a r t r e ' s 
contemporaries Medraux and Camus, had, more or l e s s , the same 
type of i d e a s , Man's a l i e n a t i o n , bad f a i t h , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
freedom, anguish, dread, absurdi ty are the very hallmarks of 
the 20th century literature. One can find, at a first 
glance, nothing new in Sartre's writings. Sartre*s originality, 
however, lies in the fact that unlike his predecessors or 
contemporaries, ho presents the problem on purely philosophical 
grounds and hence, he lays down the basis of a systematic 
formulation of the problem and a rigorous hunt for its solution, 
abolition or dissolution, 
(V), Sartre's devotion to art and literature was not purely 
at an aesthetic level but was aimed at finding a means to 
justify tho meaning and value of human existence, Sartre's 
fundamental principle, that man cannot but choose and the 
moment he chooses he becomes responsible not only lor himself 
but for the whole mankind, found its substance and full 
expression in his most famous works produced between 1938 and 
1946 i.e. between "Nausea" and "Roads to Freedom", Our 
ineluctable responsibility to choose freedom in the face of 
the world that determines all our acts and imposes an inevitable 
historic situation upon us has been the central theme of 
almost all the literary '.vorks of Sartre, Besides substantiating 
his philosophical concepts, these works are in tnemselves the 
best examples of contemporary literature. His novels, stories 
and plays possess an atibosphere which is authentically existential 
a characteristic^not found in the works of any other writer. 
Though at first sight his works like "The Wall", "Intimacy" 
and even the novels of his triology, *R6ads to Freedom* 
appear to depict the contemporary human situation in anobacenewax 
a closer exaninatlon of these works reveal that all these works 
have a milleua of their own, Tliey have a unity, a compactness 
representing not only Sartre*s philosophical ideas but above 
all the existential experiences of man at the highest creative 
level. 
In this regard these works also complement the ideas 
put forward by Sartre in his "Psychology of Imagination" and 
"what is literature". Though Sartre has not built up any 
elaborate system of aesthetics, these works do fully substan-
tiate his ideas on aesthetics. From the existential point of 
view all his works can serve as the basis for formulating his 
theory of art* ^ ^ "Being and Nothingness" will serve as the 
foundation of his theory, F. Kaelin in his "Existential Aesthetics" 
sajfe somet ling that does not conform to our view, writes! 
"It is not unreasonable to separate the 
literary efforts of Sartre from his 
already dense body of purely philosophical 
work. Our ground here is not that literature 
cannot be philosophy, but that historically 
considered, the literary interpretations of 
his philosophy are secondary| they were 
intended, in the main, merely to reach that 
larger section of his audience which is 
composed of readers for whom philosophy is 
a too forbiding a fare."^ 
We cannot accept this view of Kaelin,for, if Sartre's 
philosophy were to be separated from his literary works, it 
: U 
might have led to the idea that his philosophy had no re la t ion 
with his creat ive a c t i v i t y , at leas t when observed from the 
ex is ten t ia l point of view. The l ine of demarcation between 
philosophy and l i t e r a t u r e has remained blurred h i s to r i ca l ly , 
as Kaelin says, but so far as Sar t re ' s case i s concerned, hia 
philosophy may be ful ly understood only with reference to 
his l i t e r a r y works. In our view i f Sar t re ' s philosophy i s separated 
from his l i t e r a t u r e , both the two will become disjointed 
par ts of the expression of a personal i ty 's experiences that 
represents our age and i t s s p i r i t . They are, in - fac t , comple-
mentory to each o ther . Man i s always in a boundary s i tua t ion , 
Jaspers has r ight ly observed. One cannot be but in a s i tua t ion . 
These si tuat ions are concretized with reference to individual 
men in l i t e r a t u r e only. Hence after going throiigh a l l the 
philosophical and l i t e r a r y works of Sartre, we have come to 
the conclusion that S a r t i ^ ' s philosophical ideas acquire i t s 
content, purpose and to some extent even meaning through his 
l i t e r a ry works. 
Persuing th i s method, we have t r i ed , in th i s work, to 
evolve Sar t re ' s theory of a r t . We have t r ied to establ ish i t 
on the basis of his two main works viz . "The Psychology of 
Imagination" and "What i s Li tera ture" . We have t r ied to Justify 
Sar t re ' s stand with the help of his l i t e r a ry works. But this 
stand could not be maintained unless Sar t re ' s philosophical 
posit ion, as depicted in "Being and Nothingness", has not 
been accessable to us . Sar t re ' s concept of "Being" and 
i t s different modalities, comprising bad fa i th , commitment, 
authentici ty, freedom, and c rea t iv i ty , provided us with the 
basic infra-structure for establishing his theory of a r t . 
Sar t re ' s analysis of the works of some renowned painters has 
helped us in substantiat ing our systematization of his theory 
of a r t . 
*** 
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EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 
o 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF 
EXISTENTIAL THOUGHT 
(The roots of existential thought can be traced throughout 
the history of philosophy and literature/) It, however, found 
its first profound expression in the Danish philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) and reached its apex in the present 
century through the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul 
Sartre, Karl Jaspers and Gabril Marcel and through the 
litterateure like Dostoiveski, Unamuno, Camus, Kafka and Sartre 
(to quote only a few names). (Before working out the reasons 
for its revival in our century, it is imperative to define the 
term »existentialism'——its roots and meaning* It may, however, 
be mentioned, at the very outset, that it might be a somewhat 
futile enquiry as to how far are the present Indian conditions 
conduc-ive to the development of such type of iliilosophy. Never-
theless, concern for human existence and suffering, has been 
shown by the authors of Upnishads and Budha as well. Classical 
Sanskrit literature and Bhakti poetry of the medieval India 
' t 
may be also studied with a view to trace the elements of an 
existential philosophy, j 
It is well established that all the traditional philoso-
phies were easentialistic in nature, for, they emphasized reason 
as the essence of man to such an extent that the very existence 
of man was totally blurred or subordinated to a universal 
concept of man. 
' Essence and existence can be distinguished by their 
respective meaningsj while essence denotes an idea or a mental 
abstraction, existence is concrete, or it is facticity. The 
two terms, as is evident, are related but irreducible to each 
other. Kant illustrated it very beautifully by saying that the 
definition of the essence of a hundred dollers has no bearing 
as to whether or not this sum exists. Its existence or non-
existence (in one*s pocket), however, makes a great difference. 
On the basis of this distinction between essence and existence, 
it can be held that when we define something we express its 
essence, because whatever is definable in a thing is nothing 
other than its essence. Thus existing things are reduced to 
mere ideas or a bundle of characters common in a class of 
objects. Therefore, any attempt to define existence will 
involve the paradoxical task of defining the essence of existence. 
Though existence may not altogether be incomprehensible, yet it 
is undefinable and unanalyzable in precise terms, ftoreover. 
essence in every par t icular case has the poss ib i l i ty of 
in f in i t e structures and re l a t ions . Existence, on the other 
hand, implies only one fact and that i s , a thing ei ther exists 
or does not ex i s t . There i s absolutely no intermediate position 
between existence and non-existence, between being and not-
Therefore, a l l those systems of thought which give 
superior rank to essence and at times reduce existing objects 
to essences, can be calss i f ied as e s s en t i a l i s t . All those 
systems of thought which accept the primacy of existence and 
hold that essence of a thing i s merely a logical construction, 
which Is neither the source of existence nor i t s end, can be 
c lass i f ied as e x i s t e n t i a l i s t . 
P la to ' s theory of ideas is the f i r s t systematic expression 
of essentialism. Platonic t rad i t ion dominated the western 
philosophy for two thousand years. I t s an t i - t he s i s , exis tent ia-
lism, remained suppressed throughout the ages. However, Hegel's 
philosophy is the boldest expression of essentialism. Hegel 
completes the process of absorbing existence into essence 
through his d ia lec t ica l mechanism when 'being' ( thesis) i s 
merged with 'not being* (ant i - thes is) giving r i se to 'becoming' 
(synthesis) . Hegel rejected the causal theory on the ground 
that i t did not explain the origin of existence in terms of 
f i r s t cause. He conceived the world as a d ia lec t ica l process 
' n 
of the unfoldment of reason. Reason as a universal pr inciple 
i s at work in space and time. Expression of reason in time 
i s history and i t s unfoldment in space i s the world of physical 
objects . Therefore, according to Hegel, the f i r s t principle ia 
not the cause of which the universe is the effect but reason of 
which the world i s the effect . In th is sense reason i s consi-
dered to be absolute r e a l i t y . God i s Absolute Reason and the 
ent i re span of space-time i s a manifestation of a ra t ional 
process. For Hegel, >^at i s real i s ra t iona l , and what i s 
ra t ional i s r e a l . Accordingly, man was also reduced by him to 
reason, or in Ar i s to t l e ' s words *a ra t ional be ing ' . 
I t was th i s essentialism of Hegel in which existence 
was not only sub-merged into essence but was actually sacrificed 
at the a l t e r of reason. Against this Kierkegaard reacted 
vehemently, Natanson has remarked that "Kierkegaard i s Hegel's 
punishment". Kierkegaard's thought in th i s perspective can 
be called as anti-Hegelinism or ant i - ra t ional - the term applied 
to most of the 20th century e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . 
Prom one point of view, existentialism can be understood 
as an open revolt against the domination of reason. Limitations 
of reason had been pointed out by Kant, who enumerated the 
antinomies of reason. This task at another level was taken up 
by e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . "All the experience shows", as pointed 
out by Paul Rulblezek, "that a purely log ica l , r a t iona l . 
sc ien t i f ic way of thinking illuminates only a s t r i c t l y limited 
sector of r e a l i t y " . Before analysing other factors that helped 
in the development of existential ism in our century, l e t us 
summarise Kierkegaard's basic stand on the issue of the primacy 
of existence as against reason. 
That r ea l i t y i s ent i re ly individual and par t icular and 
not universal i s the nucleus of Kierkegaard's philosophy. The 
charac ter i s t ic feature of his philosophy i s that subject ivi ty 
becomes the very foundation of knowledge. In the sphere of 
rel igion he attacked ins t i tu t ional i sed rel igion in the form of 
Church, and his philosophical attack was mainly directed against 
absolute rationalism of Hegel, Unlike modern e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , 
Kierkegaard used the term 'existence* in a very defini te sense 
v iz , subject iv i ty . He arrived at th is point due to the Christian 
theological refusal to accept object iv is t ic conception of t ru th 
and r a t i ona l i s t i c explanations of universe and man, "But th i s 
does not mean", Dr. Waheed Akhtar points out, "that Kierkegaard's 
re l ig iousi ty ignored worldly aspect of man's existence. He used 
to say that h is was Socratic task know thyself . He t r i ed to 
overcome a 'd i sso lu te pantheistic contempt for the individual, 
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character is t ic deprivity of his age," 
Kiericegaard expounded his theory of subject ivi ty in his 
5 
'Concluding Unscientific Postscr ipt ' and the theory of being 
(ontology) in his 'Philosophical Fragmenta*• In these works. 
Kierkegaard has furnished only some h in t s , some fragments 
or some psychological analysis of these theoriea. I t was 
not u n t i l l the present century experienced the horrors 
of two world wars that existential ism became a philosophical 
movement and Kierkegaard was rediscovered as the founder of 
th is movement. Though contemporary ex i s t en t i a l i s t s do not 
accept Kierkegaard's approach^ln call ing subjectivity the 
core of existence, they, however, developed a philosophy of 
being on the foundation laid down by him in the 19th century. 
They applied ex i s ten t i a l approach to a l l the si tuations in 
which an individual found himself entangled. They renewed 
thei r attack (with more success) on a l l the t rad i t ional 
philosophies for the i r endeavour to de-exis tent ia l i se human 
being. This, however, does not imply that the contemporary 
ex i s t en t i a l i s t movement i s an attempt for the revival of 
Kierkegaard in the 20th centuryj i t i s rather vice-versa, 
for Kierkegaard's revival i s the resul t of a new awareness of 
a being. "The adoptation of Kierkegaard by modern existentia-
lism", Helmut Kuln observes, "is a creative rather than an 
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imitative process." 
Following the foot-steps of Kierkegaard, modern 
existentialists were inevitably interested in analysing such 
existential conditions of man as dread, anxiety, anguish, 
death, freedom, despair, love etc. Existentialism becomes 
an analysis of such subjective states because of its emphasis 
on the subjectivity of existence. But if existentialism is 
[) 
only an analysis of such Irrational aspects of man which are 
themselves purely subjective, the question arises, whether we 
can define it at all ? "Being merely a subjective emotional 
condition", Alfred Stern points out, "existence is even beyond 
the reach of explanation because explanation is made up of 
objective concepts, ...In trying to objectivize existence, 
concepts denature it, thus changing it into something else, 
Q 
namely another variety of abstract being." Probably, this 
should have been the reason why Kierkegaard did not create 
any systematic philosophy. Kierkegaard himself held that 
existence itself was not a system of objective laws and 
therefore, it could not be arrested in a system of coherent 
and consistent objective facts and laws. Sartre did not name 
his magnum opua as 'Existence and Nothingness* but entitled it 
as "Being and Nothingness", and similarly Heidegger entitled 
his main work not aa •Existence and Time* but "Being and Time". 
The reason for choosing the term being for these titles is 
given by Alfred Stem, who holds, that both Sartre and Heidegger 
wanted to offer an ontology a theory of being. In an ontolo-
gical theory existence disappears, since it cannot be objecti-
vized. 
Despite not making use of the term 'existence*, apparently 
a contradiction of their own emphasis on existence, different 
exponents of this philosophy accepted the basic principlet 
existence precedes essence, although all of them define their 
approach variously. Karl Jaspera maintains that existentialism 
ist 
"fi 
"To catch slglit of reality at its 
origin and to grasp it through the 
way in which I, in thought, deal 
10 
with myself—in inner action." 
(Paul Tillich is of the view thatt 
"Existentialism as a universal 
element in all thinking is the 
attempt of man to describe his 
existence and its conflicts, the 
origin of these conflicts, and 
the anticipation of overcoming 
them—wherever man's predicament 
is described either theologically 
or philosophically, either politically 
or artistically, there we have exist-
ential elements," j 
Walter Kaufman holds thati 
"The refusal to belong to any school, 
the repudiation of the adequacy of 
any body of beliefs whatever, and 
especially of systems and a marked 
dissatisfaction with traditional 
philosophy as superficial, academic, 
and remote from life—that is the heart 
12 
of existentialism." \ 
In the words of H.J.Blackhami 
"Existentialism begins as a voice 
raised in protest against the 
absurdity of pure thought, a logic 
which is not logic of tlilnking but 
JL 
the Immanent movement of Being* It 
recalls the spectator of all time and 
of all existence from the speculations 
of his own conditional thinking as an 
existing individual seeking to know 
how to live and to live the life he 
13 knows •" 
Blackham further adds thatt 
"The business of existential philosophy 
in helping the person to malce himself 
and get his experience, is to furnish 
analysis of the concrete structures of 
first hand experience in vriilch ambigul-
14 ties are operative." 
Marry Warnock is of the opinion thati 
"The appeal of existentialism has been 
largely practical, and the people have 
been fascinated by it because they 
actually want to put its principles of 
Individual freedom into practice in 
society."^ ' 
H.H.Titus maintains thatt 
/ "Existentialism represents an attitude 
^-or outlook that emphasizes human 
existence—that is, the distinctive 
qualities of individual person— 
rather than man In the abstract or 
nature and the world in general." ' 
<,') 
[In view of all that has been stated till now, we 
cannot but agree with Dr. Waheed Akhtar thatt "exiatentialiam 
Is not In the strict sense a system of philosophy but an 
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approach to the study of man". ' I may venture to add that 
being a purely radical movement, at least in our century 
(though in the western world only), it is not only the expression 
of the moods and experiences of man but also an agonised cry 
against all the processes of dehumanization, essentialisation, 
objectivisation, bad faith, alienation and an all embracing 
intellectualism.j 
I For J.P.Sartre, whose philosophy is the central theme 
of the present study* 
"Existentialism is a doctrine that does 
render human life possible| a doctrine 
also, which affirms that every truth 
and every action imply both an environment 
and a human subjectivity." ^ 
Before we expound and analyse Sartre's ontological position 
from his philosophical works, so as to understand what he means 
by 'human life* or 'human subjectivity', it will be proper to 
portray human life,as we have it, in the present century, of 
which he was a product and most probably, for which, he wrote, 
Sartre dramatizes the man's historic situation in the 
20th century in one of his plays "Altona"^ In this play, 
Sartre depicts the alienation of its main character Franz 
: a 
Von Gerlach* After the defeat of Germany in the Second World 
War, Franz, imprisoned in his subjectivity asserting his 
freedom, -which is denied to him, addresses the * masked inhabi-
tants of the ceilings*.: 
"Masked inhabitants of the ceilings, 
your attention... They are lying to 
you. Two thousand million false 
witnesses I Two thousand millidin lies 
a second! Listen to the plea of mankinds 
We were betrayed by our deeds. By our 
words, by our lousy livesI Decapods, I 
bear witness that they do not think 
what they were saying, and that they 
did not do what they wished... Dear 
listeners, my century was a Jumble-
sale, in which the liquidation of the 
human species was decided upon in high 
places... Me. Man is dead, and I am 
his witness. Centuries, X shall tell 
you how my century tasted, and you 
will acquit the accused..."^ 
Later in the same play Franz declares! 
"Everything is in place. History is 
sacred. If you change a single comma, 
nothing will be left... You, me, all 
the dead, mankind. Be on your guard. 
They are watching you. No one is alone... 
Don't throw my century into the dustbin. 
Not without hearing me... Take care, you 
JudgesI If I rot, my century will be 
engulfed."^^ 
Sartre concludes this play with the following lamentation 
of Franzt 
"Centuries of the future, here is my 
century, solitary and deformed——the 
accused*•• The century might have been 
a good one had not man been watched 
from time Immemorial by the cruel enemy 
who had sworn to destroy him, that 
hairless, evil, flesh«»eating beast«>man 
himself••• The beast was hiding, and 
suddenly we surprised his look deep 
In the eyes of our neighbours... I 
struck. A man fell, and in his dying 
eyes I saw the beast still living-
myself... Where does it come from, 
this rancid, dead taste in my mouth? 
From man? From the beast? From 
myself? It is the taste of our century. 
Happy centuries, you who do not know our 
hatreds, how could you understand the 
atrocious power of our fatal loves? 
Love<-Hatred« One and one... Acquit us I 
My client was the first to know shame. 
He knows he is naked. Beautiful children, 
you are born of us, our pain has brought 
you forth. This century is a woman in 
21 
labour..." ' 
Lamenting upon his century, Franz calls the future 
centuries with an agonized cry, presenting the full picture 
of his century—a century which is deformed, 'accused', 
'solitary* a century which is a 'woman in labour'. This 
V) 
I s abso lu te ly an absurd as well as a very t e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n tha t i f 
being faced by human beings in our cen tu ry . I t i s i n these 
condi t ions—chal lenging human freedom and depriving men of 
t h e i r au thent ic exis tence t h a t gave r i s e to e x i s t e n t i a l 
thought . Dr. Waheed Akhtar has given an appropr ia te i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Franz*a charac te r i n h i s a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Urdu 
novel Par Wu.ludiwat Ke a tha ra t t Aag Ka Darva Ka Ta.lziyveti 
mutal iah" | Inf luence of Ex is ten t ia l i sm on urdu novel: an 
Analysis of Aag Ka Darya (River of F i r e ) | • Dr. Akhtar says : 
"Having passed through the dread of 
death i n l i f e (6eing«>unto->death) 
Franz i s now carry ing on a dead being— 
a l i f e which i s not l i f e because i t 
has experienced dea th . He runs away 
from death and i s now imprisoned i n h i s 
dead i s o l a t i o n . This t ragedy i s not 
the tragedy of the new genera t ion of 
the present century only but i s a 
t ragedy of many gene ra t ions . Those 
who are o l d , those who are of the 
middle age, those who are young and 
those who are s t i l l crawlingi a l l 
have f a l l e n in to the same s t a t e of 
dead l i f e , t ry ing to hide from t h e i r 
unavoidable end. This t ragedy , 
unprecedented throughout human 
h i s t o r y , i s the cause of the b i r t h 
of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . " ^ ^ 
* 
English translation is ours. 
: () 
/Sartre*s works present only one version of existentialism 
in creat ive l i t e r a t u r e ; Camus, Kafka and Destoievski's works 
unfold other pos s ib i l i t i e s of creative expression of t h i s 
philosophy•^\ In a l l of them we find the inner most experiences 
of human beings expressed in a forceful way. The chain of 
thought se t in motion by Socrates (through his dictum-know-
thyself) was accelerated in 19th century in the philosophical 
revolt of Kierkegaard against the Western t r ad i t ion of ignoring 
the individual man* Destoiveski, Kafka, Sar t re , Camus and 
other wri ters gave i t l i t e r a r y acceptabil i ty and expressioni 
and in academic philosophy i t found i t s exponents in Heidegger, 
Jaspers , Marcel and Sartre» Sartre has the d i s t inc t ion of 
expounding ex is ten t ia l philosophy both ar t i s t ice i l ly and 
logical ly in a systematic way. 
Sartre^s def ini t ion, •existentialism not only renders 
human l i f e possible but also attirm that every t ruth and 
every action imply both an environment and a human subjec t iv i ty ' , 
i s based on the principle of the pr ior i ty of existence over 
essence. This principle i s fundamental to the whole thought 
system of Sar t re . /Though the the i s t i c and a the is t ic exis tent ia l 
philosophers hold divergent opinions about different notions, 
the principle of the 'primacy of existence as against essence', 
i s the real point of the i r convergence.j By th i s principle^ 
Sartre implies that man f i r s t of a l l ex i s t s , encounters himself, 
surges up in the world—-and defines himself afterwards. \ Man, 
for Sartr«, i s not definable because he i s nothings 
"He will not be anything untill 
lateri and then he will be what 
he makes of himself," -^  
Unlike Heidegger, Sartre holds that there Is no human 
nature because there is no Ctod to have a conception of it. 
Though for Sartre, man simply is, yet he Jsnot simply what 
he himself conceives to be, Man is what he wills, Sartre 
holds that "man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself." This, for Sartre, is the principle of subjectivity. 
It is this human subjectivity which not only renders human life 
possible but also affirms the truth of every other object and 
every action of an authentic human existence. At the same time 
the principle of subjectivity makes a man a project: 
"Before that projection of the self 
nothing existsI not even in the 
heaven of Intelllgencet man will 
attain existence when he is what he 
proposes to be," 
Thus the f i r s t e f fec t of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , according to 
S a r t r e , i s t h a t i t / " p u t s every man i n possess ion of himself 
as he i s , and p laces the whole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon h is 
shoulders ," At the same t ime , S a r t r e , holds t ha t man should 
not be held respons ib le only for h i s own i n d i v i d u a l i t y , but 
he i s responsible for the whole epoch i n which he f inds himself 
placed, j He sayst 
"Vlhen we say tha t man chooses himself , 
we do mean t h a t everyone of us must 
' o 
choose himselfI but by t h a t we also 
mean tha t I n choosing for himself he 
chooses for a l l men. . . In fashioning 
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myself I fashion man." ' 
By ' fashlohlng my Image I am fashioning the image of 
man* implies one ' s profound r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for human image. 
But t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , according to S a r t r e , i s always 
accompanied with anguish. Any person who refuses to accept 
t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or escapes from making h i s choice as a f ree 
being i s simply 'dissembling* h i s anguish. While making any 
decis ion one cannot f e e l but anguish. Simultaneously, i f 
•exis tence precedes essence*, a l l the human vedues are created 
i n the ac t s of cho ice . Though the ac t of choice i s a s e l f r 
conscious choice , according to S a r t r e , e x i s t e n t i a l choice i s 
always t h e r e . In a l l circumstances and i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s , 
choice i s t h e r e - i t occu r s . Whether a man, Sa r t r e maintains, 
determines t h i s choice a c t i v e l y or pass ive ly (because the 
choice i s always there) I s not of much importance! what i s 
important la the fac t t ha t the re i s no escape from the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of one ' s choice and no one can choose for u s . 
Moreover, i n order to e s t a b l i s h the p r i nc ip l e of the 
primacy of ex i s tence , S a r t r e d iv ides being in to two t^lea 
v i z . 'Be ing - ln - i t s e l f • and 'Be ing - fo r - i t s e l f* . Belng- in- l t se l f» 
i s und i f f e ren t i a t ed , *maasive' , t imeless s e l f • I d e n t i t y - i t i s 
what i t i s I 'Be ing - fo r - l t ae l f* , on the con t ra ry , never i s but 
c o n t i n u a l l y has to be . Since there I s no moment a t which 
i t I s i n the aenae of being I d e n t i c a l with I t s e l f , I t may be 
ca l l ed a *ho l e ' . I t i s I t s own naught. I t I s continuously 
escaping from I t s e l f which makes I t s ex i s tence poss ible) 
"Through determinate nega t ions , the 
f o r - l t s e l f carves out of t h e block of 
the I n - i t s e l f the s h i f t i n g p a t t e r n s 
of mul t ip le th ings which c o n s t i t u t e the 
world, thus revea l ing i t s e l f as an 
a c t i v e , 'naughtlng naught*." ^ 
Though i t i s c la imed ' t h a t Sar t re*s philosophy i s 
indebted with the projected ontology of Heidegger but i n f a c t , 
h i s d i s t i n c t i o n of being in to » i n - l t s e l f ' and »for - i t se l f» 
i s much Hegelian than Heideggerr lan. J.Wahl-^' po in ts out that 
S a r t r e ' s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of being as • b e i n g - l n - l t s e l f ' a n d 'be ing-
f o r - l t s e l f * corresponds to R e a l i s t i c and I d e a l i s t i c tendencies 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . This I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S a r t r l a n terms i s t o t a l l y 
wrong, because i t reduces these two modes of being to t r a d i t i o n a l 
on to log lca l notions which i s an attempt incompatible with the 
bas ic approach of S a r t r e . Sar t re could however be seen i n the 
t r a d i t i o n of Husserl and Heidegger. Natanson has r i g h t l y 
observed tha t S a r t r e , has attempted to cut across the t r a d i t i o n a l 
pos i t ions of idealism and rea l i sm i n founding a r a d i c a l l y new 
ontology. 
I t , however, seems a J u s t i f i e d claim t h a t "Sar t re t r i e s 
"52 to make exis tence great a t the expense of essence ." Though 
.nJ 
the subtle balance between existence and essence within the 
co|icept of being cannot be disregarded but the critics of 
Sartre have pointed out that he ends up, in a very particular 
sense, in essentlalizing existence itself. Exiatence, no 
doubt, should be the fountalnhead of the essential being, but 
Sartre stretched the meaning of existence exactly to the same 
limits which were prescribed for the term * essence* in classical 
tradition, Essentialista totally ignored the existence and 
Sartre totally ignored the essence. Essentiallata essentializad 
existence, Sartre existentialized essence, thus the other way 
round essentlalizing existence. 
It however, seems that Sartre reached this extreme 
position, because existentialism, in itself, was a philosophy of 
taking extreme positions. [Existentialism has a dynamic i>oten-
tiality of developing and flourishing in extreme situations. 
Such extreme situations which may develop this thought could 
arise out of the conditions imposed upon man by war, politics, 
physicalism, rule of technocracy, diseases and even extreme 
poverty and exploitation. \ Prance, at the time when Sartre*a 
creative genius blossomed, was experiencing the unprecedented 
horrors of vrar. It was a situation of extreme crises that 
compelled free man to keep silent, to negate himself. On the 
whole it was a situation highly conducive to the development 
This aspect of existential thought is discussed In detail in 
the latter part of our thesis under the aub*heading^Commitment• 
of existential thought. 
The factors responsible for the rise of existential 
thought during the present century are discussed in detail 
in the sub chapter entitled 'Commitment* of the present work. 
It may, however, be inferred from what has been stated in the 
preceding pages that existentialism is not a systematic world 
out-look, but a revolutionary radical approach to the under-
standing of human existence in its historic set-iQ>. While 
affirming existence to everything, it denies existence to 
everything of which we are not immediately aware. It tries 
to describe the things rather than deduce or analyze them. 
It tries to describe what man "is" rather than to Justify his 
presence in the world. It reduces life from what we would 
like it to be to what it is,") 
Before closing the present topie it is essential to 
assess whether this movement has any relevance to the present 
Indian situation. Despite the fact that hundreds of thousands 
of young men from our undivided country were recruited to fight 
against the axis of Nazi Germany and Japan to defend the 
interests of the British imperialism in the woyld, including 
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our own land, the Indian continent did not experience those 
horrors of the war that shattered the very core of human 
existence and Its values in the West, The western :man 
experienced it directly -aod his Idealism was shattered, as a 
result of which he was disillusioned with all the philosophies. 
• ) ' -
Therefore, he was In an urgent need of developing a philosophy 
that could express and j^ustify the despair, anguish, disillusion 
and discontent of his existence which was totally ignored by 
all those philosophies that projected man as an essentially 
good creature and defined him in terms of pure rationality. 
Anyhow, our country was influenced indirectly by the experiences 
of the west. 
The two gjreat world wars in the West were the most 
horrible expressions of man's irrationality* Hence it is 
justifiably claimed that existentialism is the world out-look 
of the western Europe only. Nevertheless, the sources of this 
philosophy can be traced in the early philosophy of the East 
as well. Although there can be some existential elements 
present in many thinkers of this part of the world, but most 
of the existential concepts have remained unrealized. For 
example, one of the central concepts of existentialism, 
'Alienation', was emphasized by the western traditions right 
from Hegel and Marx upto the present day, but in the Indian 
tradition of Pantheism it had no meaning, because alienation 
has been entirely inconceivable in the Hindu view of life 
which identified man with nature and God. Despite rigid cast 
system, howsoever alienated one may feel himself, the society 
in the Indian conditions was so structured that it absorbed 
everyone in its fold. This was what Kierkegaard termed in 
the 19th century European context as an all embracing pantheism 
. M ) 
of a social order. In all the three fields vlzj moral, 
political and psychological, where alienation has been discovered 
to raise its head, the experience of alienation itself jremained 
unrealized in our society and absolutely alien to our set-up. 
In morals the existentialist concept of alienation owes its 
origin to Christianity which has never been a vital part of 
our morality. In politics it owes its origin to the division 
of the capitalist society into bourgolesi and proletarian! 
and in so far its psychological content is concerned, the 
supreased class of Indian society was never allowed even to 
realize its own deprivity, for, they were denied even the 
right to know themselves and to contemplate. However, the 
voices of mystic thinkers and saints, particularly those who 
emerged from the lower strata of the Indian society, echo an 
intense feeling of alienation. In the Muslim tradition of 
literature and poetry, too, this experience was expressed. 
Ironically all these attempts ended up in an attempt to 
deallenate this tendency within the society through social 
reforms. The term as such may be a new one, but the problem, 
in one way or the other has been in every society. And the 
East is no exception. 
With the advent of large scale Industry and mass migration 
of rural 'not-haves' to the urban areas, alienation was expe-
rienced at different level in various groups. The process of 
westernization culminated in alienating Indian educated Hindu 
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and Muslim from their cultural roots and religious traditions. 
The partition of the sub-continent, in the wake of independence, 
caused millions of people to cross the new political borders, 
drenched in their own blood and to pass through a Jungle of 
dead corpses, devastated villages and crops, looted and 
burnt houses, and demolished worship places. These uprooted 
people, in millions, could not settle in their newly chosen 
and promised lands for years to come and even a considerable 
part of them is still called refugees or mahajirs. All these 
factors combined with the aftermath of the reorganization of 
the Western and Eastern states and the experience of the American 
and Russian imperialism, proved instinimental in further disillu-
sionment of the intellectuals in the sub-continent. Though in 
philosophy the thene of alienation, may seem to be based on 
an alien concept, in literature and arts it found expression 
as an aesthetic experience. 
Similarly, the sense of 'guilt supposed to be altogether 
absent in Indian conditions, may be traced, in one or the other 
form, in our literature. Undoubtedly the theories of original 
sin and guilt have their origin in Christianity but they have 
some affinities in Islamic mysticism as well as in Hinduism* 
In literature, some parallels may be drawn between the 
concepts common in existential literature and the literature 
of Indian languages, as Dr. Waheed Akhtar observes in his 
article^^ 
(Urdu Novel per Wujudiyyat ka Athart Aag Ka Darya (The River 
of Fire) Ka Tajziyyati mutaliah - The impact of existentialism 
on Urdu Novel: An analytical study of Aag Ka Darya - A novel 
by the most outstanding urdu novelist, Qurrat al-Ayn Hayder,). 
But it never implies that such parallels are identical with 
the contemporary western meaning of existentialism. The holy 
scriptures of the East may contain some elements of existen-
tialism, for religious experience is very close to what is 
called existential experience. All that is important in a 
work of religion is the human existence in relation to God. 
The problems faced by existential philosophy are not Divine 
problems, for God is absolute and perfect, and not in the 
process of creating Himself, On the contrary existentialism 
deals with the problems faced by man in his acts of free choice. 
Hence the thrust in religious scriptures is different from that 
of existential philosophy. 
We have perhaps reached the stage where it can be claimed 
that existentialism, as a philosophy, though the outcome of 
the most crucial contemporary events of the western part of 
the world,is basically an agonised cry against all the processes 
of dehumanization, crude objectivity, bad faith and alienation. 
However, it should not be accepted as a creed. (The ground 
for the emergence of existential thought was prepared by the 
two world warsi) and popularized by a literary movement in the 
rareguard of which were Sartre and Camus. Sartre, who actively 
participated in the Resistence Movement in France, and latter 
who raised his voice against all political injustices in 
various parts of the world, e.g. the Vietnam war and the 
freedom struggle of Algerian people, popularized this philosophy-
through his creative writings which are among the best literary-
products of our time. 
SARTRE'S 
CONCEPT OF 
BEING 
In all the traditional metaphysical theories the 
status of 'being* or 'existence' has been either compromised 
or totally neglected. To restore priority of 'being', Huaserl 
gave a call to go back to things themselves. Re ejecting the 
Kantian position that reality is hidden behind the appearance, 
Husserl maintains that it is the phexwmenon itself that one 
must look into to find the essence of that which is and that 
there is no reality which is hidden behind the appearance. 
Sartre finds this part of Husserl's phenomenological analysis 
as a sincere and serious attempt in bringing philosophy into 
real contact with the world, but rejects the role assigned 
to neosia and neoma. In Huaserlian thought system, neosis 
is the primary reality whereas neoma is dependent upon and 
secondary to neosis. The neoma or the object is the consti-
tution of the neosis, i.e. object is dependent upon the subject* 
The dependence of the object on the subject, according to 
Sartre, leads Husserl to the analysis of things as they appear 
.S8 
to human consciousness. Due to this approach» phenomenology 
becomes In the hands of Husaerl, a study of the structure of 
human consciousness Itself, The duality of subject and object, 
the phenomenon and the reality thereof Is, In Sartre's view, 
imaginary and consequently fatal to philosophy. At the very 
outset, in the first chapter of 'Being and Nothingness*. 
Sartre categorically rejects the traditional philosophical 
dichotomy of *being* and * appearance', according to which 
reality was divided into the interior and the exterior in the 
same existent. Saz*tre saysi 
"There is no longer an exterior for the 
existent if one means by that a super-
ficial covering which hides from sight 
the time nature of the object. ""^-'^  
"...It does not point over its shoulder 
to a true being which would be for it, 
absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, 
for it reveals Itself as it is."^ 
The traditional philosophies had maintained a kind of 
dualism of being and appearance to an extent that the appearance 
had been presented as a purely negative thing. Rejecting the 
concept of appearance as that which is not»belng, Sartre sees 
it as 'positivity'. He holds that "if we no longer believe in 
the being-behlnd-the-appearance, then the appearance becomes 
full positivityi its essence la an 'appearing* which is no 
longer opposed to being but on the contrary is the measure 
of it."^*^ 
'- ( 
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So what appears of an existent is exactly equivalent 
to its being, neither more nor less. It does not indicate 
some true being which would be, for it, absolute. It reveals 
itself as it is, it is absolutely whatever it is. 
With the same reasoning, Sartre re^ Jecta the Aristotelian 
doctrine of potential and Actual Reality and the dualism of 
appearance and essence* He holds that whatever is, is actual 
and behind the actual there is neither 'potential nor virtue*. 
Being is always actualized, whatever it is, it is actual. For 
example, Sartre holds, we should refuse to understand by 
genius a particular capacity to produce a certain work which 
could not be actualized in the life of a person. The genius 
of a person "is neither the work considered in isolation nor 
the subjective ability to produce itt it is the work considered 
as the totality of the manifestation of the person."' The 
essence is not hidden in appearance, essence is revealed in 
appearance. Essence is not a property "sunk in the cavity 
of an existent, "The phenomenological being manifests itselfj 
it manifests its essence as well as its existence and it is 
nothing but a well connected series of its manifestations."'^ 
This stand distinguishes Sartre's philosophy from that of 
Husserl. While Huaserl stressed upon human knowledge, Sartre 
emphasized human action. 
Description of human consciousness is the starting 
point of every phenomenology and self-identity is the core of 
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human consciousness. Husserl tried to solve the problem of 
self-identity on epistomological plane only. But Sartre holds 
that epistomological side is not the only feature of human 
consciousness. Without ignoring the importance of the episto-
mological features of human consciousness, Sartre upholds the 
importance of man's actions and reactions to different things 
and situations to which he finds confronted in the world. All 
the literary works of Sartre substantiate this view in concrete 
human characters acting in actual situations. Analysis of 
things as they appear to human consciousness, leads Sartre, as 
is the case of Husserl, to the study of human consciousness 
itself, which according to him can never reveal 'what man is*? 
Husserl laid aside the real existent world, hoping to re-establish 
it within the structure of consciousness. This resulted in the 
rejection of the real world. In one of the famous passage of 
Being and Nothingness. Sartre clearly says thatt 
"It is futile by a sleight of hand to 
attempt to found the reality of the 
objective on the subjective plentitude 
of impressions and its objectivity on 
non-being; the objective will never 
come out of the subjective, nor being 
from non-being," 
What Sartre wants to establish is that the notion of 
the dependence of the object upon the subject is an off-shoot 
of Husserl's phenomenological analysis. Though Heidegger 
stressed the mutual dependence of the subject and the object. 
Sartre turned the very thesis of Husserl upside down by-
advocating the dependence of the subject upon the object. 
And if the basic axiom of phenomenology, viz, 'consciousness 
is consciousness of something* is to be understood and 
explained in its true spirit, according to Sartre, "this 
means that transcendence is the constituting structure of 
consciousness, that is, that consciousness emerges supported 
41 by a being which is not itself." On the basis of this 
ontological proof, as Sartre calls it, *we have left pure 
appearance and have arrived at full being. Consciousness 
is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversly 
it is a consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its 
existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being. 
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Being is everywhere." Adding to Heidegger's definition 
of Dasein, viz. it is a being such that in its being, its 
being is in question, Sartre maintains that "consciousness is 
a being such that in its being, its being is in question 
4^ 5 insofar as this being implies a being other than Itself." -^  
This position necessitated the study of human conscious-
ness and its involvement in the objective world on the one hand, 
the results of which are found in his novels, particularly 
'Nausea' and 'Roads to Freedom*, on the other, it helped him 
to arrive at a definite and concrete explanation of being. 
"Being", he holds, "is/'. Being is in-itself. Being is what 
44 it is." Being is neither more nor less than that what it is. 
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Being can neither acquire nor produce nor does it have 
being because it is itself a being. Moreover, being is 
always whatever it is, it cannot be what it is not. 
Closely connected with this issue and equally signifi-
cant for the understanding of being is Sartre*s distinction 
between existence and essence. 
Existential philosophers may be, at least, placed into 
two general groupsi theists and atheists. While Kiericegaard, 
Jaspers and Marcel can legitimately be placed in the theistic 
group, Heidegger, Sartre and most of the Franch Existentialist 
philosophers can be grouped roughly and broadly as atheists. 
Not only the philosophers of these two groups differ on many 
points but within the same group also they differ on many 
points. However, inspite of these differences, all existen-
tialists accept that 'existence precedes essence*. This 
position is radically opixjsed to the Essentialistic view i.e. 
* essence precedes existence*. It was a revolt against the 
Platonic tradition of the Western philosophy that had maintained 
the primacy of universal ideas over particular existents. 
Nearly all the Western philosophies upto 20th century, in one 
way or the other, accepted the priority of general ideas over 
the individual existents. There were only a few exceptions 
like Kierkegaard and Marx, who anticipated the notion of the 
primacy of concrete existence over ideas* Essentialists were 
also in search of general concepts, universal categories and 
4:) 
definitions of every class of beings. 
Existential philosophers on the contrary, advocate the 
primacy of the individual, subjective, concrete existent over 
the general, objective essence. The main argument of existen-
tial philosophers is that it is individual existent from which 
a general concept is derived, it exists while a general concept, 
being a mental abstraction and construction,does not. 
Theistic philosophy maintains that 'each individual man 
is the realisation of a certain conception in the Divine under-
standing', and this concept which is realized in every man is 
his essence by which man can be defined. Sartre being an 
atheist, maintains that "if God does not exist, there is at 
least one being whose existence comes before it can be defined 
by any conception of it.^ Sartre says, 'that being is man', 
while Heidegger puts it as the 'human reality*. 
All existentialists, whether theists or atheists, hold 
that man can not be defined in terms of 'essence' or a fixed 
nature. Every individual man is an indefinable reality or 
rather an actuality. There can be no general definition of 
man. Psychological theories try to fit the human existence in 
the frame-work of a general theory. That is why most of the 
psychological schools fail to understand man. Only a being 
that is fully detnmined by its essence and the laws governing 
it can be defined and reduced to a general definition. Man 
'1-i 
Is undetermined actuality* Existentialist psychology should 
take every individual man as an independent reality. It is 
action through which human existence unfolds itself and 
realizes what it is not. Being-in-itself is grounded in 
freedom, and freedom is transcendence. It is on this under-
standing of man that Sartre says thati *man first of all 
exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines 
himself afterwards*. "Man", Sartre holds, "is not definable, 
it is because he is nothing. He will not be anything untill 
latterJ and then he will be what he makes of himself. Man is 
not what he conceives to be, but he is what he wills and makes 
of himself."^ 
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BEING-IH-ITSELP 
& 
BEING-FOR-ITSELF 
Sar t re d i s t i ngu i shes between two types of being, Being-
I n - l t s e l f and Be lng* lo r» i t se l f . A comparative ana lys is of 
these two f ace t s of being revea l t h a t v/hile b e l n g - i n - i t s e l f la 
I n v a r i a b l e , unchangeable and se l f contained, b e i n g - f o r - l t s e l f 
i s subject to change, has the a b i l i t y to evolve and possesses 
an unlimited and cease less movement. 
Though, according to Sartre, man is heing-lor^itaelf, 
yet i t also includes b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f , t ha t i s , a l l the b io log ica l 
cons t i t uen t s of human body. In t h i s respec t man i s not d i f fe ren t 
from other be ings , but h i s •be ing- fo r - l t se l f* i s cons t i tu ted by 
consciousness, freedom and t ranscendence. These t h r ee a r e , i n 
a sense , synonymous i n S a r t r e ' s philosophy. A pene t ra t ing 
analys is of these not ions i n S a r t r e ' s philosophy leads to the 
conclusion t h a t consciousness as wel l as freedom have t h e i r 
o r i g i n i n 'no th ing* | transcendence a lso means to be what i s not 
t ha t Is^ to r e a l i z e nothingness • 
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Throughout the 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre emphasizes 
tha t being-±n-itself i s , and whatever can be said about i t i s 
that i t simply ex i s t s . I t can never be anything other than 
what i t i s . I t i s the object of consciousness or 'ios-K^hoses' 
A7 as described in his "Nausea". "I t i s the transcendent essence 
of human existence, hence beyond the framework of space and time". 
I t has no within which i s opposed to a without. " I t has nothing 
secret , i t i s solid ( m a s s i f ) . " ^ "I t has no negationj i t i s fu l l 
pos i t i v i ty . I t i s i t s e l f indefini tely and i t exhausts i t s e l f in 
being."^ Being self contained and to t a l l y incapable of movement. 
I t i s ;)ust l ike a chess-board every part of which i s occupied. I t 
i s 'as fu l l as an egg*. "In the in - i t s e l f there i s not a par t i c le 
of being which i s not wholly within i t se l f without dis tance. Vlhen 
being i s thus conceived there i s not the s l igh tes t suspicion of 
dual i ty In i t . . . i t i s fullness.^' ' The i n - i t s e l f i s not only 
ident ical with I t se l f but la the complete and p lent i fu l being. 
Sartre puts i t in the following wordst 
"The i n - i t s e l f i s ful l of i t s e l f , and 
no more plentitude can be Imagined, 
no more perfect equivalence of content 
to container. There i s not the s l i g h t -
est emptiness in being, not the t i nes t 
crack through which nothingness might 
s l i p in , "5^ 
In comparison to belng-ln-i tself or nature which i s what 
i t i s , being-for- i tself or consciousness, according to Sartre, 
i s what i t i s not, and i s not what i t i s . Being-for- i tself i s 
a continuous process of negating i t s e l f — » a n ih i la t ion* . I t 
i s capable of change and evolution; i t questions i t s e l f arrl 
by th i s process of negation i t transcends i t s own being. Forever 
trying to f u l f i l i t s e l f , i t i s constantly trying to be what i t 
i s not and consequently negating what i t already i s . Therefore 
i t i s always i n the s t a t e of f l i gh t from i t s e l f . 
When Sartre says that 'Belng-for- i tse l f • or man i s what 
i t i s not and i s not what i t i s , he simply means that man i s not 
a *soldier* or a 'grocer' or a ' tai lor* or a 'Professor' i n the 
sense as a table i s a tab le , 'Soldier' or 'grocer' or ' t a i l o r ' 
or 'professor' i s the "person who I have to be and who I am n o t . , , 
i t i s a 'representation' for others and for myself which means 
that I can be he only in representation. But i f I r«present 
myself as him, I am not he} I am separated from him as the 
object from subject , separated by nothing, but t h i s nothing 
i so la te s me from him. I cannot be he, I can only play at being 
him| that i s , imagine to myself that I am he. And thereby 
affect him with nothingness, , , ,what I attempt to rea l ize i s a 
b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f of the cafe waiter,''•'^-' 
Be ing- for - l tae l f i s always In the persuit of Being-ln-
i t s e l f which i t never a t ta ins . Hence man i s never subjected to 
the principle of i d e n t i t y . I t i s a hallow^ an emptiness, a void 
which i s never f i l l e d , 
Being-for*i t8e l f , which according to Sartre, i s much 
akin to his concept of 'bad f a i t h ' , ^ e problem presented by 
4 c ) 
bad fa i th i s to expose the duali ty of the deceived and the 
deceiver existing within the same consciousness at one and 
the same time. For example, Sartre raises the question as to 
how is i t possible for a coward to acknowledge his cowardice 
and at the same time declare to be courageous* All such 
s i tua t ions , according to Sartr«, can be understood by postulating 
consciousness that i s *within i t s e l f , separated from i t s e l f . 
What happens i s tha t a person in order to perceive himself as 
a coward necessari ly effects n ih i la t ion . By the n ih i la t ion or 
negation of cowardice, the notion of courage evolves. So within 
the same consciousness, at one and the same time, both cowardice 
and courageousness exist<| That i s why Sartre defines the concept 
of being-for- i tse l f as something which •is what i t i s not 
(cowardly) and i s not what i t i s (courageous) or "is what i t i s 
not (homosexual) and i s not v^iat i t i s (non-homosexual). 
Therefore, in order to be one thing, consciousness, man or 
being or being-for- i tse l f , i t i s necessarily another and the 
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whole system i s Nothingness*" 
AB elaborated ea r l i e r , Being-in-i tself i s pure pos i t iv i ty i 
i t i s as ful l as an egg and has not a t race of negation* Being-
fo r - i t se l f , on the other hand, being not what i t i s , i s far 
from being as fu l l as an egg} i t i s a void to be f i l l ed which 
i s to proceed ceaselessly towards a future and i t i s the "being 
55 through which Nothingness comes into the world." j ^ Nothimrnei 
comes into the world with men. Similarly man^s tendency to 
f j 4:1 
question is also meant to negate. "The being by which 
Nothingness arrives in the world is a Being such that in its 
being, the Nothingness of its being is in question* The 
being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own 
Nothingness"-; Sartre holds that it is not a anihilating act 
of being but purely an ontological character of being. 
Sartre uses the concept of Nothingness for making a 
distinction between human consciousness and the world. The 
main function of conscJkouaness or pour-sol is to observe the 
things or *Ea-soi* and give meaning to them. This can be done 
only through selection. But selection necessarily involves 
detaching an object from other objects so as to give it a 
meaning. For example, if I say there is 'piere*, my conscious-
ness distinguishes *piere* from other people who constitute 
the *en-soi'• In this process our consciousness anihilates and 
nulifies rest of the en-sol or in other words while giving 
meaning to plere, existence is denied to everything else which 
then becomes Nothingness. This, whole process is called by 
Sartre *Negatities*. 
The whole process of Nothingness or Negatities is an 
human endeavour. Sartre has already told us that Nothingness 
comes into the world through human being. And this being, as 
we know, is what it is not and is not what it is| hence it 
remains always in the process of becoming. Human existence 
T)!) 
never coincides with himselfj It Is always following the 
* en-sol*« full of negation, an empty vessel, ever questioning 
and negating Itself? a void projected towards future. As a 
conclusion it can be said that while belng-ln-ltself Implies 
passivity, belng*for-ltself Implies activity and creativity, 
and the main function of Nothingness is to select and render 
meaning to things, which constitute being-in-ltself, 
O A 
BAD FAITH 
AND 
THE SERIOUS WORLD 
Sartre*a diacuasion of bad faith follows from hia 
definition of man which is baaed on the premise that conscious-
ness is a process of continued negation, a nihilation. Man, 
for Sartre, is the being who is what he is not and who is not 
what he is. He is freedom and freedom is nothingness. Man, 
Sartre holds, must actualize nothingness In order to transcend 
his being. He must recognize that he alone evolves the values 
by which he lives* He is not provided with a ready made self 
or nat\ire but rather must be constantly making himself. He 
is nothing! he is always to be whatever he chooses because in 
him existence always precedes essence. 
The realization that he is empty not only within but 
also without, the realization that all the values he lives 
by and the projects and projxiaals of hia life are sustained 
by his free choice, places a great burden on him. He has 
to accept the sole responsibility of his life. Prom this 
responsibility no one can save him, neither Ck>d nor others. 
rui 
He is his own fate. He, therefore, tries to flee, to escape 
from this burden. He takes refuge in a world where he imagines 
his life and actions are determined and guaranteed by others; 
he imagines to be a being "whose reality does not have the 
slightest trace of nothingness and whose being is identical 
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with itself.""^  Whether it is Gk>d, nature or transcendental 
society, he thinks, "the order of things is absolute. It 
CO 
is a serious world." This attitude of consciousness, "which 
is essential to human reality and which is such that conscious-
ness instead of directing its negation outward turns it towards 
itselfp^^ is, for Sartre 'bad faith* (mauvaise fol). 
This mode of Dasein is called by Heidegger 'Being-in« 
the-world* or "Day-to-day-Being". It is inauthentic. Inauthen-
ticity is an attanpt to flee from oneself. Its mode of 
operation is bad faith in Sartre's terminology. 
Han, for Sartr«, comprehends the serious world by bad 
faith. He contrasts this spirit of seriousness with a lighter 
attitude of one playing a game. The rules of the game are already 
prescribed and the player is bound to abide them, no matter 
how serious the stacks be. But there is always the possibility 
of change of rules. There is also the possibility of initiating 
an entirely different game if one so chooses. For Sartre, 
every life is exactly similar to a game, because everyman has 
to make it himself. Nan has to play the game of life according 
to the book of rules, but such a book is not handy. 
r/d 
Serious world, on the other hand, is absolutely opposite 
to that of playing a game. In this world, no doubt the rules 
are also Inveftted but there is absolutely no possibility of any 
change in them. Each and every rule and regulation is predetei^-
mined. Man tries to escape into such a world by bad faith. 
Such a description of bad faith is tantamount to false-
hood or lying to oneself or in other words it is a sort of 
mechanism of escape. But Sartre allows that "bad faith is a 
60 lie to oneself.," only. It should neither be identified with 
lie n»r with falsehood. "Bad faith is self-deception. It is 
a lie to oneself"• Sartre defends this position on the proviso 
that lying to oneself is distinguished from lying in general 
or falsehood. 
Sartre agrees that lie is a negative attitude "but 
this negation does not bear on consciousness itself, it aims 
only at the transcendent"? The essence of the lie is that 
the liar is actually and completely in possession of the truth 
which he is hiding. One cannot lie about what he is ignorant 
of. "The ideal description of the liar would be a cynical 
consciousness, affirming truth within himself, denying it in 
6^ his words, and denying that negation as such".-^  In lying, 
therefore, the transcendency of consciousness remains unaffected 
and negation doe» not touch the inner structure of consciousness"? 
In other words the object of lie is transcendent | it is always 
outside consciousness. The liar intends to deceive the other 
ryi 
and does not seek to hide hla intentions from himself* Even 
when he says "I vrould never want to deceive you| this is truei 
I swear lt| all this of course, Is the object of an Inner 
negation, but also It is not recognized by the liar as his 
Intention, It is played, initiated, it is the intention of 
the character which he plays... but this character, precisely 
65 because he does not exist, is a transcendent".^ "Through the 
lie, consciousness affirms its existence as hidden from the 
other, and exploits for its own ends the ontologlcal duality 
between myself and myself viewed from the : eyes of the other." 
On the other hand "one who practices bad faith is hiding 
a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruthS ' 
In appearance, bad faith, then has the structure of falsehood 
but there is a marked difference between the two attitudes* 
In bad faith, the duality of the deceiver and the deceived 
does not exist^while in falsehood it exists. Bad faith entails 
the unity of a single consciousness| there is no ontologlcal 
duality between the deceiver and the deceived. The one who 
lies and the one to whom the lie is told are one and the same 
consciousness. What Sartre wants to point out is the fact 
that in bad faith the deceiver, in his capacity of the deceiver, 
knows the truth which is hidden from him in the capacity of 
the one as deceived. 
i) 
PATTERNS 
OP 
BAD FAITH 
In Sartre*a analysis, man was and is, in tvro modes of 
being. He was in the manner of Being-in»itsell| he is in 
the mode of Being-for-itself so far as his present and future 
are concerned. His past action was an event or object in 
the world. For example, if a man has stolen or has behaved 
like a coward, then he was a thief or a coward Just as the 
table was a table or the tree was a tree. But in the mode of 
Being-for-itself, i.e. so far as his present and future are 
concerned, we cannot say that he is a thief or a coward? for 
it depends upon hito to choose whether to be a thief or not 
in present or future. Therefore, man in Sartre's analysis 
has the being-in-itself of things in the world, but at the 
same time he is not that which he chooses to make himself. 
This vaacillating structure of Being makes it easy for the 
man in bad faith to deceive himself by a 'metaphysical play 
of words*. 
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But then what must be the being of man if he is 
capable of being in bad faith? Sartre tries to fix up more 
exactly the condition for the possibility of bad faith in 
•the patterns of bad faith'. 
Sartre's phenomenological description of the erotic 
behaviour of a coquettish woman appears to give him a basic 
insight into the mechanism of bad faith. In this typical but 
amusing example when a women cons, ents to go out with a 
particular man for the first time, she understand?very well 
the intentions, which the man who is seeking her company 
cherishes regarding herf she does not want to read the real 
meaning of phrases addressed to her, like 'you look very 
charming*, 'I find you so attractive* etc. She decides to 
take these phrases on their face value as merely respectful 
or admiring. Since she does not quite know what she wants, 
she sees only the explicit meaning of his utterances and 
completely strips them of their sexual beckground. She takes 
the utterances of her friend as objective and sincere as a 
'table is round* or *the wall colouring is blue or grey'. 
Since she wishes neither to commit herself to the future nor 
to remove all the possibility of any involvement; she gives 
everything the quality of being-in-itself. She is well aware 
of the desire she invokes in her companion "but the desire 
cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her." She does 
n^ altogether want to get rid ot that desire nor is she 
satisfied by the mere respect offered to her. To satisfy her. 
there must be a feeling which is addressed wholly to her 
personality, i.e. to her full freedom. But at the same time 
this feeling must be wholly a desire; that is, it must address 
itself to her as object. The woman is clearly in two minds> 
she wants not only her freedom be respected but also the charm 
and beauty of her body be appreciated. But then suddenly 
her companion grasps her hand because he is unwilling to leave 
the things as they are. Grasping of hand is to force a 
decision, i.e. to change the situation. Now it is a very 
crucial moment for the woman. Leaving the hands in the warm 
hands of her companion implies to consent in herself to 
flirt, to engage herself| which she does not want. Tto withdraw 
it is *to break the troubled and unstable harmony which makes 
the hour charmful'. In the conflict of decision, the young 
lady leaves her hand there. But she does not notice it, 
because as it happens, by chance, she becomes at this moment, 
all intellect. She draws her companion upto the most lofty 
regions of sentimental speculations. She speaks of life, of 
her life, she shows herself in her essential aspect a^ 
personality, a consciousness. And during this time the 
divorce of the body from the soul is accom]()lished| the hand 
i^sts inert between the warm hands of her companion-neither 
go 
consenting nor resisting——a thing." ^ 
Sartre holds that this woman is in bad faith. She 
used various procedures to maintain herself in bad faith. 
r • ' 
She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing 
them to being only what they arej that is, to existing in 
the mode of in-ltself. She is actually playing a game, Just 
like the game of sea->8aw. She plays one idea against negation 
thereof and vice-versa. 
The human being, for Sartre, is at once a facticity 
and a transcendence, i«e* given and possible projects asso-
ciated with his freedom. To her advantage, the woman uses 
this double property of human reality. Though aware of the 
first approach, i.e. facticity, she uses the second approach 
i.e. transcendence. i^ She is aware of the desire she evokes 
but purifies it of anything humiliating by acknowledging it 
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only as pure transcendence." While attempting to transform 
facticity into transcendence and vice-versa, she feels that 
she is escaping all reproaches. "But she does so at the 
price of arresting of glueing down, of thingifying, her 
71 possibilitiea—of objectifying her transcending freedom."' 
In one of the famous passages of *Being and Nothingness*. 
Sartre saysi 
"The basic concept which is thus engendered 
utilizes the double property of the human 
being, who is at once a facticity and a 
transcendence. These two aspects of human 
reality are and ought to be capable of a 
valid coordination. But bad faith does not 
wish either to coordinate them or to 
surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith 
!"j- • ^ 
seeks to affirm their identity while 
preserving their differences. It must 
affirm facticity as being transcendence 
and transcendence as being facticity, in 
such a way that at the instant when a 
person apprehends the one, he can find 
72 himself abruptly faced with the other."' 
No doubt this 'facticity-transcendence' character of 
human reality serves to illuminate what Sartre intends by 
bad faith but it does not eliminate . his dilemma concerning 
it. Because inspite of the facticity-transcendence character 
of human reality, »«consciousness affects itself with bad 
faith. As a consequence, consciousness must be aware of 
its intention of hiding truth from itself. 
However, Sartre's factlcity-transcendence relation 
of human reality draws us back to his initial distinction 
between 'Being-in-itself• and *Being-for-itself•. For Sartre 
Belng-for-itself is a distinctive human reality, •which is 
what it is not and which is not vAiat it is' • Unlike Being-
in-itself, Being-for-itself is not a 'what* or object or thing, 
That is to say it is not what it is, it lacks identity or 
7/1 
"a certain coincidence with itself." It has no nature or 
fixed essence. On the other hand it is what it is not; its 
future is undetermined. Ito say it differently, the being of 
human reality is not what it is and is what it is not because 
it is frea* 
Cv 
Understanding the connection between the 'Being-in-
itself and Being-»for"itaelf' and the 'Pacticity-transcendence 
character of human reality* is essential to throw some more 
light on the concept of bad faith. Assuming its possibility, 
bad faith cannot affirm facticity as being transcendence and 
transcendence as being facticity, unless human reality were a 
being, that ia^  what it is not and which is not what it is. 
Unless within the human reality there were the possibility 
of free interplay between what it is and what it is not, the 
game of facticity-»transcendence could not be possible. 
Precisely it is so, as Sartre advocates, there is already a 
•built in tension* between *what it is* and 'what it is not* 
of the human reality| because human being as *Being»for-itself* 
exists *at a distance from itself*, that it can move freely 
between facticity and transcendence. 
With this elaboration it can be inferred that the 
woman referred to in the example 'is what she is not* and 
*is not what she is*. She has the possibility of being 
complete intellect when infact she is being advanced otherwise, 
i.e. to sexuality. In the situation that is provided to her, 
she shifts to what she is not or transcendence. But still 
she is in bad faith, because she cannot be *all intellect* in 
the manner that an •inkwell is an inkwell*. She is a being 
who is not what she is and is what she is not; she is free 
i > . 
though without I d e n t i t y . That i s why Sa r t r e says t h a t "the 
condi t ion of the p o s s i b i l i t y for bad f a i t h , i n i t s most 
immediate being, i n the I n t r a - s t r u c t u r e of the p r e - r e f l e c t i v e 
c o g i t o , must be what i t i s not and not be what i t i s . " ' ^ I t 
implies tha t i f man i s what he i s , bad f a i t h i s forever 
impossible , "Bad f a i t h requ i res tha t t he re be an Imponderable 
d i f fe rence separa t ing being from non«-being i n the mode of 
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being of human r e a l i t y . " ' The in terchange between t ranscen-
dence and f a c t i c i t y could not be attempted i f the human r e a l i t y 
were not so c o n s t i t u t e d . 
Though t h i s metastable concept of t ranscendence-
f a c t i c i t y i s one of the bas ic inst ruments of bad f a i t h , i t 
i s not the only one of i t s k ind. "Another d u p l i c i t y " , according 
to S a r t r e , "derived from human r e a l i t y i s to regard be ing-for-
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i t s e l f as complementary to B e i n g - f o r - o t h e r s . " ' ' The woman 
specif ied i n the example has also used t h i s dev ice . She 
considers herse l f to be a"being- in- the-mids t -of - the-wor ld , i . e . 
of our i n e r t presence as a passive ob jec t among other o b j e c t s -
i n order to r e l i e v e hersel f suddenly from the functions of her 
be ing- in- the-wor ld , t ha t i s , from the being which causes there 
to be a world by pro jec t ing i t s e l f beyond the world towards i t s 
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own p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " 
Such an a t t i t u d e , which i s a c t u a l l y the a t t i t u d e of 
bad f a i t h makes a very confusing s y n t h ^ s i i by saying a t once 
tha t *I am what I have beati* and t h a t *I am not what I have 
been*. Since S a r t r e ' s basic concept of human r e a l i t y i s that 
Subject to sudden change. 
( . : 
of a being which is what it is not and which is not what it 
is, he proceeds to analyse the more subtler structure of bad 
faith, viz. the persuit of sincerity. 
Sincerity which seems to be the antithesis of bad faith 
7Q 
demands that "a man be for himself only what he is"«'^ In 
other words sincerity is a sort of determination to be for 
oneself and for others to be what one really is. But this 
is precisely the definition of being*in-itself• Man cannot be 
what he is in the manner of the being«in-itself• This implies 
that the concept of sincerity cannot represent the constitutive 
principle of human reality because human ideality cannot be, 
in Sartre's system of thought, what it is, it must be able 
to be what it is not. 
It therefore, follows that if man is what he is, bad 
faith is impossible for ever and the project of sincerity 
ceases to be his ideal; it rather becomes his being. But man 
is not what he is because how can he be what he is, when he 
exists as consciousness of being. If sincerity is a universal 
concept, then its definition "one must be what one is" cannot 
be the regulating principle for the judgements and concepts 
through which we express what we are. It is not an ideal of 
knowing but the ideal of being; it is an absolute equivalence 
of being with Itself as the prototype of being. In this aense 
it is necessary that we make ourselves what we are, "But 
(M'I 
what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make 
ourselves what we are, if our mode of being is having the 
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obligation to be what we are?" Sartre illustrates his 
point with the example of a cafe waiter. The cafe waiter 
tries to reduce himself to a being-in-itself of the cafe 
waiter. He is playing as being a waiter in a cafe. He is 
playing his role in order to realize it. Simultaneously, 
from within, the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a 
cafe waiter in the sense that *this glass is a glass*. It 
does not, however, follow that he cannot form the "reflective 
Judgements or concepts" regarding his condition. But all his 
judgements and concepts refer to the •transcendent—they are 
the matter of abstract possibilities'. "And it is precisely 
this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter in question) 
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and who I am not." It is not that he does not wish to be 
this person but rather there la no common measure between his 
being and mine. It is a representation for others and for 
myself which means that I can be he only in representation. 
Sartre sayst 
"But if I represent myself as him, I am 
not hef I am separated from him as the 
object from the subject, separated by 
nothing, but this nothing isolates 
me from him. I can not be he, I can 
only play at being him» that is, imagine 
to myself that I am he. And thereby I 
affect him with nothingness. In vain do 
I f u l f i l l the functions of a cafe w a i t e r . 
I can be he only i n the neu t ra l i zed mode, 
as the ac tor i s Hamle t , . , what I attempt 
to r e a l i z e i s a b e l n g - l n - i t s e l f of the 
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cafe w a i t e r . " 
Sai'tre, therefore, maintains that the cafe waiter is 
in bad faith because he has ignored his transcendence in the 
face of his facticity. The example furnished and analysed 
by Sartre is highly significant, because it brings out 
clearly the two roles of human existence i.e. its facticity 
and transcendence. 
Sartre illustrates his point yet by another example, 
viz. that of a confidential meeting of a homosexual and 
his friend. The homosexual, in this example, suffers from 
a feeling of guilt that he absolutely denies of being a 
'paederast*. Since he has not choosen a life as such, he 
declares that *He is not really a paederast"^ even though 
he admits to having indulged^on occasion, in homosexual 
relations. Sartre says "his case is always 'different*, 
'peculiar*! there enters into it something of a game, of 
chance, of bad luckf the mistakes are all in the pa,st|... 
Here is assuredly a man in bad faith who borders on the comic, 
since, acknowledging all the facts which are imputed to him, 
he refuses to draw from them the conclusion which they 
impose." ^  
(.:'> 
The * homosexual* in th i s example i s nothing different 
from the *cafe waiter* or the *young lady* of the previous 
example. They are a l l in bad f a i t h . All the three v iz , the 
young lady, the cafe waiter and the homosexual, are absolutely 
r ight in choosing to think of themselves only in terms of 
the i r freedom. Homosexual, in the above example, i s right 
in holding that he i s not a homosexual absolutely in the 
way that , th is table i s a table ; implying thereby that the 
established pat terns of conduct cannot define a man*a essence. 
But the homosexual i s absolutely wrong in applying th i s freedom 
with respect to h i s past a c t i v i t i e s , Sartre holds that i n so 
far as he has committed these acta in the past , he i s a 
'paederast ' because he cannot disown the responsibi l i ty of what 
he has done but he cannot be said to be 'paederast* in any 
absolute sense, that is^ ^ .".with respect to his present and 
future. What the homosexual i s trying to do i s to use simul-
taneously and dishonestly the two meanings of *to be*, "He 
understands *not»being* in the aenae of 'not-being-ln- i tself *, 
He lays claim to 'not being a paederast* in the sense in which 
th i s table i s a t ab l e . He i s in bad f a i t h , " °^ 
What makes the argument in teres t ing i s the fact that 
homosexual's friend urges him to be s incere , implying to 
accept to be a paederast in the absolute sense of the term. 
To admit to be a paederast i s , to his f r iend ' s mind, s incer i ty . 
But Sartre holds tha t the argument of the homosexual's friend 
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becomes as avenue to bad f a i t h . Because he wants his friend 
to admit to be a homosexual in the sense that t h i s table i s 
a t ab le . To Sartre» so far as his past actions are concerned, 
he must be sincere i . e . he must admit to be a paederast and 
that i s good fa i th but in so far as his present and future are 
concerned his s incer i ty f a l l s pray to bad f a i t h . Hazel E.Barnes 
however, observes that "with regard to the present, s incer i ty 
i s in good fa i th in so far as one describes his projects as 
they actually seem to him to be rather than as he merely 
desires another to see him. But i f a person makes himself 
the project of being which he i s , th i s i s not s incer i ty but 
bad fai th ."^5 
This poiht wi l l however, become clear if we see what 
i s the goal of since*'ity and that of the bad f a i th . For 
Sar t re , the goal of s incer i ty and the goal of bad fa i th are 
not so di f ferent . With regard to past if one admits what one 
had been, i t i s s ince r i ty . I t i s because in his f a l l into 
the pas t , the being of man i s constituted as a being-in- i tse l f . 
The goal of s incer i ty , in so far as i t aims at i t s e l f in 
'present iraraenance*, i s to confess what one rea l ly i s , so that 
he may f ina l ly coincide with his being i . e . to be, in the mode 
of be ing- in- i t se l f , "what I am in the mode of not being what 
86 I am." I t s fundamental assumption i s that I am already, in 
the mode of the in*i tse l f , what I have to be. "Thus we find 
at the base of s incer i ty a continual game of mirror and 
' I I 
reflection, a perpetual passage from the being vrtiich is •what 
it is to the being which is not what it is and inversly fzrom 
the being which is not \*iat it is to the being which is what 
87 it is." ' And when we examine the goal of bad faith we find 
that its aim is to cause me not to be what I am, in the mode 
of 'being what one is*, or to be what I am in the mode of 
'not being what one is*. Thus we find at the base of bad faith 
the same game of mirror and reflection as was dectected in 
sincerity. And in fact. In order for me to have an intention 
of sincerity, I must at thejoutset simultaneously be and not be 
what I am. Sincerity does not assign a particular quality but 
it iams at making me pass from one mode of being to another in 
relation to that quality. "The second mode of being, the 
ideal of sincerity, I am prevented by nature from attaining; 
and at the moment when I struggle to attain it, I have a 
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vague preJudicative comprehension that I shal l not a t ta in i t . " 
This implies that bad fa i th i s possible only because sinceri ty 
i s conscious of missing i t s goal inevi tably, due to i t s very 
nature. That i s why Sartre maintains that " . . . i n order for 
bad fa i th to be possible, s incer i ty i t s e l f must be in bad f a i t h . 
The condition of the poss ib i l i ty for bad fa i th i s that human 
r e a l i t y , in i t s most immediate being, in the Intrastructure 
of the pre-ref lect ive cogito, must be what i t i s not and not 
be %rtiat i t ia."®^ 
Sartre* concludes his discussion of bad fa i th on the 
• fa i th of bad f a i t h ' . He holds that if bad fa i th i s a belief 
then the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of 
belief. The •waltanschauung' of bad faith is that "it 
believes Itself and does not believe itself in bad faith, 
it believes itself and does not believe itself in good 
faith. " ^ 
The criterion of truth held by bad lalth is totally 
different from that of good faith. For bad faith, truth 
is only a "method of thinking, a type of being which is like 
that of objects, the ontological characteristic of the world 
of bad faith is thati that here being is what it is not and 
91 is not what it is." It is a sort of »non-persuasive 
evidence*. It apprehends evidence but rejects it in advance so 
as not to be persuaded and transformed into good faith. This 
•original project* of bad faith is a decision in bad faith 
on the nature of faith. Sartre says that in bad faith 
"...there is no question of a reflective, voluntary decision, 
but of a spontaneous deternfination of our being. One puts 
oneself in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad 
faith as one dreams. Once this mode of being has been realized, 
it is as difficult to get out of it as to wake oneself 
up I bad faith is a type of being in the world, like walking 
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or dreaming, which by i t s e l f tends to prepetuate i t s e l f . " ' ' 
Since there is an i n i t i a l decision not to make a 
decision and i t s critftrion i s not that of the good f a i t h , 
bad fai th i s resigned in advance not to be transformed Into 
(>[^ 
good faith. And the conclusion that can be derived from it 
is that bad . faith is a constant threat to for-itself or 
consciousness» which is an unavoidable menace* Sartre 
accordingly maintainsi 
"If bad faith is possible^ itjls because 
it is an immediate, permanent threat to 
every project of the human being, it is 
because consctousneas conceals in its 
being a permanent risk of bad faith. The 
origin of this risk is the fact that the 
nature of consciousness simultaneously is 
to be what it is not and not to be what 
it is."^' 
Being an immediate and per*nanent threat to every human 
project, bad faith becomes the most common theme of Sartre's 
literary viorks. The analysis of any of the literary works of 
Sartre is beyond the scope of this work, hence a passing 
reference to them should suffice. 
While discussing the various existential concepts like 
freedom, subjectivity, choice, anguish, obscene, prejudice, 
human relations, historical situation, religion, politics etc. 
throughout his plays and novels, bad faith remains a persistent 
theme, 'coiled like a worm-* at the heart of being, Lucin 
04 Fleuruer of "The Childhood of a Boss"^^ is a perfect and 
penetrating study of a man in bad faith. While "Anti Semite 
OR 
and Jev*^ "^  la a study of bad faith in prejudice, "Lucifer and 
the Lord" and "The Flies"^ are the most illuminating examples 
of bad faith in religion, Sartre's triology, "The Roads to 
97 Freedom"» represents a vast panorama of characters of the 
world-war affected individuals acting in bad faith. 
What Sartre establishes in his 'Being and Nothingness' 
is artistically exemplified in his novels and plays in concrete 
form in actual situations. That all the human relations are 
exercises in bad faith is established by the fact that all 
these relations are debased by their internal negation and 
that a tragic failure is inherent in their very structure. 
That is why almost all the characters of his novels and plays 
have finally chosen to live in bad faithr—the only possibility 
if one chooses to exist. 
Barness E, Hanzel is however of the view that "Man can 
live without illusion... The discovery of freedom is also 
the discovery of future. And to discover a future means to 
98 determine a future."^ If one accepts this view, then not 
only have we to reject the very notion of bad faith but also 
the entire ontology of Sartre. If the discovery of future 
implies determination of future, then being will always remain 
at the stage of Being-in-itself with no possibility of its 
prdjectlon in Being-for-itself, The discovery of freedom is 
possible in the state of authentic existence only. If 
attained, it does not stay for more than a moment. It is, 
however, in these moments that man can live without illusions. 
For rest of the life, according to Sartre, being exists only 
( JL 
i n bad f a i t h . If one has to exist one cannot avoid bad 
fa i th . 
The views similar to tha t of Hazel are equally unjus t i -
fiable from Sartr ian view-point. The claim of any thinker 
that "if man is able to recognize and accept the rea l i ty of 
his being, i t i s possible to consider human conduct based on 
good fa i th" , i s merely an i l l u s i o n . This i s because 
'recognizing and accepting the rea l i ty of one's being' i s not 
a logical process—~it has an ex i s t en t i a l import, which has 
a depth significance of rea l iz ing and feeling and not of 
recognizing and accepting, the r e a l i t y of one's being. Moreover, 
Sar t re ' s footnote statement i» 'Being and Nothingness' that 
"these considerations do not exclude the poss ib i l i ty of an 
ethics of deliverance and salvation" i s made in a different 
context, not supporting the views that advocate for the possi-
b i l i ty of good f a i t h . 
SARTRE»S 
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 
Psycho-analysis is a method of applied Investigation 
as well as a technique. Both theorltlcally and practically 
It influenced almost all the disciplines of knowledge and 
areas of human activity. It was natural requirement of the 
late 19th century individual's alienation aa a result of 
accelerated transition from a life of *Gemeinachaft' to 
*Gesellchaft'. Gemeinschaft, a social unit, is a conscious 
and deleberate design of unity, inapite of occasional separate-
nesB, and Geaellachaft signifies separation, Insplte of 
occasional unity. Notwithstanding the physical presence of 
parent or parents, the Increasing number of fatherless or 
motherless children was an indication of the total alienation 
of man. All the rational philosophers from Descartes to 
Kant were being challenged by this unique phenomenon. Pheno-
menology and Existentialism were gathering momentum. The 
technological involution, which was in the offing at the turn 
of the century, was not the only factor responsible for 
t h i s change but the pre-war individual existence, which 
was at the cross roads of *to be or not to be' was 
equally responsible for evolving a technique to probe into 
human psyche. 
Sigmund Fntud, mediciner turned psychologist, i s 
considered to be the pioneer of psycho-analysis. Himself, 
he wri tes , "Psycho-analysis i s my creation; I was for ten 
years the only person who concerned himself with it. ' '^^^ 
Broadly speaking psycho-analysis has two parts v iz , psycho-
analjrsis as an invest igat ing tool and psycho-analysis a 
therapy. Fr^ Md was bas ical ly an invest igator but l a t t e r 
he switched over to therapy and worked over i t so as to 
bring a revolution in the whole f ie ld of psychological 
treatment of human beings. 
Existential psycho-analysis can also be considered 
as consisting of an investigating tool as well as a therapy. 
Sartre i s of the opinion that ex is ten t ia l psycho-analysis 
as therapy has not evolved as yet . "This psycho-analysis 
has not found i t s Fr^Ujd". ""^ This might have been true in 1943 
when Being and Nothingness was written but after f i f t i e s a 
lo t of work has been done in exis tent ia l psycho-analysis 
par t icular ly by Binswanger and M.Boss usually known as 
exis tent ia l psycha t r i s t s . In his exis tent ia l psycho-analysis 
Binswanger gives a profound "synthesis of psycho-analysis, 
phenomenology and ex i s ten t ia l concepts modified by original 
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ins igh t . " Boss, staunch follower of Heidegger, In his 
Daseinsanalytic re-evaluation of psycho-analytic therapy 
and theory shows the i r " in t r ins ic harmony and the impact 
of Daseinaanalysis on t r ad i t iona l psycho-analytic techniques." 
However, ex is ten t ia l psycho-analysis used as an investigating 
tool or as a therapy cannot be conceived without Fr«ud as 
i t s predecessor, if not i t s founder. Whether Sartre accepts 
i t or not i s of l i t t l e Importance because insp l te of cer tain 
points of disagreement on many points they agree in t o t o . 
A brief exposition of the points on which they agree or 
disagree wil l be given here, as a perface to the ex i s t en t i a l -
psycho-analys i s , 
The point of departure of a l l the psycho-analysis, 
t r ad i t iona l or modern, i s man. The t rad i t iona l psycho-analysis 
par t icu lar ly behaviourists , had explained the human conduct 
as a mere response to s t imul i . Sartre agrees with Preud in 
holding man to be a unified whole rather than an arithmetical 
sum. Sartre maintains "The principle of t h i s psycho-analysis 
i s that man i s a t o t a l i t y and not a co l lec t ion ." Now i f 
man i s a t o t a l i t y then he expresses himself as a whole even 
in his *most Insignificant and most superf ic ia l behaviour.' 
All actions of a man are revealing only when related to one's 
basic outlook of l i f e . Therefore, the goal of exis tent ia l 
psycho-analysis i s mainly ' t o decipher' and explain the 
'empirical behaviour patterns of man'. For example, most 
of the people ignore or do not understand cer ta in gestures 
or a s ign or a word. The •revelations* even i f seemingly 
non-senaical, have meaning and can be deciphered if the man 
1?* question i s considered i n h is t o t a l i t y . But, "the truth" 
Sartre holds, "is not encountered by chance, i t belongs a 
priori to human comprehension and the essent ia l task i s an 
hermeneutic, that i s , a dec.phering, a determination, and 
a eonoeptualizatioa. "^ ^^ ' 
Hence the s tart ing point of Sartre's ex i s t ent ia l psycho-
analysis i s experience i . e . .•px»e<«K>ntological comprehension 
which man has of the hxaman person* • But the behaviour, conduct, 
s ign or gesture or the revelat ions of a person are symbolized 
i n a x)eculiar manner by h i s own choice . At the same time each 
individual disguises his choice under occasional character 
of choice and i t s h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . So comparison i s 
the only method to understand these revelations which men 
express in different ways. 
Sartre agrees with Freud on the basic principle that 
"all object ively discernible manifestations of •psychic-l ife* 
maintain a symbolic re lat ion to the fundamental to ta l structure 
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which constitutes the individual person." Both of them 
z*efuse to accept what Sartre refers to as 'primary givens* 
the great explanatory idols of our time viz. heredity, character, 
environment etc. Existential psycho-analysis refuses to 
recognize anything 'before the original upsurge of human 
freedom.' The Freudian libdo is also a virgin wax before 
the history of an individual i s known. For both i t la as 
incorrect to imagine a man born with ready-made disposit ion 
as i t i s incorrect to conceive him to be manipulated mechani-
ca l ly by forces of nature or society. 
Qnplrlcal psycho-analysis (as Sartre ca l l s i t ) as well 
as ex i s ten t ia l psycho-analysis "consider the human being a 
perpetual , searching h is tor iza t lon*. ^Whlle analyzing such 
a being, ex is ten t ia l psycho-analysis does not uncover the 
s t a t i c and constant givens i#e« heredity and character etc.^ 
i t discovers the meaning, or ienta t ion and adventures of 
( individual ' s ) h is tory . Both the methods analysis do not 
consider man to be simply present in the world without any 
l inks but take into account the t o t a l s i tua t ion in which the 
man i s h i s to r i ca l ly placed. Each *his tor ical fact* i s 
considered at once as a factor of the psychic evolution and 
as a symbol of that evolution. 
Within an existing s i tua t ion both the analyses search 
for a fundamental a t t i tude which Is beyond the simple and 
logica l def in i t ions . I t i s because th i s a t t i tude i s basically 
pr ior to a l l logic, hence i t required a reconstruction according 
to the laws of specific synthesis . Freud ca l l s th is search 
for the fundamental a t t i tude 'complex* and Sartre ca l l s i t 
•original choice*• 
Both these psycho-analyses refuse to admit that "the 
subject i s in a privileged posit ion to prodeed in these 
11D 
inquires concerning himself ." ' '^ The pat ient i s not to be 
believed on his own account of himself. S t r i c t objective 
methods using documentary evidence are required by both the 
analyses. Freud believes that the pat ient l i e s continuously 
without being aware of i t because he i s hindered by deter-
minant unconscious motivations. Sartre re jec t s the unconscious 
psyche of Freud since i t escapes the i n tu i t i on of the subject. 
He makes the psychic act co-extensive with consciousjjess. 
Vfhatever may be the differences between Sartre and 
Freud on the existence or no-existence of unconscious psyche» 
the nearest equivalent of Freudian unconscious psyche i s 
the concept of »bad faith* in Sar t re . Bad f a i th is the 
inauthentic eaiistence of man whose opposite, Sartre c a l l s , 
'Project of Sincerity* and that i s au thent ic i ty . Just as 
according to Freud, man i s hiddered by 'determinent unconscious 
motivation', hence continually l i e ing without being aware of 
i t , s imilar ly , in Sar t re ' s view i t i s too d i f f icu l t to escape 
•bad faith* and establ ish authentici ty or the project of 
s incer i ty . In fact , "authenticity i s one's capacity to hear 
the cry of his inner most being in the s t i l l n e s s of his 
soli tudeI i t wells forth from the depths of man's consciousness 
Just l ike true love. The moments of authent ic i ty are usually 
limited and in such moments one may even weep.. . but the tears 
111 he sheds are f i t for purifying the angels*" So unless 
the pat ient reaches such a level of h is j^Afiignce or conscious-
neas, he cannot be believed to be rev^jlrtingTli^^&^tt^rue self. 
Il*( Ace No. 
^, 
Sartre doea not hesitate to reject the Libido theory 
of Freud as he thinks that we cannot explain all the psychic 
manifestations in terms of instincts. Libdo theory reduces 
man to his biology »The libido of the *will to iwwer* in 
actuality constitutes a '; psycho-biological residue which is 
not clear in itself and which does not appear to us as being 
112 beforehand the irreducible limit of the investigation," 
Freddian psycho-analysis gives contigent results which are 
not convirKJing as it is experience which establishes that 
the foundation of complex is libido. Therefore the original 
and undifferentiated project of human reality is neither 
constituted nor represented by libido. It is the choice, 
Sartre proposes, by vrtiich a person acts one way rather than 
another, to relate himself to Being. The choice is conceived 
as a fundamental characteristic of being by which being makes 
itself and explores its Immense possibilities. All the 
possibilities grounded in one thing, receive legitimacy as 
a result of choice. Each such result will be at once fully 
contigent, legitimately Irreducible and will always remain 
particular. The details of behaviour will particularize the 
choice but they cannot ".make it more concrete than It already 
Is. "That is because the choice is nothing other than the 
being of each human reality*., as there is no difference 
between existing and choosing for Itself." '-^  
Prom this it follows that in existintial psycoanalysis 
we have not to proceed from the fundamental •Complex*, which 
la exactly the choice of being, to an abstraction l i ke Libido 
which would explain i t . The complex la the ultimate choice, 
i t i s the choice of being and makes i t s e l f such. Accordingly 
Sartre maintains that the l ibido and the will to power are 
neither as general charac ter i s t ics common to a l l mankind nor 
as irreducibles which would determine human behaviour. 
What Sartre wants to establ ish from this comparison la 
that ex i s t en t i a l psycho-analysis i s a method which brings 
to l ight the subjective choice by which each person makes 
himself what he l a . Since i t i s a choice of being, i t reduces 
par t icular behaviour patterns to fundamental relat ions of 
being expressed in the individual ' s behaviour,not to l lbldonal 
or sexual ins t inc t s of Freud or *wlll to power' of Adler. 
"The behaviour studied by t h i s psycho-analysis will include 
not only dreams, f a i l u re s , obaeasions, and neuroses but also 
and especially the thoughta of waking l i f e successfully 
114. adjusted ac t s , s tyle e t c . " Rest of the ex is ten t ia l paycho-
analysia of Sartre i s largely concerned with establishing i t s 
re la t ion with his ontology. 
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EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO ART 
(; ' 
THEORIES OF ART 
(A Brief Survey) 
Art has always been a «yaterious phenomena. Interpreted 
in different ways throughout the history of human civilization. 
Artistic activity is as old as human existence itself, Archeo-
loglsts have discovered a number of pictures created by 
predecessors of modern human species. Man has always been 
interested in depicting, through different art forma, his 
observations and impressions of the nature. He is distinguished 
from all other beings because of his creative power i.e. 
representation or recreation of his perception of nature and 
all the phenomena that constitute the physical world. He 
has been always striving to discover the hidden meaning or 
mystery of the world, with which he has to cope. The primitive 
man, belonging to any period of the developmental stage of 
human species, has been interested in expressing himself through 
different media vrtiich constitute the essential forms of different 
fine arts like dance, music, poetry, sculpture, architecture 
and painting. This urge reflect* man*s urge to recreate 
; 0 
and represent the r e a l i t i e s , which he encounters in his 
daily l i f e , in one form or the other . Different fine a r t s 
are expressions of the same urge* 
The nature which man had to confront, and has to confront 
even today, seems to be in a chaotic form. The universe, as 
a whole, from exis ten t ia l point of view i s absurd, which Implies 
that i t has no order, no plan, no d isc ip l ine , no purpose. I t 
i s human existence (Daseln or Being-for-i tself) which gives 
meaning and direct ion to a l l that exis ts in the universe. All 
such attempts found expression in the works of art with a view 
to unveil the mystery of being, the hidden meaning behind 
phenomenal world. Art Is actual ly an odyssey through unknown 
worlds that manifests man's quest to unfold and capture the 
mystery of being. From th i s point of view, a l l the works of 
ar t are att«npts to transcend the apprearances and the absurd. 
Right from pre-Socratic philosophers t i l l our age, a r t i s t i c 
experience, i t s process and i t s products at tracted the at tention 
of thinkers who examined and Interpreted them in different 
ways. In order to evaluate the i r relevance to ex i s t en t i a l i s t 
in terpreta t ion of a r t , i t i s essent ia l to give a brief but 
c r i t i c a l account of some extant theories of a r t . For such a 
c r i t i c a l survey one has to assess these interpretat ions of ar t 
i n a broader perspective re la t ing them to the t o t a l i t y of 
existence. 
f ( 
ART 
as 
IMITATION 
Imitation theory of art is as old as the hiaman 
civilization itself. Before Plato could reshape it, it had 
considerably been developed by hia predecessors. The principle 
of imitation, prior to Plato, had been employed by the artists 
and litterateures to the extent of attaining such a high 
degree of excellence that some times the artistic creations 
of antiquity were taken as real by the spectators. 
The two prevalent theories of art in Greece viz, *The 
Theory of Imitation* and the 'Hedonistic theory*» were rejected 
by Plato on metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic grounds. The 
entire 'world of nature, according to hia metaphysics, is Just 
an imitation, a reflection, an imperfect copy of the world 
of Ideas, According to him if a work of art is simply an 
fUl 
Imitation of the material objects of the senses, it is an 
imperfect copy of the already imperfect copy of an Ideaj it 
is a shadow of a shadow, a reflection of a reflection; hence 
far removed from the reality. Therefore, to imitate is to 
waste human energy unnecessarily, for what the work of an 
artist aims at is already done much better by nature. 
It was this metaphysical standpoint which compelled 
PlQto to exclude the artist from his ideal Republic. He had, 
Infact, a fine aesthetic sense. That is why he himself 
declared in his Republic that he would have been very glad to 
Justify art, to prove its rationality and to give it a place 
In the ideal Republic if someone could tell how art could be 
assigned a useful function in human society. 
On a closer analysis of Plato's philosophy, we can 
say that Plato was actually dealing with the epistemological 
problem viz; the cognitive value of the products of art. 
Therefore, he could not pay much attention to the intrinsic 
character of things, the intrinsic value of mental activity 
which happens to be the cardlo-vaacular feature of a work of 
art. That also seems to be the reason why Plato failed to 
recognize the value of art. His lack of Interest in the mental 
processes other than pure thought forced him to discourage 
artist and debar him from entering his ideal Republic. 
Plato rejected the hedonistic theory of art, propounded 
by Socrates, as it was in conflict with his ethical theory. 
frl 
He rejected the imitation theory of art, for it did not fit 
in his metaphysical view of the reality. He was inclined 
to accept the Sophist's view that art created illusions. It 
was, however, Aristotle who improved Plato's theory of art, 
pin-pointing some vital drawbacks in the metaphysical theory 
of his teacher. Aristotle objected that if ideas were really 
transcendent, if they existed beyond the world of stars, how 
could the ideas act upon matter in such a way that the objective 
world came into being. As one of the biggest exponents of 
Idealism. Aristotle brings the Ideas from the transcendental 
world to earth. Ideas, according to him, are not transcendent 
but immanent I they make things what they are; they are progi^-
asively realised in matter. Our world, according to Aristotle, 
is not a shadow but a real world of form and matter in union. 
On the basis of this ontological theory^ Aristotle 
improves upon the conception of Plato's meaning of imitation. 
The external world, for Plato, was merely irrational matter 
on which form was somehow imperfectly impressed, while for 
Aristotle the objective world was a synthesis of idea and 
matter. Idea is, to Aristotle, the soul, the essence, the 
motive force which determines the direction of the growth, 
evolution and development of matter. It was not beyond the 
reach of creative Artist. Art for Aristotle had either the 
moral or the intellectual purpose. It is creative activity 
under intellectual direction. If the artist concerns with 
the realm of senses only and ignores the idea completely. 
(.') 
he is not an artist at all. For Aristotle imitation is 
idealisation, the presentation of things, not as they are 
but as they should be| not as they are knovoi to senses, 
not as they exist in the external world but as they are to 
be under the controlling force of ideas. Therefore, imitation 
is not merely production of a thing but of things, better or 
worse than they are found in the external world. 
( ') 
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ART 
as 
WISHFULFILMENT 
An abundant contribution has been made by the recent 
discoveries of psychoanalysis and analytical schools of 
psychology to a sound and profound interpretation of art. 
What is of interest to a psychologist in a work of art?, 
according to one of the leading psychoanalyst, Wilhelm Stekel 
is to investigate the impulse which drives people to create, 
A psychologist is mainly concerned with such deepest impulses 
and instincts of an artist which force him to create a work 
of art. He is not going to place a Judgement of aesthetic 
value but rather tries to study the psychological processes 
underlying and accompanying the aesthetic activity. 
There are divergent opinions regarding the nature of 
these impulses and instincts of which art is an expression. 
Credit goes to S, Freud, vAio, for the first time, brought 
! • • ! 
th i s subject under the purview of sc ien t i f ic research and 
t r ied to correla te the two branches of human knowledge 
science and a r t . 
According to the psycho-analysis of Freud, ar t i s an 
ac t iv i ty , aim of which i s to assuage unappeased whishes. At 
the bottom of every a r t i s t i c work there are cer ta in inst inctual 
forces compelling the a r t i s t to c rea t e . If not expressed, in 
the i r suppressed s t a t e , such Intra-psychic confl icts can drive 
the a r t i s t to neurosis. I t i s t h i s fundamental opposition of 
these psychic forces within an a r t i s t that are responsible 
for the creation of a work of a r t . Anything which i s the 
product of opposite psychic forces mulit be having the character 
of suppressed or unfulr-filled wish of an a r t i s t which i s the 
dynamic force at the root of a work of a r t . Just l ike dreams 
and fantacies, a work of ar t represents th i s wish as fu l f i l led . 
But how ? 
Freud lays enormous importance to the gra t i f ica t ion 
which the individual obtains through fantacies and day-dreams. 
Everyone has day-dreams, which according to modern researches 
reveal that to some extent every individual has some abnormal 
tendencies. Whether there i s anyone who i s absolutely normal 
i s yet to be established and can perhaps be never established. 
In a day-dream one imagines his desires and wishes 
fu l f i l led , which are , according to Freud, mostly erot ic and 
','[') 
egotistic in nature. If the gratification or the ability 
to obtain gratification, in the world of ideality, is not great 
or not ,very great, an individual develops the tendencies 
of day-dreaming and phantasies, Freud saysi 
"Unsatisfied wishes are the driving power 
behind phantacieaj every separate phantasy 
contains the fulfillment of a wish, and 
improves an unsatisfactory reality. The 
impelling wishes vary according to sex, 
character and circumstances of the creator." 
Sex, character and circumstances constitute the psycho-
social make up of an artist and it exclusively depends on the 
fulfillment of his urges (basically sexual), that is, on the 
quantity of suppressed libidonal energy, whether an individual 
develops a neurosis or not. 
When the instinctual urges become powerful and individual 
is incapable of attaining their gratification, these energies 
turn and flow backwards along with course of the libido-
development of those early stages at which they were once able 
to obtain full satisfaction. If they become more powerful they 
break through into consciousness inspite of moral, economic 
and social restraints and obtain satisfaction in the form of 
substitute gratifications and actions. Freud maintains that it 
is at this stage that libido re|;z*esses into infantile position, 
a process which the ego is not going to tolerate. When the 
<5 U 
psychic conditions oi such an individual are unable to 
discharge his libidonal energy through proper channels of 
satisfaction by real desired objects he gains and tries to 
gain gratification through phantasy, a condition which Jung 
calls 'Introversion', 
Being an introvert, the artist is unable to satisfy 
his overpowering instinctual needs in the world of realityj 
he turns away from the real world to that of phantasy. Although 
it is a way which could lead him to neurosis, through the 
discharge of instinctual energy and the satisfaction one 
gains from creating the work of art, which concretizes one's 
unfulfilled wishes in the socially acceptable forms of creative 
activity. One saves oneself from neuroses and regains contact 
with reality. Through the creations of art an artist obtains 
gratification of his intense childhood wishes which he 
represents as fulfilled in his creation. It is by this 
analysis that Freud has tried to prove the presence of 
infantile wishes in the work of art. He quotes the example 
of Sophocles 'Tragedy of Oedipus *. 
"It may be that we were all destined 
to direct our first sexual Impulses 
towards our mothers, and our first 
impulses of hatred and violence 
towards our fathers| our dreams convince 
ua that we were King Oedipus, who slew 
his father Lolus and wedded his mother 
Jocasta, is nothing more tfv less than 
a wish-fullilment—the fulfilment of the 
wish of our childhood... As the poet 
brings to guilt Oedipus to light by his 
investigation, he forces us to become aware 
of our inner selves, in which the same impulses 
are still extant, even though they are 
2 
supressed." 
Freud also s ta tes that Shakespeare's Hamlet i s rooted 
in the same soi l as Oedipus Rex» Therefore, Freud's main 
thesis i s that unfilled wishes, originating in the unconscious, 
are sat isf ied in the work of a r t , and if possible, we can 
discover these unfilled wishes by minute observation and 
analysis of facts and furthermore, these wishes are basical ly 
infant i le wishes. 
Jung's Criticism of Freud's Analysis of Art! 
In the scheme of Freudian psychoanalysis, a r t has 
double purpose. Not only does i t f u l f i l l the wishes of the 
repressed libido but i t also sa t i s f ies man's longing for 
perfection and recognition in the real world. The unconscious 
longing i s to sat isfy sexual des i res , the conscious longing 
i s to have social recognition and s t a tu s . While unconscious 
longing of the human psyche may be called i t s weakness, the 
conscious longing may be called i t s s t rength. 
I t was however, Jung who re;Jected Freud's in terpreta t ion 
of unconscious mind. For Jung a r t i s an expression which 
1 11 
arises fro« the stratum that exists universally In the mind 
of human race. He names it as the •collective unconscious'. 
Aa a part of human payche, it cannot be said to exist in 
itselfJ it is a possibility of everything but nothing in 
reality. It comes from time immemorial. The unconscious for 
Jung is not only "...receptacle of all unclean spirits and 
other odius legacies of opinion of dead situations, such as 
the store publique, for example, which constitutes Freud's 
super-ego, but it is in particular the one ever living seed-
ground which manifests itself through ancient symbolical images, 
yet by means of these images points to a renewal of the spirit."^ 
The core of Jung's psychoanalysis is his conception of 
archetypes or symbolic constants that aire the common heritage 
of mankind. Jung says that "the aasence of art does not 
consist in the fact that it is charged with personal peculiar-
ities", as Freud had called it, "but that it rises above the 
personal and speaks out of the heart and mind and for the 
4 
heart and mind of the humanity." 
It is by this point of view that Jung rejects Freud's 
theory of art as wishfulfilment and propounds that art being 
distinctive and autbnoiaous cannot be wholly explained by 
psychoanalysis. 
( I ' 
ART 
as 
INTUITION 
The ftmdamental thesis of Intultlonlsts Is that art la 
Intuition* It will not concern us here to show whether these 
philosophers are antl-»intellectuala or less intellectuals or 
whether these philosophers tend to give metaphysical import 
to art, and are completely lacking in analytical or linguistic 
analysis. It is also irrelevent to our present study as to 
whether there is any disagreement among these philosophers 
with regard to their approaches to ipoae rationalism against 
emprlcism or to hold idealism as opposed to materialism. We 
mean here simply to explain the views of some leading philoso-
phers who maintain that "Art is Intuition", 
Just as rationalists emphasize reason, empriclsts 
emphasize experience, linguistic philosophers emphasize 
language! Intultlonlsts emphasize Intuition "within their 
whole thought system that Include the sphere of art as well. 
Unlike rationalists or empriclata, whatever intuitioniata 
conceive ia absolutely particular and haa no trace of univeraal 
concepts; whatever qualitiea they ascribe to the objecta are 
those that make them unique in the realm of nature. They do 
not portray at all the general characteristics. In thia 
respect they come very close to exiatentialiata if they are 
not recognized as identical to them. 
We will focua our attention mainly on the moat famoua 
Italian philosopher of our century, B.Croce (1866 - 1952), 
becauae he haa been very influential proponent of the intuitional 
interpretation of art. But before going in the detaila of 
Croce'a philosophy, some light is alao required to be thrown 
on H. Bergson*s philosophy becauae hia ayatem of thought also 
culminatea into a kind of intuitioniam. 
(a). H. Bergaon (1859 - 1941 )t fumiahea a very aharp 
contraat between intuition and intellect and identifiea art 
with the former. For him, the prime reality ia movement or 
change. It is only by movement i.e. change, that life has 
appeared. The moat uaeful meana of aurvival and progresa is 
provided by intellect. Intellect not only serves for the 
survival but its most important function ia to establiah the 
most satisfactory reactiona to environment. Bergaon maintains 
that man's intellect has changed reality for man's convenience 
from a perpetual happening to a patterned immobility. Intellect 
or reasoning power can understand the patterned and the 
Immobile. Life and movement, however, are neither patterned 
nor Immobile but a moving complex In which no one element I3 
separable from the r e s t , and I s , in consequence, quite beyond 
the power and scope of in te l l igence . Hence, so far as our 
minds are controlled and led by i n t e l l e c t , we will be unable 
to grasp the real nature of l i f e and movement. Some psycholo-
g i s t s have, however, pointed out that Just as animals, p a r t i -
cularly insec ts , man has a very r ich ins t inc t ive power by 
\rtiich he works. Bergson, though accepting the ins t inc tua l 
power of man, does not accept that t h i s power could furnish 
us the knowledge of the real nature of th ings . Ins t inctual 
knowledge can provide us with prac t ica l knowledge but since 
i t works unconsciously, i t becomes somewhat useless for a 
philosopher. Bergson however, maintains that between these 
two mental powers or facul t ies v iz . i n t e l l e c t and ins t inc t , 
there i s another facul ty, which, while giving the Immediate 
knowledge of l i f e - in -ac t ion possessed by i n s t i n c t , gives to 
consciousness the more Impersonal and remote objects of 
i n t e l l e c t . This faculty i s termed by him as In tu i t ion , He 
claims that i t i s only through th i s faculty, that man can 
comprehend the very movement of l i f e i t s e l f and could free 
himself from the irreducable contradictions in r ea l i t y created 
by In t e l l ec t . Hence i t i s in tu i t ion pnly by which one can 
a t ta in the true nature of r e a l i t y . 
-As compared to the sc ient i f ic or philosophic geniixsp 
he recognises a r t i s t ' s g i f t s to be perfectly in tu i t ed . He 
sayat, <By in tu i t ion i s meant the kind of i n t e l l e c tua l sympathy 
by which one places oneself within an object in order to 
coincide wich what is unique in it and consequently inexpre-
ssible '• Since intellect cannot go much deep, therefore, the 
uniqueness and consequently the i.iexpressibility of an object, 
can be explained by the artists only, who work by intuition 
alone. Intuition is a direct vision which the artist is 
unusually gifted with. Most works of art are the products 
of intuition that alone can penetrate into reality and grasp 
its dynamic character and its unique qualities. In a work 
of art reality is captured with its dynamic character. 
Intuition is comparable to mystic or existential 
experience. Iqbal, whose philosophy is very close to Bergsonian 
notions of intuition and creative evolution, defines the 
religious experience as immediate, unanalysable, synthetic in 
character and incommunicable. He qualifies further the pro-
phetic experience as capable of communicating the incommunicable. 
In Iqbal's view, a poet's Job is similar to mission of a prophet. 
The prophetic character of art has> therefore, its origin in 
intuition,'^ 
Besides Bergson and Iqbal, usually most of the artists 
and poets have been always defining their creative process in 
terms of intttltion, 
(b). B. Croce (1866 - 1952) was a Hegelian who evolved 
his theory of art on the basis of a critical appraisal of 
>) 
Hegel. According to Hegel, Reality is unity vrtiich includes 
in it all multiplicity and opposition without compromising 
and disturbing its basic oneness. The opposites are opposites 
only to each other but not to the Absolute) the • 
supreme unity is not static but dynamic. As for the problem of 
opposites, Hegel furnishes his famous dialectical method of 
triadic form, vizf thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis, Hegel 
held that, of the two terms involved in opposition, the 
second is the negation of the first, but the third term in 
which both of them are synthesised, is the negation of negation. 
This process gives rise to an evolutionary course that is 
explained by him in other terms. I.e. Being, Not-Being and 
Becoming. Croce rejects this triadic theory of opposites and 
furnishes his own diadic theory of distincts. The main point 
of Croce for this rejection of Hegelian triadic method is 
that the philosophic thought is not only the synthesis of 
opposites but that of the distincts also. In other vrords, 
though Croce accepts the Hegelian concept of opposites he 
recognizes some such concepts which are not opposites but 
distincts. As the two terms themselves suggest opposite 
concepts are quite different from the distinct concepts. Croce 
maintains that while two distinct concepts can unite, opposite 
concepts cannot. It was mainly on the basis of this logical 
error, Croce observes, that Hegel considers intuition as thesis, 
representation as anti-thesis and philosophy as synthesis. 
For Croce, religion cannot be the opposite of art, i.e. to 
consider religion as the negation of art is as impossible 
as to consider their truth to be possessed by the third, 
viz. philosophy. Had Hegel identified the difference 
between the opposites and distincts, he would have perhaps 
been able to recognize the truth of aesthetic activity, i.e. 
art. 
From above it can be maintained that as a follower of 
Hegel, Croce accepts his concrete monism but as a critic he 
rejects his triadic theory of opposites* He accepts Hegel*s 
view that Reality is unity in. multiplicity, but deviates from 
him when he holds that it is not abstract. No doubt, Reality 
is of the nature of thought but it manifests itself In 
multiplicity of forms that are concrete. As an Intuitive 
aesthetician, his fundamental thesis is that art is intuition 
and intuition, in the philosophy of spirit, is the first 
original form of spirit. He does not differ from Hegel in 
respect of the conception of spiritj he rather differs from 
him in respect of the forms of spirit. While according to 
Hegel, spirit manifests itself into a triad, viz. the critical 
spirit, practical spirit and Absolute spirit, Croce holds 
that the spirit manifests itself into two forms only, never-
theless, he retains the terms employed by Hegel, i.e. 
theoritical spirit and practical spirit. Theoretical spirit 
manifests itself into intuition and concept, and practical 
spirit in the economic will and ethical will. 
So intuition is the first of the eternal forms of 
spirit and it is, according to Croce, the sphere of Art. 
Since art is intuition, therefore, as a form of spirit, it 
is also eternal. It is not universal but individual and has 
not conceptual unit. He saysi 
"We deny that it has the character of 
conceptual knowledge. Conceptual knowledge, 
in its true form, which is philosophical, 
is always realistic, aiming at establishing 
reality against unreality... But intuition 
means, precisely, indistinction of reality 
and unreality, the image with its value as 
mere image, the pure ideality of the image..." 
Croce further holds that art is not a moral act; it is 
beyond good and evil. It does not arise as an act of will 
which presupposes the moral obligations and the criteria of 
good or evil, 'praisworthy or blameworthy. "Not only is 
there no penal code that can condemn an image to prison or 
to death, but no moral Judgement, uttered by a rational person, 
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can make of its object..." 
Rejecting the famous saying that ' i n tu i t i on i s blind, 
and i n t e l l e c t lends her eyes' Croce says that "intuit ion i s 
perfect ly independent of i n t e l l e c t . I t i s not blind but i s 
self-shining, i t 'does not need to borrow the eyes of others, 
for she has excellent eyea of her own" . . . t h e to ta l effect 
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of the work of art is an intuition; and notwithstanding all 
those intuitions, the total effect of the philosophical 
dissertation is a concept."^ While differentiating between 
an intellectual fact and an intuitive fact, Croce holds: 
"The difference between a scientific 
work and a work of art, that is, 
between an intellectual fact and an 
intuitive fact, lies in the difference 
of the total effect aimed at by their 
respective authors." 
Croce also does not allow space and time to be attributed 
to intuition. For him, artistic intuition is free from spatial 
and temporal relations. For him the intuition which is fi^e 
from spatial and temporal relations is the only true intuition. 
"We have intuitions with space and time, the colour of a 
feelirjg, a cry of a pain and an effort of will, objectified 
in consciousness! these are intuitions which we possess, and 
11 
with their making space and time have nothing to do." CjToce 
asks I "who is conscious of temporal sequence while listening 
to a story or a piece of music without breaking into it with 
a similar act of reflection? What intuition reveals in a work 
of art is not space and time, but character, individual 
12 physiognomy." 
So far Croce has maintained that intuition is the first 
of the eternal forms of spirit which is the sphere of art and 
is accordingly eternal. Intuition cannot be conceptualized. 
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No moral or penal code can be ascribed to it. It is exclusively-
independent of intellect. It is free from spatial and temporal 
relation. But then what intuition is? 
Croce maintains that intuition is expression. Sometimes, 
intuition has been confused with simple sensation. Sensations, 
according to him, are intuitions only when they are formed 
synthesised and expressed. "Every true intuition or represent-
ation is also an expression. That which does not objectify 
itself in expression is not intuition or representation, but 
sensation and mere natural fact. The spirit only intuits ia 
making, forming and expressing. He who separates intuition 
-IT 
from expression never succeeds in reuniting them." -^  
As a spiritual manifestation of an artist, intuition 
is not only sensation but expression which distinguishes it 
from mere mechanical and passive sensation. It brings the 
impressions or feelings from the obscure region of mere sensation 
to the region of spiritual activity. It is the illumination 
of the inner self of the artist. It is a very complicated and 
difficult job, hence achieved by a genius only, because it is 
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the expression of a complex s t a t e of sou l . That i s why 
the ninth symphony could not be c rea ted by any except Beethoven, 
the 'Hamlet* except by Shakespeare^'Monalisa* by Leonardo da 
Vinci . We may draw a p a r a l l e l between Croce's theory of 
i n t u i t i o n as expression and I q b a l ' s prophetic experience 
explained as communication of the incommunicable. Iqbal sayat 
It Is in this perspective that Croce holdst "That which 
does not objectify Itself In expression Is not Intuition. 
Intuitive activity possesses intuition to the extent that it 
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expresses them" and "to Intulte is to express, and nothing 
else more, but nothing else leas than to express," 
ART 
as 
EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION 
"To evoke in oneself a feeling one has 
once experienced and having evoked it 
in oneself then by means of movements» 
lines and colours, sounds or forma 
expressed in words, so to transmit that 
feeling that others experience the same 
17 
feeling this the activity of art."" 
(Leo Tolstoy) 
Eugene Veron, Yejo Him, Roger Fry, Leo Tolstoy, are 
some of the famous exponents of the emotional theory of art. 
Though they differ in detail but what is common among them 
and where they converge to agree, is that the function of 
art is to express the whole gamut of humsui emotions and not 
merely to create beauty or to provide pleasure to an individual, 
whether artist or the reader or spectator. We are not here 
concei?ned with finding out what are the differences among 
these philosophersi we will rather focus our attention on one 
of the most famous exponents of this view of art, viz. Leo 
1 - " 
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Tolstoy. 
Art, according to Tolstoy, is not a mer« means of 
pleasure, but one of the essential needs of human life. 
"...By words a man transmits his thoughts to another, by art 
18 he transmits his feelings..." From this point of view art 
becomes one of the means of intercourse between man and man. 
Just as speech serves as a vehicle for transmitting our 
thoughts and experiences, in a similar way, art serves the 
purpose of transmitting the feelings and emotions between 
an artist and his addressee. The capacity of a man to 
receive another man's expressions of feelings and to experience 
those feelings himself is the main factor on which the whole 
gamut of artistic activity is based. If a boy, Tolstoy holds, 
having experienced, say, fear, on encountering a wolf, relates 
that encounter In such a way that he again experiences the 
feelings he had lived through and infects the hearer with what 
he had experienced, is art. Similarly, if a man having 
experienced the feelings of suffering, or enjoyment or delight, 
sorrow, courage etc. (whether in reality or In imagination) 
commimicates these feelings in ^ n effective way to others who 
are Infected by them, he enters in the domain of artistic 
creativity. Notwithstanding any prejudice for or against any 
medium, (it can be through words, colours, llnea, sounds, forms 
etc.), it is the expression of emotions only, which could 
evoke an equivalent degree and similar kind of emotions in 
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others. The main characteristic that makes an expression 
artistic is its ability to unite emotionally the receipient 
with the artist in such a way that he feels as if the work 
were his own, as if the work were one which he had for long 
wished to express. Tolstoy, in other words, wants to abolish 
the phychic-distance between the work of art and the reader 
or spectator? it is a complete unity of the artist and the 
art's receipient. Any work which abolishes the phychic-
distance and invokes this union is, according to Tolstoy, a 
work of art. 
Art is not only what we see in the theatres, concerts 
and exhibitions. "All this is but the smallest part of the 
art which we communicate with each other... All human life is 
19 filled with works of art of every kind", from craddle song to 
the monotonous sound of grave digging. But not that, Tolstoy 
warns us, everything that we do in everyday life is art; it is 
rather that part, which we, for some reasons, select from life 
to which we attach special attention. A woi^ of art by which 
ve can cosamunicate our feelings and emotions to others^must, 
however, be individual, have clearness of expression and 
above all must be authentic, i.e. be true to the artist's self. 
The absence of any one of these three conditions excludes any 
WD lie from the domain of art. 
Finally Tolstoy rejects the metaphysical, psychological, 
hedonistic and even intuitionistic interpretations of art. 
I ;^  
He holds! 
(1) Art la not, as metaphysicians say, the manifestation 
of some mysterious idea of beauty or Gk>d. 
(2) Art is not, as some psychologists hold, a game in 
which man lets off his excess of stored up energy. 
(3) Art is not simply the expression of man's emotions 
by external signs. 
(4) Art is not the production of pleasing objects; 
(5) Art is not wish-fulfillment• 
In his view art is fundamentally the expression of our 
feelings and emotions and serves the purpose of the emotional 
union and integration of the entire humanity. 
All the different theories of art emphasize a particular 
aspect of art, subordinating other aspects of it or, in some 
cases, ignoring certain aspects totally. It may be said that 
though these theories help us to understand art partially, 
there is a need of an integrated approach to art. Art has 
various dimensions and the best way for appreciating, under-
standing and evaluating art may be provided by a multidimen-
sional approach to art. Sartre's existential theory of art, 
which we propose to deal with in detail in the next chapter, 
because of its emphasis on the expression of totality of human 
existence, will provide a compratively comprehensive view of 
art. But for the comprehensive study of Sartre's existential 
theory of art, an analysis of 'Existential Interpretation of Art' 
seems obligatory in the topic that follows now. 
1 :^. 
EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION 
Of 
ART 
Hiaman thirst for knowledge Is as old as the human 
existence itself. Using the scientific as well as existential 
experiences, man envisages a situation^ foresees the course 
of events, projects a desirable outcome before minds eye and 
devices means which cause events to take a certain course. 
Though modern psychologists consider man as simply a mass 
of conditioned reflexes, he is still the lord of his creation, 
a position \diich he obtained through his consistant efforts. 
His desire for understanding all the facets of perceptual 
world is so strong and persistent that it seems to be his 
essential nature. 
Not being content with the simple sights and sounds, 
which are the basis ol perceptual knowledge, we instinctively 
strive, by coordinating them, to locate their origin in the 
material world. EVen if we identify some traces of its 
origin in the material world, we go further to discover all 
the links of causal chain. When we fail to understand its 
origin in the material world we try to locate it in other 
spheres, for example, the metaphysical, the aesthetical or 
ethical. It can be maintained that since we want to under-
stand and interpret each and every phenomenon as a part of 
the whole, we are not satisfied with the bare perceptual 
impressions because they do not lead us too far. 
Scientific explanation attempt at explaining and 
interpreting the data received through perception or through 
the most sophisticated scientific instzniments. Nearly all 
the human responses are tried to be explained and interpreted 
in scientific terms but there are some human responses such 
as aesthetical, ethical, religious or metaphysical responses 
of man with which science seems unable to deal with. Since 
we have an aesthetic sense, an ethical sense, a religious 
sense and a metaphysical sense, which evidently constitute 
some basic and indispensible responses of man, and with which 
science is unable to deal with, it can be presumed that man 
cannot live by a scientific explanation alone. 
There are some such internal urges within our own 
being which are not satisfied by the how and why Interpretation 
of science. No doubt science tries to explain the universe 
as a whole but man has an urge to know the hidden meaning of 
the universe. Its mystery, as a whole and aspires to relate 
himself to it existent!ally. Scientific interpretation tries 
to explain the outer structure of different phenomena but 
does not and cannot say how to relate ourselves vrith those 
phenomena. Besides> there are also some features of the 
universe which are not dealt with by science at all| these 
are, for example, pain and suffering, hope and Joy, love and 
hate, harmony and beauty of nature, ruthless life and death 
struggle for survival, decay, death etc, etc, as inevitable 
manifestations which life has to undergo. 
Such responses of man are very acute and intricate. 
We often try to explain them and offer an interpretation. 
But the moment one offers some explanation or interpretation 
of such responses, he automatically falls back on experience. 
If we, however. Judge any such interpretation from a broader 
perspective it can arbitrarily be called an existential 
interpretation. But it is not and cannot be a universal 
law in the sense in which a scientific interpretation is 
said to be. "It is mainly because a scientific interpretation 
not only makes use of universals but it also uses such a 
universal language which is intelligible and applicable to all. 
An existential interpretation, on the other hand, though also 
using universals as well as universal language, says different 
things to different men with a corresponding difference of 
appeal, A scientific interpretation uses a comparatively 
cold language about the nature of things as they might 
be when all the human interests, preferences and insights 
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are supressed—it i s r a the r a dehumanization. An exis tent ia l 
in terpre ta t ion uses a warmer language which i s more subjective 
and humanized."^^ I t i s however, because man's nature, from 
exis tent ia l point of view, i s never fixed once for a l l | his 
nature i s essent ia l ly and continuously modified by the culture 
and time he l ives i n . Dilthy Ortegaay Garret has r ight ly 
observed that 'man has no nature, he has only a h i s t o r y ' . 
J .P .Sar t re observes tha t "there i s no human nature because 
there i s no God to have a conception of it."^*^ Man, according 
to Sartre , simply i 3 | he i s not what he conceives to be | but 
he i s vrtiat he w i l l s . Being-for- i tself , in the philosophy of 
Sar t re , i s man which i s fu l l of negation. Being not what he 
i s , man i s not subjected to the principle of iden t i ty . 
Therefore, when such a transcendental being, as ex i s t en t i a l i s t s 
cal l him, and conditioned being, as psychologists c a l l him, 
i s defined, a l l the in terpre ta t ions become arbi t rary and 
Inadequate and ignore the following factors! 
a) • The influences he has in his conscious or sub-
conscious mind. 
b ) . His tor ic i ty of human existence, 
c) • Some goal he seeks to achieve in future. 
If we look at human being in th i s perspective, there 
i s a d ia lec t ica l re la t ionship between the ex is ten t ia l 
in terpre ta t ion and personali ty or ientat ion. I t i s because 
of this personality or ien ta t ion that different ex i s t en t i a l 
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interpretations suggest different ways of treating the 
universe or relating oneself to it. For example, some say 
•Life is a gajrden of flowers*, some say 'Life is full of 
thorns* and still others say, *Life has no meaning at all* 
and so on and so forth. Likewise if we turn the pages of 
the history of art, we find that art has been interpreted in 
many ways. These interpretations are so varied and different 
from one another that they, on the whole, covey almost the 
whole gamut of life from craddle- - song to grave digging. 
Some say art is imitation, others say, it is only emotional 
expression, for others, it is beauty, and still for other 
it is intuition or sublimation of supressed sexual urges* 
These are all existential Interpretations which are 
neither hypothesis nor partly justifiable postulates; these 
are rather motivational reinforcers that integrate the 
individuaiV thoughts, feelings, emotions and aspirations for 
a stable way of life and the mode of treating the universe 
or any particular aspect of it on aesthetlcal plane* 
An existential inteiTsretation of art can be compared 
with dream Interpretation, notwithstanding Freudian interpre-
tation of dreams. The object of a dream interpretation is 
self understanding and that of an existential interpretation, 
the person's stable adjustment or orientation to the universe 
as a whole or to some significant aspect of it* One may for 
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example, Interpret art as beauty, another may call it as 
vdshfulfllment, for others it may be intuition. All such 
interpretations try to give meaning and direction to life 
on aesthetical plane. Their primary function is as much 
aesthetic as orientative. An existential interpretation is 
in fact a deeply inward response to the mystery of being and 
to the mystery of Cosmos. It is no doubt, a totally subjective 
response or interpretation but not in the sense in which 
one's preference tot this necktie or that necktie is subjective. 
But in the sense in which one's basic moral or human values 
are subjective without ignoring the universally accepted 
norms. 
An existential interpretation can neither be substituted 
by nor compared to a scientific interpretation. It is mainly 
because a scientific interpretation deals with the outer core 
only, while an existential interpretation, besides explaining 
the inner core also performs mostly the directive function. 
It can accordingly be maintained that while an existential 
interpretation always has an aesthetical as well as ethical 
function, in some cases it can also stimulate scientific 
research. 
An existential interpretation of art takes into account 
not merely particular facts and elements in a work of art, 
but the full range of different features of the universe 
without supressing any feature* An artist must therefore 
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necessarily be aware of the evolutionary features of life, 
though the knowledge of factual detail is not called for. 
Again, he must be aware not only of the beauty and harmony 
and happiness in the universe. Above all he must have some 
existential experiencesi for example, he must have experienced 
•freedom* within himself; he must have experienced at least 
some moments of subjectivity to the extent as Kierkegaard 
realised itj he must be aware of the dread which Heidegger 
interprets as the essential mode of human existencei he 
must be fully aware of the feelings of alienation, anguish 
and historicity of his being; he must know the meaning of 
silence and above all he should be able to translate the 
communicative role of silence implying that every significant 
work of art leaves certain things unsaid» Historicity for 
a contemporary artist means existential awareness of the 
impact of technology on the process of dehumanization in 
modern society and politics. 
However, existential interpretation of art is not 
necessarily at variance with other appoaches, which claim 
to be scientific to art. Existential approach to art takes 
into consideration all the different theories with regard 
to nature of art and creative process but accepts only those 
interpretations which give due importance to existential 
experience, which if not similar, are at least, closer to 
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the experience of creative artist because creative experience 
is actually existential experience that may be sumed up as 
the experience of unfragmented human existence. 
Almost all the theories of art emphasise only one aspect 
of creative experience and ignore certain other aspects. 
That is why no theory of art is adequate enough to interpret 
artistic experience and its product. Among the major theories 
of art, the Formalist theory of Bell and Fry states that 
any thing which is art is an instance of significant form and 
anything which is not art has no form. In opposition to this 
theory. Emotionalists reply that Formalists have ignored the 
truely essential property of art; for emotionalists (Tolstoy) 
art is not significant form but rather the expression of 
emotion in some senseous medium. Institutionists reject 
both the formalistic as well as emotionalistic theories and 
maintain that art cannot be identified with any physical 
objectJ art is some such creative and cognitive process 
which is spiritual in nature without any scientific or moral 
content. Likewise, art from psychoanalytic view point of 
Freud and his followers is an activity whose aim is to assuage 
unappeased wishes which are erotic in nature. In opposition 
to Fireud, Jung holds that art is an expression which arises 
from the stratum that exists universally in the mind of human 
race (archetypes of collective unconscious). M. Wietz holds 
that to define art is to close the concept when its very use 
reveals and demands its openness; hence art cannot be defined. 
This approach i s logica l outcome of G,E«Moore*s theory of 
undelinabil i ty of value. In addition to these schools of 
thought there are a number of par t icular aestheticians and 
l i t t e r a t e u r e s who in te rpre t a r t from different points of view. 
Some say, for example, a r t i s an emotion, some say i t i s only 
form, some emphasize only content and others emphasize expre-
ssion. 
These in terpre ta t ions though in themselves expressive 
and significant about a work of a r t , emphasize only a pa r t i a l 
view of a r t . Can we say that Beethovens 9th Symphony had 
only rhythm and no content orLeonardo*s Mona Lisa had only 
form and no emotion. None of the above quoted theories of 
a r t are able to offer sat isfactory answer to such questions. 
Although Wittgenstien*s analysis of the basic elements of a 
woric of ar t could help us to remove the basic prima-facie 
discord between different interpretat ions of a r t , as shown 
by M. Weltz in his a r t i c l e "Theory of Aesthetics", but i t 
cannot help us much because i t lacks Existential in^wrt. 
An ex is ten t ia l in terpre ta t ion will not only take into 
consideration a l l the aspects which are indispensable parts 
of a work of a r t but i t wi l l be an ex is ten t ia l i l luc idat ion 
of a work of a r t i . e . i t wi l l illuminate the depths of one's 
hidden at t i tudtta , choices and responses. I t cannot ignore 
any aspect of l i f e , no matter how d i s t inc t or remote. An 
in terpre ta t ion which unveils the extreme depths of human 
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existence, keeping in view, the total perspective of the 
Cosmos, is an existential interpretation of art. The total 
perspective of Cosoos includes basic features of human 
experience, cosmic law and order, the mysteries of birth 
growth, decay and death; the beauty as well as the fury of 
the nature, good and evil, tragedy and joy. 
1 .S 
REFERENCES 
1, Freud, Slgmund 
2. 
3* Jimg» C.G. 
A, Jacobi, Jolande 
t "The Relation of the Poet to rtey* 
Dreaming". Nevue Revue. Vol# I 
C1908;, trans, first published In 
collected papers. Vol. IV (1925) 
of. "A Modern Book of Esthetics", 
Edt. Melvln Reader; Holt, Rlnehart 
and Winston, (U,S.A.-1965), p. 31. 
t "The Interpretation of Dreams". 
U900, translated 1913> The English 
edition) ofI •A Modern Book of 
Esthetics*, edtJ Melvln Reader; Halt 
Rlnehart and Winston (U.S.A.-1965), 
p. 137. 
» "Contribution to iUialvtlcal Psychology". 
Harcourt, Brace iNew York - 1928;, 
pp. 246 - 47. 
t "Psychological Refleetlorjs". An 
Anthology of the Writings of C.G.Jung, 
Edt. Pantheon Books (New York, 1953;, 
p. 177. 
5. Iqbal, Mohd. 
6. Croce, B. 
I "The Reconstruction of Religions Thought 
in Islam". Ashraf Press. Kiashmirl 
Bazar, ^Lahore - 1962). 
I "Art as Intuition", of *A Modern Book 
of Esthetics', edt. Melvln Rader, 
Holt, Rlnehart and Winston (U.S.A. 
1965), p. 92. 
7. Ibid.. 
a. Ibid., 
9. Ibid.. 
10. Ibid.. 
11. Ibid.. 
t p. 91. 
t p. 97. 
t p. 98. 
X p. 98. 
I p. 99. 
1 2 . I b i d . . 
13 . I b i d . . 
14. Sharlef , M.M. 
15. Croce 
16. I b i d . . 
17 . Tols toy, Loe 
18. 
19. 
20 . KhawacJa, Jamal 
21. Sartre, J.P. 
p. 99. 
pp. 101-102. 
"Two Points of Croca*a Aesthetics" 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, 
No.II, July, 1942. 
p. 102. 
p. 102. 
"Art 'Pie Language of Emo tlona". 
'Aesthetics", edt. Jerome Stolnltz. 
The Macmlllan Company (U.S.A.-1966;, 
p. 43. 
Ibid.. p. 42. 
Ibid., p. 44. 
"Quest for Islam". Allied Publishers 
.Pvt. Ltd., ;N.D.-1977)» pp.4-8-
"Exlstentlallsm and Humanism", op.clt.. 
p. 28. 
SARTRE»S THEORY OF ART 
1 r 
EXISTENTIALISM 
AND 
ARTISTIC CREATIVITY 
Our de t a i l ed analysis of e x i s t e n t i a l philosophy and 
i t s main concepts i n the f i r s t chapter and a survey of some 
c l a s s i c a l and old t heo r i e s of a r t and the e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of a r t i n the 2nd chapter have enabled us to expound 
and examine Sar t re*s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a r t . But before 
proceeding i n tha t d i r ec t i on i t seems e s s e n t i a l to throw some 
l i g h t on how ex i s t en t i a l i sm approaches the problem of a r t i s t i c 
c r e a t i v i t y . 
A r t i s t i c Crea t iv i ty t 
Prom the etymological s t and-po in t c r e a t i v i t y means to 
c r e a t e , to make or to produce In t he phys ica l sense. A r t i s t i c 
c r e a t i v i t y would, t he re fo re , imply a process of making or 
c r e a t i n g an a r t i s t i c piece of work. But the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y with the process of making, producing 
1 r,' 
or creating can not be confined to i t s etyinological sense 
alone. F.E.Sparshett points out that etymological definit ion 
would indicate that we have ident i f ied one specific kind of 
process and apply the same process to a l l other works of a r t . 
"We have no reason", he points out, "to suppose that anything 
corrosjionding to th i s defini t ion e x i s t s . " Hence without 
ins i s t ing on any ready made notion or one kind of generalization 
with regard to the a r t i s t i c c rea t iv i ty , i t wi l l be more in 
the f i tness of things, to have, some f i r s t person accounts 
of creative process, Brewster Ghselin's *The Creative Process 
——A Symijosium' i s one such work which presents the personal 
account of many outstanding a r t i s t s and wri ters of the i r own 
creat ive processes. We shall refer to a few such records 
here with a view to see through the creat ive person's 
experiences. 
For C.G.Jung, a creator gives expression to the structure 
of his own psychic l i f e : 
"The work in process becomes the poet ' s 
fa i th and determines his psychic develop-
ment. I t is not Goethe who creates Faust, 
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but Faust who creates Goethe." 
According to this view in creating some piece of art, 
an artist creates himself. Or, in other words, the piece 
of art recreates the airtist. Thus the created work and the 
creator are complementory to each other's being, 
Stephen Spender holds that creation begins vaguely: 
It is I 
"a dim cloud of an idea which I feel 
must be condensed into a shower of 
words. "-^  
Alfred North Whitehead defines what motivates a poet to 
create in the following wordst 
"the state of imaginative muddled suspense 
which precedes successful inductive genera-
lization. "^ 
In the view of Isadora Duncan, creative activity is 
5 
"a state of complete suspense." 
Describing his restlessness during a night when he was 
Just lying on his bed, unable to sleep because of taking 
coffee, Henri Poincare gives an account of the involuntary 
and unconscious process that led to shape one of his works. 
He sayst 
"Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide 
untill pairs interlocked, so to speak, 
making a stable combination. By the next 
morning I had established the existence of 
a class of Puchsain function, those which 
come from hypergeometric seriesi I had 
only to write out the results, which took 
but a few hours." 
1 8 
Anton Chekov, on the other hand asserts that all 
creative activity, though appearing spontaneous at first 
glance, is still thought-out and pre-planned. Rejecting the 
automism in creativity, he says: 
"To deny that artistic creation Involves 
problems and purposes would be to admit 
that an artist creates without premeditation, 
without design, under a spell. Therefore if 
an artist boasted to me of having written a 
story without a previously settled design, 
but by inspiration, I should call him a 
lunatic,"' 
It may be inferred from what Chekhov says that howsoever 
effortless the process of creating art may be, it involves 
conscious effort of an artist as a pre-r«quisite» 
The awareness of unrealized possibilities by an artist 
—4iunting for an expression to his creativity——Is beautifully 
expressed by one of the geniuses of all time, Vincent Van Go^. 
In a letter to his brother he givos vent to his feeling that 
he was one of those men who were somehow mysteriously imprisoned, 
He writesi 
"Prisoners in an I-don*t-know-what-for 
horrible, horrible, utterly horrible 
cage,*, the man who is doomed to remain 
idle, whose heart is eaten out by an 
angxilsh for work, but who does nothing 
il 
because it is impossible for him to do 
anything, because he is as it were impri-
soned in something. Because he hasn*t 
got Just that which he needs in order 
to be creative. Because the fate of 
circumstances has reduced him to a state 
of nothingness. Such a man often doesn't 
know himself what he might do, but he feels 
instinetivelyt yet am I good for something, 
yet am I aware of some reason for existing! 
I know that I might be a totally different 
man, how then C€in I be useful, how can I 
be of service! something is alive in met 
what can it be!" 
The diversity of the views, as quoted above, suggests 
that any generalization about artistic creativity is simply 
a misleading and a futile exercise. Though it is a highly 
controversial problem in art, yet one thing, at least, 
accepted to be conmon in all the accounts of this experience 
is that, regardless of the sphere or medium of creative 
activity there is a peculiar and mysterious pattern that 
constitutes it. It is the artist*s deep involvement in his 
aspiration to expreaa himself that conacioualy or unconsciously 
shapes his work. He is absolutely immersed in his field of 
endeavour*—-trying to explore new vistas in Ills field, which 
assumes the form of his creative work. But this is the only 
thing generalizable in all cases. Otherwise the accounts 
of different writers and artists about their individual 
experiences do not seem to offer any common denominator! 
infact they differ widely. However, another important common 
factor in c rea t iv i ty i s the a r t i s t ' s urge to find creative 
expression of his ex is ten t ia l experience. This ±B on the 
one hand conscious and on the other involves an unconscious 
ef for t . The popular view of c rea t iv i ty follows from George 
Wholley*s statement! 
"The function of the la tent but energetic 
imaginatida i s to constel late perceptual 
images as well as to re ta in them} vrtien 
they emerge into the l i gh t to take their 
place in a work of a r t they are already 
complex, carrying with them a context of 
feeling and thought which i s not the i r 
Q 
or ig inal perceptual context."^ 
What Vfhalley intends to es tabl ish i s that c rea t iv i ty 
i s a sor t of ' c rys ta l i za t ion of experience* stored in memory 
or unconscious that emerges into consciousness as a ready 
made poem or a painting or a piece of music. Though Sparshott»s 
remark that "Pirofessor IKtsA^ey does not indicate vrtiat sort 
of evidence he would adduce in favour of th i s asser t ion" ' i s 
important. Dr. Alexander acknowledges the psychological 
significance of Whalley»s statement. Dr. Alexander saysi 
" I t is unnecessary to argue at length 
that the appeal of a r t i s based on 
unconscious psychological p rocess . . . 
the question i s what unconscious psycho-
logical processes the aesthet ic resx>onse 
consiats of."^'' 
<)^ 
It is also unnecessary ito deal with, not only at 
length hut even in brief, Dr. Alexander's notion of unconscious 
psychological process which has Freudian overtone because 
Sartre has rejected the Freudian departmentalization of 
consciousness into different parts already discussed in the 
first chapter. Prof, F.E. Sparshott, however, observes very 
rightlyt 
"...If there is a poetic process, the poet 
becomes nothing more than a place where 
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poem happens." 
This statement has an existential import. Sparshott 
comes very close to Sartre, \fh.o has criticised the notion of 
philosophers that 'the image was in consciousness' and 'that 
the object of the image was in consciousness'. Though a 
detailed analysis of this criticism will be presented in the 
second part of this chapter but it should suffice to mention 
here that according to Sartre this misconception arises only 
from our habit of thinking in spatial terms which he calls 
the 'illusion of immenance'. 
At present two radically opposed theories of creative 
activity are, however, in vogue. These aret 
a). Artistic creativity is wholly irrational inspiration. 
b). Artistic creativity is wholly purposive and therefore 
a conscious activity. 
Inspite of the extreme nature of these theories, their 
propoundera appear to agree that creative activity has a 
common denominator. V. Ilmafl and M.C.Beardsly have however, 
rejected these extreme views. In "Creativity in Art";^ Tomaa 
maintains that creation involves both inspiration as well as 
purpose. It is an activity subject to the critical control 
of the artist. Beardsly in "On the Creation of Art"' analysis 
in detail the inventive as well as the selective phases of 
this process. 
In addition to all these differing views and theories, 
Grahm Wallas, recognizes some regularity of pattern in these 
theories and the individual views of artists, writers, 
scientists et la and perhaps inspired by the rapid scientific 
inventions, breaks down the total sequence of creative activity 
into four stages. These stages aret 
"(1). Preparation: in which the ideas for the woiHc are 
identified and toyed with. 
(2). Incubation: in which the mind may consciously be 
involved with other things while the 
unconscious is resolutely playing with 
and sorting out ideas. 
(3). Illumlnationt in which the creator becomes avrarB of 
how all the elements fight together or 
gets the picture. 
(4). Verification: In which the final details are checked 
out and the accuracy assured. "^^ 
.M5 
All these views are but the psychological explanations 
oJ the concept of creativity. They can be called the mecha-
nistic theories al80» because they lack existential import. 
Psychologists of the most diverse orientations have tried 
to explore at length, even with the help of experiments, the 
process of creativity among artists and other men of genius. 
It seems all of them have only wandered around the problem 
without obtaining even a dim idea of this activity. In other 
words they have failed to unfathom the depth of the mystery 
that is creativity. It were perhaps the existentieuL philoso-
phers that could offer a significant analysis of creativity. 
II 
We have already discussed in the previous chapter that 
in the strict sense of the term, existentialism is not a 
system of philosophy but an approach to the study of man. It 
is exclusively a man-oriented philosophical movement propound-
ing that man, being alone in the world, has no essence, no 
fixed nature, and, therefore, cannot be defined. He bestows 
meaning on the world that is essentially absurd, having no 
meaning and value. Man*« being is not made but is always 
in the process of becoming. The certainty of death and the 
perilousneas of life are inherent in the very condition ol 
human being. It is by recognition of this human condition 
that existentialists embark upon the anguish, dread and concern 
1 ' " 
that make up hvunan existence and saddle it with inelectable 
responsibility lor creating itself and its environment. Man 
is committed to his being and through it to the entire field 
of his existence and contemporarious historic situation. 
The fullest expression of this human condition is found 
in the literature of existentialist writers. But the question 
is how far have these writers been successful in depicting 
this condition of man, thertsby formulating an existential 
view of art. It would be clear if we examine more clearly 
their views about art. In the paras that follow, we will 
discuss Heidegger and Jaspers) Sartre will be discussed in 
the other parts of the chapter. 
(a). For all existentialist thinkers, existence or 
being is always concrete and particular. In Heidegger's 
philosophy, "being" the general category, is not 'a-being*. 
It is not a particular being. 'A-being* has or is in 'being*. 
Being is determinant of such a being as a being. 'Being* is 
ontic, for it is Just without being aware of its being. Dasien 
(The being) is the term that Heidegger has coined for human 
existence. The being to which human existence is specifically 
related is called * Existenz'. Human existenz is a being, which 
as a being is interested in his very being. It is ontological 
in the sense that it is conscious of being a being. This 
•implies that self-awareness is the distinguishing feature of 
• r-
human existence. I t i s th is awareness of human existenz 
which can be cal led ex is ten t ia l awareness forming the 
core of ex i s ten t ia l experience. 
The mark of human existence, Heidegger says, i s that 
i t ex is ts in various relationships towards i t s being. The 
f i r s t and the most essential re lat ionship or condition i s 
i t s *Being-in*the*»wDrld'. *Being-in-the-world* implies 
actual izat ion of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ^ 
of Dasdten. In th is sense Daslen i s pure potentia3.1ty or 
poas ib i l i t y i i t has no antecedent essence but i s only what 
i t makes of I t s e l f . When Dasien in r e l a t ion to things i s 
there-ln-the-worldJ i t i s "thereness" of Dasien. which implies 
that i t always exists in a s i tuat ion in r e l a t ion to other beings. 
But at the same time Daaiifen. being grounded in freedom, makes 
use of other beings as i t s too l s . The mode of other beings 
In re la t ion to Dasien i s handiness. Dasien not only creates 
i t s e l f freely but also bestows meaning upon other beings too . 
All meaning in the world has human or ien ta t ion . When Dasien 
takes refuge in the world, i t f a l l s down from i t s high 
pedestal and i s degenerated in day-to-day-being, which marks 
the "fallen s ta te of man". This mode or s t a t e i s devoid 
of freedom, an escape from freedom, and i s , therefore, unau-
then t i c . Authenticity of human existence i s grounded in 
freedom. Freedom fao«s death at every moment that inspires 
'dread* of the unknown. Freedom i s leap into unknown. When 
man t r i e s to flee from this dread he i s stripped off •being-
.•1 
unto-death", and consequently f a l l s down from human existence. 
Creativity i s the expression of freedom and freedom l i e s In 
creating oneself and one 's environment unceasingly. Thus the 
vAiole s t ructure of human existence revolves around freedom 
and crea t iv i ty i the l a t t e r being the expression and assertion 
of freedom Inherent in Daalen. I t i s through crea t iv i ty that 
man's being a t t a ins au thent ic i ty . 
Heidegger's essay en t i t l ed "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" explains the contribution of ar t to nan's real izat ion of 
authent ic i ty . In th i s essay Heidegger distinguishes "art 
work from the 'mere-thing* and from the 'useful-object ' by 
being that which ' In se t t ing up a world, se ts forth the 
ear th ' ."^ The two concepts, v i z . , ' the world' and ' the e a r t h ' , 
which are of central Importance to Heidegger's interpretat ion 
of a work of a r t , are explained by an example. He says that 
a Greek temple, which for example, houses a god, shows the 
tanperament and outlook of Gi^ek people as well as the meaning 
they attached to things at a par t icular stage of ' t he i r 
h i s to r i ca l development•• This he ca l l s as ' s e t t i ng up a world ' . 
But at the same time, the asJne temple also indicates the 
'glory of the stone and the powers of the earth that 8iq)port 
i t ' . This he ca l l s ' s e t t ing forth the e a r t h ' . For Heidegger, 
both the two facets , v i z . , 'world' and the ' e a r t h ' , are the 
most essent ia l features of a work of a r t . They consti tute a 
unity within i t . But they a re , nevertheless. In such a s t a t e 
f -—I 
of tension against each other that they pull in opposite 
dlrectiona—the world trying to bring earth into the light 
of meaningfulneas and the earth trying to draw world down 
17 
Into i t s e l f , " Heidegger holds: 
"The repose of the work tha t r e s t s on 
i t se l f thus has i t s essence in the 
intimacy of s t r i f e . " ' 
For Heidegger, i t i s in th i s tension between "the world* 
and ' the earth* that t ru th i s revealed* I t i s in the s t r i f e 
between *the world* and ' the earth* that being urJolds i t se l f . 
I t becomes the most important and v i t a l function of a work of 
a r t to unwrap the hiddenness of being. The *ral3on d*etre* 
of a work of ar t i s not only whrt i t shows but also how the 
existent feels and imagines i t s own existence* A work of ar t 
i s , therefore, a product of *a free act bom out of spontaneity 
i tself*• I t i s authentic because i t has an exis tent ia l 
Import. I t shows, in c lear perspective, the Joy, the despair, 
the mystery as v/ell as the poas ib i l l t l e s of meaningfulness or 
meaninglessness of human existence* In th i s sense, ar t can 
contribute much to the rea l i za t ion of one*s authenticity. 
(b ) . Man, in Jasper*a philosophy, as in almost a l l the 
other ex i s ten t ia l philosophies, l a without essence or a nature. 
Jaspers approaches human existence i n two different ways which 
reveal two d i s t inc t but Inseparable phases of i t s being. These 
^^ ^^ * Daalen and Bxlatenz, While Daalen Is myself regarded aa 
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an object, Bxlatenz is my very self. Exlatenz can neither 
be known as an object nor can it be grasped as a subject behind 
the phenomena. It is not something in general, because it 
is one's very own existence. Dasien is full of fixed and 
determined traits, but Existenz is infinitely free and open 
to new possibilities. Both the two-/phases of man's being, 
though opposed and in a constant conflict with each other, 
are, nevertheless inseparably connected. Only the philosophical 
reflection can illuminate Existenz. and make it able to 
communicate to other Existenz. 
Though both are in the world, but Dasien. in its attenpt 
to prolong its being in the world, gets not only lost in the 
objects of its desire but also does realize its boundry 
situations, thereby avoiding the ultimate limits of its 
Exist enz. It is, however. Exist enz which not only becomes 
aware of its ultimate limits but recognizes the boundary 
situations which a man can never avoid. It is a consciousness 
of this aspect of one's being that not only makes one free 
but also enables one to express authentically. 
One question regarding authenticity that arises, ist 
In what way does art contribute to man's realization of his 
authenticity ? Jaspers deals with this problem in the first 
volume of his work "Philosophy*, which is his magnum OPUS. 
Ls:) 
Hlatorically, Jaspers says, art, like philosophy, has 
served religion and has remained under its domination for a 
pretty long-period. Both the content and the consciousness 
of art remained identical with religious experience. Histori-
cally artist has not only remained anonymous but personally, 
he was not 'autogenous* in his work. He was creating 'sublime 
works* on the basis of a 'general transcendent consciousness*. 
However, it was not untill the liberation of philosophizing, 
Jaspers points out, that art also severed its ties with 
religion, 
Jaspers says that any attempt to find something common 
in all works of art and term it as its basic feature is 
misleading. Because it is not the essence of its origin but 
the essence of its medium which makes a woric of art historically 
communicable. In the words of JaspersI 
"Art originates as the elucidation of 
Existenz by an ascertainment that will 
let us visualize being in present existence. 
In philosophizing we treat being as think-
able, in art as representable."^ 
What Jaspers wants to point out la that when a worfc 
of art elucidates Existenz so that human being, in its present 
mode, is visualized, it becomes autogenous. But it is not 
philosophiilng, it is art. In Jaspers* view, "philosophizing 
is the thinking in life in which I extricate my life from 
untruth..., from existence to being.»^° But what it lifts 
J 4 :j 
us out from lies still within us. In this thinking truth 
is not our possession but our direction. It is never what one 
has attained. It is rather "on the borderline between what I 
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must conquer and what I may gain," In other words, in 
philosophizing, the fate of this intermediate being is inadequacy. 
In art, on the other hand, 'which in the form of vision 
externalized into an image*, fulfilment comes in a leap. 
Whenever we see a work of art, we forget the realities of 
existence and dewell, though for a moment only, in a world 
of its own, which has, of course, no flaws. But then we 
abruptly step back into existence. For Jaspers, viewing art is 
not being in between (as in philosophizing), it is being 
different. Jaspers sayst 
"Far from life, it seems in its perfection 
to contain all of lifej and yet when the 
living reality returns, life will be left 
22 to its own devices," 
This leads Jaspers to hold that while philosophizing 
is to think in the reality of life itself, 'art separates 
reality from contemplative enthralIment'.This is also the reason 
that the satisfaction, v^ich is denied to philosophizing, is 
so peculiar to the enjoyment of art. 
Art, as elaborated above, originates in the elucidation 
o^ Existenz, But Jaspers has already told ua in the beginning 
that Existenz alone is in a boundry situation. And the main 
i'U 
characteristic of a boundry situation is that it can no 
more be shown in 'historic reality*——than it can be defined 
in an ideal type. A work of art, therefore, while trying 
to show a boundry situation in historic reality is actually 
an attempt to distract the viewer from himself, Jaspers 
is, therefore, compelled to sayJ 
"Often I would like to Join the poet, 
to follow him into his rich world that 
gives or promises all things| and yet 
I have to believe the spares apoeal 
of one who philosophizes. It will be 
my experience that less I forsake myself, 
and the less I desist from my own philoso-
phizing, the more open will my mind remain 
to the existential origin of art." ^  
As for the creativity in art and philosophy, Jaspers 
upholds his above opinion. He says that the essential 
quality of man is to seek his own uplift in philosophizing. 
This quality becomes communicable in the works produced by 
the individuals known as philosophers and artists. 
Though the substance for a work, to both the philosopher 
as well as the artist, comes from Exlstenz alone, but the 
possibility of communication comes firom creative faculty only. 
What an artist produces is not onlyimpenetrable and infinite 
in its origin but is also new like ever unfolding reality. 
4'^ 
"The truth of the creative ability", for Jaspers, 
"lies in its service to the Elxistenz that unfolds by virtue 
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of creation." Artists of different ages have brought 
revolutionary changes, through their works, in the map of 
the realm of art. Though they create perfect woiics but they 
do not seem, to Jaspers, to touch the innermost existence 
of being. Jaspers points out: 
"To make the language of transcendence 
creatively audible, it will not suffice 
to be Existenz. nor will it suffice to be 
a genius. How the one upholds the other 
in an artist, in a singularity that defies 
repetition is the secret of his origin." -^  
Jaspers, however, concludes that an artist as an 
Existenz is more than his work. Since each work of art, 
unlike a philosophical work, represents a complete and perfect 
whole, the very perfection of a work of art, as well as, 
detachment of its existential ground, puts the artist into 
the state of existential unrest. This not only evokes the 
lust of creation but also the pain and discontent without 
which creative process cannot continue. 
i . i : 
SARTRE'S THEORY 
OP 
IMAGINATION 
Imagination i s one of the e s s e n t i a l elements in 
a r t and a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y . I t has been defined, i n t e rp re t ed 
and analysed i n d i f f e r en t ways by philosophers as well as 
l i t t e r a t e u r s . Being appl icab le i n almost a l l the f 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i z a t i o n ^ the nature and process of imagination, 
i s to some e x t e n t , genera l and ambiguous. Epistemologists 
and psycho log i s t s , a r e , accordingly, as qual i f ied to opine 
about i t , as the c r i t i c s of Art and l i t e r a t u r e . For, t h i s 
problem i s of c e n t r a l Importance in both the f i e l d s of 
philosophy and l i t e r a t u r e , though the l i n e of demarcation 
between the two f i e l d s has no t , h i s t o r i c a l l y , been much c l e a r . 
As an appropr ia te and purposeful medium of expression, some 
of the phi losophers have a c t u a l l y entered the f ie ld of 
l i t e r a t u r e . Sartire, Kafka, Camus, Dostoyevsky and Iqbal a re 
Ml 
only some of the recent examples of this approach. Hence in 
our treatment of the problem of imagination, not only will 
the theories of philosophy and literature overlapi we will 
also include the majority of the recent eocponents of episte?* 
mology and psychology as well as those of Art and literature. 
The present chapter is divided into two parts vizt 
( A ) , A brief historical survey of the concept of imagination. 
( B ) . A detailed analysis of Sartre's concept of imagination. 
( A ) , A brief historical survey of the conceipt of 
Imaglnationt 
(I), The concept of imagination is essentially psycholo-
gical in nature. Psychology as a fullfledged discipline is 
a very late development in the field of knowledge. Early 
Greek thinkers might have dealt with other psychological 
problems but wittingly or unwittingly, they never dealt with 
this problem as we know it today. Imagination as a philoso-
phical or psychological problem happens to be as important 
as any other metaphysical problem but it failed to attract 
the attention of the Greeks. Since the Greek approach or 
outlook was mainly metaphysical, they could see nothing but 
the cognitive value of the mental process ignoring its 
intrinsic characteristics. We will present, here, Just an 
overview of Plato and Aristotle because they are undoubtedly 
the most important representatives of the Greek period. 
^ 5 . " -
Being conducive to his •Theory of Ideas*, imagination, 
for Plato, remains a somewhat lower mental activity than 
26 that mental activity which gives knowledge. Plato's 
failure to recognize the value of art and artists emerges 
from his lack of interest in the mental process other than 
(pure) thought, 
Ari s to t l e ' s posit ion i s not much different from Plato. 
He could have categorically rejected P la to ' s philosophical 
posit ion (and infact he did) and substantiated his own view, 
but his outlook-^ towards the whole thought process, par t icular ly 
imagination, did not make any breakthrough. The sensit ive 
soul, for Aristotle has two aspects! the appetative and the 
cognit ive. While memory i s an out-growth of appetative soul, 
27 
imagination is an off-shoot of cognitive soul. Though, in 
detail, Aristotle differs from Plato, yet he also treats the 
problem of imagination from the cognitive point of view. This 
position leads us to hold that, although the Greek period is 
marked with purely metaphysical tendencies, their approach to 
imagination, art and artistic creativity was purely episte-
mological • Ignoring the intrinsic characteristics of 
such a vital process. 
(II). The PXatonlc-Ariatotlian tradition dominated all 
fields of knowledge upto 15th century A.D. untill the dogmatic 
approach towards the subject was challanged during Renaissance. 
All old traditions of belief and dogma, so far held in esteem. 
)-r; 
were finally shattered and thrown off with the dawn of 
modern period, i.e. the beginning of 16th century A.D. But 
most of the philosophers of new tendency viz. Rationaliam. 
who were interested in imagination and artistic creativity, 
also dealt with this problem from epistemological point of 
view. Deacartis, who represents the Rationalist stream of 
thinkers, could neither free himaelf from the Scholastic 
influence nor could he fully understand the problem of 
imagination from empirical point of view. Descartes saysi 
"...no corporeal species is received in 
the mindt pure thinking is performed 
without any corporeal speciesj Imagina-
tion, however, which can only arise in 
the case of corporeal things needs 
species, which is a truely corporeal 
thing."^^ 
Descartes further clarifies this stand in his 
"Meditations-Vand maintains that imagination is concerned 
with all that which is picturable (which can be perceived) 
and that which is unpicturable falls in the domain of imder-
2Q 
standing. ^ The notion of unpicturable part of thought 
indicates the scholastic (or spiritualistic) influence on 
Descartes, the notion of picturable part in his theory is 
a clear indication of the presence of empirical tendency in 
him. It is, however, an entirely different question and out 
of the scope of this work, whether rationalists, on the whole 
MV 
wanted to emanicipate philosophy from Christian dogmatics 
or they were actually interested in rationalising Christianity, 
But so far as the problem of imagination is concerned, their 
approach only emphasized the superiority of intellectualiza-
tlon, thereby coming very close to Greek rationalist tradition. 
While the Greeks had intentionally regarded imagination as 
a somewhat lower mental activity, the rationalists did it 
unintentionally. 
The shape of philosophy in the 18th and I9th centuries 
would have been totally different, had Descarte*s methodic 
doubt, which was pregnant with anti-dogmatism and anti-
mystic tendencies, been carried further. Neo-Platonism and 
mysticism were Just to re-emerge in the garb of rationalism. 
A revolt against these tendencies issued in the form of 
empiricism culminating in Hume's philosophy. 
Hume*3 approach to imagination was entirely different 
than that of his predecissors. He made a clear distinction 
between impressions and ideas. Hume saysi 
"All the impreaslona of the human mind 
resolve themselves into distinct kinds 
which I shall call impressions and ideas."-^ 
The faint Images of the impressions of external objects 
are called by Hume as ideas, which are nothing but the images 
themselves. He divides them further into simple and complex 
categories. The function of imagination is to associate 
different parts of simple and complex impressions, in a 
manneri as it pleases* so as to form a new idea. Hence, 
imagination in Hume's view becomes not only a free mental 
activity but also a creative faculty of mind. He however, 
warns usjagainst confusing imagination with memory, because 
freedom, which is the basic characteristic of imagination, 
distinguishes it from memory that is devoid of it. In a 
way, Hume anticipates Sartre in maintaining that without 
freedom neither imagination nor creativity is possible. This 
view of Hume is important, because it furnished the basic 
model to Sartre, inspite of his many objections to the Humeian 
view. (These objections will be discussed in the 2nd part of 
this chapter). 
The two divergent trends viz. Rationalism and Empiricism, 
got converged in the appropristic philosophy of Kant. For 
Kant, 'something* besides the sense impressions (Empiricism) 
and the ideas we have about them (Rationalism) is always at 
work in all our experiences. Kant sayst 
"The first that is given is the phenomenon, 
which if connected with consciousness, is 
called perception, Aa every phenomenon 
contains a manifold, and different percep-
tions are found in the mind singly and 
scattered, a connection of them is necessary, 
such as they cannot have in the senses by 
a J 
themaelvea. There exists therefore, in 
MB an active power lor the synthesis of 
the manifold which we call imagination."^' 
Unlike Plato and Descartes, imagination in Kant is 
not a lower mental activity. He elevatas imagination or the 
image making faculty so high that, in his view, the experience 
of the world is not possible without it» He describes this 
image faculty in two ways, viz, empirical Imagination and 
transcendental imagination. Empirical imagination is a 
purely image making process which varies from man to manj 
transcendental imagination operates at the level of under-
standing of the world which is also sub;)ect to change, 
(III), Kant's distinction between empirical and 
transcendental imagination leads us to the distinction between 
primary and secondary imagination made by Coleridge, Primary 
imagination, according to Coleridge, is somewhat identical 
with Kant*s empirical imagination in sofaras its function is 
to perceive the world. Similarly secondary imagination is 
also somewhat identical with transcendental imagination in 
sofar as its function is to make the images on the bEisis of 
perceptual knowledge. Secondary imagination is identical 
with transcendental imagination to the extent of being the 
basic material on which it works, but in sofar as their 
development and end products are concerned, they are poles 
apart. In Blographa»Literiraia. Coleridge sayst 
) I 
"The primary imagination I hold to be 
the l iving power and prime agent of 
a l l human perception and as a repe t i t ion 
of a l l human I AM. The secondary I 
consider as an echo of the former, co-
existing with the conscious w i l l , yet 
s t i l l as ident ical with the primary in 
the kind of i t s agency, and differing 
only in degree and in the mode of i t s 
operation* I t dissolves, diffuses, 
d i ss ipa tes , in order to recreate ,"^ 
The sole function of primary imagination i s perception 
of the worldi secondary imagination, though an echo of the 
primary imagination, i s different from i t . The tvro are 
ident ica l in kind but d i f fer i n degree and the mode of opera-
t ion . Secondary imagination i s iden t i ca l , to some extent , 
with Kant*s transcendental imagination, but i t i s ent i re ly 
different from Hume's concept of imagination. According to 
Hume, imagination unifies simple or complex ideas so as to 
create a new idea, but in the view of Coleridge, secondary 
imagination 'd issolves , diffuses and diss ipates*, so as to 
create a new idea. He comes closer to Hume when he holds 
perception not only as an essent ia l ground for but also a 
gate-way t o , imagination. 
I t i s , however, Wordsworth that goes diz»ectly against 
Hume and Coleridge on the role of perception in imagination. 
In Wordsworth's view, imagination can woric even when there 
i s no perception, for making i t dependent on perception i s 
!,) 
rather equating it with memory. Iftilike Hume and Coleridge, 
Wordsworth holds that absence of perception should make no 
obstacle for the artistic imagination. In the Peddlarj* 
Wordsworth shows how he had preserved his childhood impressions 
which he could narrate when he was quite old. 
Preservation of childhood impressions seems to be 
nothing but a clear or dim memory. Wordsworth also seems to 
have fallen prey to \^at Sartre calls the 'illusion of imme-
nance*, because his statements as well as his approach to 
imagination is nothing but the result of thinking in space 
and in terms of space, notwithstanding his extraordinary 
contributions to the world of literature. 
(IV). It is well known that our century witnessed a 
rapid change in almost all fields of knowledge. During the 
last decades of the 19th century, while scientists were 
engaged in reducing their disagreements, philosophers were 
badly suffering from the centuries old disease of differing 
with one another and infact multiplying their disagreements. 
This resulted in a philosophical revolution in the form of 
the emergence of diverse schools of thought. The most 
important of these schools of thought are Analytical philosophy 
and Existentialism, While Ludwig Wittgenstein represents 
Analytico*Linguistic philosophy, Sartre represents Existential 
philosophy. 
i.i:.' 
Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem of Imagination 
is not as definite and that concrete as could have been 
expected from his analytical genius. His approach to It is 
quite general. In Blue and Brovm Booksp he comes very close 
to Sartre when he saysi 
"There la a kind of general disease of 
thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called the mental 
state from which all our acts spring 
XL 
as from a reservoir, "•'^  
Confining himself to a purely linguistic analyses 
without seeking any existential import in imagination, 
Wittgenstein does not ask the questions like *what an image 
is* or more Importantly, »what happens when one imagines 
something*, but he discusses, in detail, as to how we use 
and Interpret the word imagination. He describes the nature 
of imaginifcaig by explaining the relation between v^at we say 
about the image i.e. how we use and interpret it, and what 
we say about the object of which it is an image. After a 
detailed analysis of this relativity, which is irrelevant to 
our problem, Wittgenstein maintains, that imagination is 
our means of interpreting the world as well as of forming 
images in the mind. Images themselves are not separate from 
our Interpretations of the world; they are our way of 
•Kti 
thinking of the objects in the world,-^ "^  
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This brief h is tor ic background of the concept of 
imagination enables us to analyse Sar t re ' s theory of imagi-
nation as discussed in his "Psychology of Imagination", 
However, to make the concept more perspicuous, a brief 
sketch of the human rea l i ty aa depicted in his * magnum-opus' 
"Being and Nothingness" i s also necessary. 
(B)• Sar t re ' s Conception of Imaginationt 
Our discussion of 'Being' and i t s two dimensions 
in phenomenological perspective (de ta i l s presented in the 
f i r s t chapter) has led us to maintain that while being-in-
i t s e l f refers to that aspect of being which, by v i r tue of 
i t s being ident ica l with i t s e l f , i s complete and fu l l of 
existencei Being-for*itself, on the other hand, because of 
i t s complete openness, has ab i l i ty to receive existence 
and transcend being-in- i tse l f . However, being-for- i t se l f 
i s always dependent upon being-in- i tsel f because conscious-
ness cannot ar ise in a being without the physical body. I t 
i s t h i s consciousness which transcends i t s e l f pointing 
towards ful f i l led being which i t never a t ta ins* 
Being-in-i tself , which i s complete and coaipact, has no 
re la t ion with the external world. But, Being-fox^itself, 
in which ac t iv i ty and creat iv i ty are impl ic i t , cannot be 
thought of without i t s re la t ion to the external world. The 
world, for Sartre , i s not the t o t a l i t y of things as they 
^1 k 
exist but is a 'construct of \^at is seen of the externality 
through the for-itself*. Sartre sayst 
"As for the world—-i.e., the totality 
of beings as they exist within the 
compass of the circuit of self-ness—— 
this can be only what human reality 
sujTsaas towards itself... what I ask 
in the face of the world is the 
coincidence with a for*itself, which 
I am and which is conscious of the 
world."^^ 
This statement makes it clear that the external 
world, for Sartre, ha« meaning only in terms of human 
consciousness which iS projecting itself towards it. This 
does not however, imply that existence of external world 
depends on man's consciousness or the external world conditions 
consciousness or that the consciousness can exist without 
the external world. Sartre holds thatt 
"It would be in vain to imagine that 
consciousness can exist without a giveni 
in that case it would be consciousness 
(of)itself as consciousness of nothing 
——that is, absolute nothingness. But 
if consciousness exists in terms of the 
given, this does not mean that the given 
conditions consciousness; consciousness 
is a pure and simple negation of given 
and it exists as the disengagement from 
the certain given and as an engagement 
towards a certain not yet existing end."-'' 
) . ; . ) 
Human reality or consciousness enjoys lull freedom 
in its process from disengagement to engagement which it 
never attains. For Sartre, human reality is free because 
*it is not enough'. 
"It is free because it is perpetually 
wrenched away from itself and because 
it has been separated by a nothingness 
from what it is and from what it will 
be.-58 
And at the same time, for human reality to be is to 
choose oneself. Sartre points outi 
"Nothing comes to it either from the 
outside or from within \rtiich it can 
receive or accept. Without any help 
whatsoever, it is entirely abandoned 
to the intolerable necessity of making 
itself be-down to the slightest 
detail."^^ 
It follows then that if 'human reality is free* because 
•it is not enough* and in order *to be*, one has *to choose 
for oneself* because 'nothing comes from outside or from 
within* then this freedom should be reflected in all the 
human actions. For our purpose, we will elaborate, in the 
context of Sartre*s ontology, his treatment of the problem 
of imagination, pointing out how far it is a free mental 
activity in artistic creative process• 
I .) 1 
For a phenomenologlcal analysis of an image, Sartre, 
at the very beginning deals with the question about the 
nature of that activity which leads us to say *I have an 
image'. He distinguishes the image which is the object 
of our actual consciousness from the image which we describe 
through any work of art. Tfee object, for Sartre, can be 
described as it appears to us in the form of image unless the 
actual consciousness of the ob;)ect remains unaltered. This 
description is not, however, the description of the image as 
such. For, a description of the image, Sartre says, a new 
act of consciousness called reflection is required in which 
the attention is turned away from the object and directed 
to the manner in which the object is projected in mind. 
Thus a description of an image is possible only by an act of 
second degree i.e. by reflection and "it is this reflective 
. Ao 
act which permits the Judgement •! have an image'." 
The mental image, so established by our reflective act, 
can have, according to Sartre, the following four character-
istics: 
i). Unlike his many predecessors, Sartre maintains that 
image is itself a consciousness. It is neither in or out of 
consciousness. As pointed out in the first part of this 
chapter, Sartre comes very close to Wittgenstein in criticising 
the philosophers who considered mind as some sort of storehouse 
where images not only live, but intermingle, develop and form 
]rr: 
new ideas. For Sartre, these philosophers, particularly 
Hume, are the victims of the 'illusion of imnenanca* because 
they believe not only that the image is in consciousness but 
also the object of the image is in consciousness. 
This adaconception arises only from our habit ol 
•thinking in space and in terms of space*. Since Hume 
believed that "what is true of the object is also true of 
41 the idea**, he came to the conclusion that to have an idea 
of an object, for example, Tess, is to have Tess in conscious-
ness) and whatever qualities the object had, so had the idea. 
Sartre says that had these philosophers not taken the 'illu-
sion of immenance* for granted, the radical distinction 
between consciousness and the conception of an image would 
have been avoided. 
Our perception, Sartre says, is a certain consciousness 
and the subject, for example, Tess, is the object of that 
consciousness. Now if we shut our eyes and produce an image 
of Teas we have Just perceived, Tess norw occuring as an image 
can no more enter into consciousness as it could do so as an 
object. This is because, the image of Tess is not and cannot 
be Tess. Whether we perceive or imagine Teas, who is before 
us, seated on a chair, she always remains outside conscious-
ness. Sartre says: 
1 ' - • 
"Whether I see or imagine that chair, 
the object of my perception and that of 
my image are identical, it is that chair 
of straw on which I am seated, only 
consciousness is related in two different 
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ways to the same chair." 
This statement makes it clear that the object is not 
in consciousness, not even as an image. It is also not 
even a superficial appearance of an object which has somewhat 
"extrinsic" relation to the existing object. It is, however, 
evident, that it is a 'certain type of consciousness*, a 
synthetic organisation* which has a direct relation to the 
existing object. This'certain type of consciousness' is not 
what may be called an image, because consciousness by virtue 
of its nature is actual and concrete and exists in and for 
Itself. For Sartre, the only thing that can be said is that 
the word 'image' or 'mental image' indicates a relation of 
consciousness to the object. It is this 'image' or 'mental-
image* or to use the more appropriate word 'imaginative-
consciousness' which, according to Sartre, is 'born', 'appears', 
'develops' and 'disappears* in accordance with the rules 
appropriate to it. 
11). But our reflection towards this image can not be 
considered as observation in the same way as we observe the 
material objects. To show that it is a sort of quasl-obsejrva-
tlon, Sartre distinguishes three types of consciousnesses 
\r>i 
a). Perceptual consciousness, 
b). Conceptual COhsclousness. 
c). Imaginative consciousness. 
In perception, the object enters In one's consciousness 
In its completeness but the object can be seen from one side 
only. It allows the object appear only In a series of profiles. 
But in conception one can think of the concrete essences in a 
single act of consciousness. One can seize it in its entirety 
at one glance which is not possible in perception. That is 
why, Sartre holds, we can never perceive a thought nor think 
a perception. The two phenomena are radically different. 
Sartre says: 
"The one is knowledge which is conscious 
of itself... the other is a synthetic 
AT 
unity of multiplicity of appearances."^ 
Possibility of illusion makes the perceptusuL knowledge 
hypothetical in nature. But an object as an image(»l.e, in 
Imaginative consciousness) is presented Immediately for what 
it is. Its knowledge is not hypothetical? its knowledge is 
final. The difference between the two is that knowledge in 
perception forms Itself slowly, whereas in Imagination 
the knowledge is immediate. This characteristic makes imagi-
nation not only a synthetic act which is complete at the very 
moment of its appearance but it also gives us that knowledge 
which we already possess. Sartre holdsi 
}{]') 
"The difference (between perception and 
images) is not that of vividness but 
rather that the object of the images can 
in no way exist in the world of perception, 
they do not meet the necessary conditions," 
Moreover, in perception, objects constantly overflow 
consciousness, while the object of the image is never more 
than the consciousness one has; it is limited by consciousness. 
The origin of the image cannot therefore be determined fix)m 
the imagej 'the very act that gives me the object as an image 
includes the knowledge of what it is*. 
On the basis of this reasoning Sartre maintains that 
an image never reveals any new aspect of the object. »We 
can be deceived by the perception but not by the image, 
because it is entirely certain and concrete*. The meaning of 
an image is also certain, concrete and immediate* It occurs 
without a need to decipher it. That is also the reason why 
the world of images is a world in which nothing happens. 
It, therefore, follows that though our attitude towards 
the object is that of observation, but since it does not add 
anything to our knowledge it cannot be called observation. 
Sartre holds that we should call it quasi-observation, 
iii)• Though, in contrast to perception, no external 
criteria can be assigned to imaginative consciousness but it 
t : : 
posits its object as nothingness. Every consciousness, 
as we know, assumes its object in its own way, Perception 
posits its object as existing; an image also assumes an 
•act of belief* for the existence of its object. This act 
of belief, according to Sartre, can have four forms. These 
are (1). non-existent, (2) absent. (3) existing elsewhere 
(4) self-neutralization. 
The first two, as ia evident, are pure negations; the 
fourth 'corresponds to a suspension or neutralization of the 
proposition' while the third, though positive, assumes an 
implicit negation of the actual and the present existence of 
the object. Sartre sayst 
"...This positional act—-and this is 
essential——is not superimposed on the 
image after it has been constituted. 
The positional act is constitutive of 
the consciousness of the image." 
Therefore, the main characteristic of imaginative 
consciousness is that its very structure implies the negation 
of present and actual existence of the object. Sartre saysi 
"Alive, appealing, and strong as an image 
is, it presents its object as not being... 
We seek in vain to create in ourselves the 
belief that the object really exists by 
means of our conduct towards itx we can 
\iV[ 
pretend for a second, but we cannot 
destroy the immediate awareness of its 
46 
nothingness." 
As elaborated above, the ob.ject of imaginative conscious-
ness is either absent or does not exist, Sartre adds that 
imaginative consciousness, however^ "presents itself as an 
imaginative consciousness, that is, as a spontaneity which 
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produces and holds on tne object as an image." ' This image 
is spontaneous. Being 'transversal* in nature, it is not 
knowledge. It is 'a diffused light which consciousness 
releases for itself. 
The essence and substance of these four characteristics 
is that an image is neither a condition nor a 'solid and 
opaque residue*, nor is it a 'cross-section of the stream 
of consciousness* but a consciousness which is not and cannot 
be a part of some larger consciousness. This consciousness 
is, however, unable to reveal any new aspect of the object 
because "the object as an image is never anything more than 
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the consciousness one has of it." And, finally, image is 
not only spontaneous but it also posits its object as nothing-
ness because its object exists elsewhere which amounts to 
implicit negation of the actual and present existence of its 
object. 
This account prepares the ground to examine all such 
objects, for example, portraits, reflections in a mirror etc.. 
1 i,K) 
which, although existing in the external world, are also 
called images. For Sartre, the only factor common to all 
such objects, which are various species of the same genius, 
is to make the absent thing present, to present them to 
perception. Except for mental images, the material of all 
such objects that brings an absent thing to perception can 
be determined. The material of the mental image, Sartre 
aays, "derives its meaning solely from the intention that 
4 Q 
animates it," ^  But this intention is not the object itself. 
Intention serves only a means for evoking its objects or 
as representations of the absent object. It, therefore, 
follows that the image is an act which envisions an absent 
or non-existent object by means of a physical or mental 
content which is present only as an analogical representative 
of the object envisioned. 
There is, however, no clear cleavage between the world 
of images and the world of objects because "the two worlds", 
Sartre holds, "real and imaginary are composed of the same 
stuff. Only the grouping and interpretation of these objects 
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varies." It is only the attitude of consciousness which 
defines the imaginery and the real world. And it is this 
attitude of consciousness which remains implicit at the 
heart of every authentic work of art. This attitude of 
consciousness also differentiates mental images from photos, 
signs, portraits, schematic drawings, faces in fire, spots 
ic: 
on walls etc. In all such cases, the object is present 
but so far as the mental image is concerned, it has no referent 
in the external world. To objectify mental image is, for 
Sartre, to arrest it in its surroundings, "to localize it in 
apace between one thing and the other". Mental image can 
neither mingle up with the surroundings nor can space be 
ascribed to it. Sartre maintainsi 
"The fact of the matter is that the mental 
image does envision a real thing, which 
exists among other things in the world of 
perception} but it envisions that thing by 
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means of a mental content.""^ 
Just as in the case of pictures, photos, carricatures, 
the common trait or law is that they are objects for consciousness] 
similarly, the purely mental content of the meixtal image does 
not escape this law. Hence, Sartre saysi 
"A consciousness which faces the thing it 
envisions is a perceptual consciousness; 
and a consciousness which envisions the 
thing as empty is pure consciousness of 
meaning. p52 
This unavoidable necessity of consti tuting a mental 
image as an object for consciousness i s , for Sartre, the 
transcendence of the represen ta t ive ' . This transcendence 
does not, however, mean any external i tyl i t i s the represented 
object that i s external and i s not i t s mental analogue. 
u:r, 
This description of the mental image leads Sartre to 
the solution of the fundamental question regarding the 
nature that could be attributed to consciousness if it is 
capable of imagining. For Sartre the real nature of conscious-
ness can be revealed only vrtien the phenomenological method is 
applied to it. But phenomenological reduction, at once, 
confronts us, face to face, with the transcendental conscious-
ness which, as already told by Sartre, *unveils itself our 
reflective description*. Therefore, this analysis will yield 
the results pointing to the 'intuition of the essence of 
consciousness'. 
The phenomenological analysis unfolds that transcendent 
consciousness implies a consciousness which is constitutive 
of the world. This world is not, however, constituted of 
such objects as 'the earth, the animals or the men and their 
concrete stories*. Sartre saysi 
"We are here in the presence of a primary 
and irreducible fact which presents itself 
as contingent and irrational specifications 
of the neomatic essence of the world." "^  
Some phenomenologists may claim this 'uncovering of 
the contingent existent in its entirely as metaphysics but 
we are not concerned with this issue here. What is of primary 
concern to us is to know 'what must a consciousness be in 
order to possess the power to imagine ? 
h':?; 
At the very beginning of the analysis of mental image 
Sartre has already warned us against falling prey to the 
'illusion of immanence* • All the theories which are the 
product of the illusion of immanence supply images such types 
of existence which are strictly like those of things; 'they 
are reborn sensations'; 'they belong to intra-mundane existence'. 
The image on the other hand, is as real as other existence. 
The only question concerning the images is the problem of 
their relationship to the exlstents, and whatever that 
relationship may be, the existence of the image remains intact. 
As a matter of fact, the existential problem of the 
images cannot be sidetracked. Keeping in view the whole 
philosophy of Sartre, it can be held that there is a certain 
type of existence attributable to the objects of our conscious-
ness. The hypothesis we have about imaginative consciousness 
happens to be radically different from the hypothesis of the 
consciousness of the real. This also implies that the type 
of existence of the object of image also differs in nature 
from the type of existence of the object grasped as real. If 
I form an image of Tess, my imaginative consciousness includes 
a certain position of the existence of Tess, insofar as she 
is now at this very moment in Kashmir or Delhi. But while 
she appears to me as an image, this Tess, who is in either 
Kashmir or Delhi appears to me as absent. It is this absence 
which Sartre calls actuality and it is this existential 
nothingness of imagined object which is enough to distinguish 
] f ; v 
images from the objects of perception. 
There is, however, much difference between an object 
being envisioned as nothing and being given-as-absent. This 
is mainly because in perception, many •empty intentions' are 
derived from the elements of the object now given to other 
elements of the object which are no longer given or revealed 
to us. For instance, the legs of the arm-chair conceal 
certain curves and a certain design of the rug on which it 
stands* But we seize these hidden 'arabesques* aa existing 
now, as hidden but not at all • absent. It is therefore the 
given data which enables us to determine or posit the object 
that is not given as real. Hidden parts are as real as the 
given parts. "In this senaa^f Sartre holds, "to perceive 
this or that real datum is to perceive it on the foundation 
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of total reality as a whole."^^ 
But the imaginative act is the reverse of the act of 
reality. If we want to imagine the hidden arabesques, we 
have to isolate them by directing our total attention updn 
than. We have to constitute them by ceasing to grasp them 
in •vaccume* and in order to grasp them by themselves, we 
have to grasp them as absent. In this sense, Sartre maintains, 
our "imaginative act is at once isolating, constituting and 
annihilating".^^ 
; < • ) 
This argument leads us to the conclusion that imaginative 
consciousness is something like unreality. And that the nature 
or the essential requisite for a consciousness to be able to 
imagine is that "it must have the possibility of positing an 
eg 
hypothesis of unreality." 
In the first part of this chapter, it was held that 
the imaginary object can be posited either as *non-existent' 
or as 'absent* or as 'not posited as existing' or as 'existing 
elsewhere*. Now whatever the form an imaginary object may 
have among these four forms, the point to be noted is that all 
of them Include the entire category of negation, though in 
different degrees. Thus the negative act is not only consti-
tutive of the image but it is its most intimate structure 
'negation is in no way added to the image'. This negation 
or negative act is, however, to be held in relation to the 
whole world so as to make an image possible. But if we 
accept the psychological notion that consciousness consists 
of the reflection of the succession of determined physical 
facts, then It is entirely impossible for a consciousness to 
ever produce anything but the real. Therefore, in order to 
be able to form an image it becomes obligatory on the part 
of consciousness to escape from the world. "It must be able 
to withdraw from the world by its own nature and efforts. In 
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a word it must be free." It is, therefore, clear that 
negation is the only factor which is an essential condition 
] ( > ^ 
for consciousness to conceive the unreal or to produce an 
image. This however, does not imply that the image i s purely 
and simply world-negated. Sartre sayst 
" I t i s always the world negated from a 
cer ta in point of view, namely, the one 
tha t permits the positing of the absence 
or the non-existenpe of the object 
presented as an image." 
This * cer ta in point of view* can be cal led a s i tua t ion . 
Hence, the essent ia l pre-requisi te which enables consciousness 
to imagine I s that i t must be situated in the world, i . e . 
*be-in-the-world». I t i s th is si tuation-ln-the-world which 
motivates consciousness for the construction of any unreal 
object . 
I t , therefore, follows that in order to imagine, 
consciousness must be free from the specific r e a l i t y . This 
freedom must, however, be able to define i t s e l f by a *being-
in-the-world*, which i s atbnce ' the const i tu t ion and the 
negation of the world. "Thus the unreal , which i s always 
a two-fold nothingness——'nothingness of i t s e l f in relat ion 
to v/orld and nothingness of the world in r e l a t ion to itself* 
——must always be constituted on the foundation of the world 
which i t denies. ' '^ 
We are now in a position to maintain that imagination 
i s not an 'empirical power of consciousness' but the whole 
of consciousness as It realizes its freedom, Sartre saysi 
"Every concrete and real situation of 
consciousness In the world Is big with 
Imagination as much as it always presents 
itself as a withdrawing from the real," 
It does not, however, follow that all perception of the 
real must reverse Itself In imagination. But as consciousness 
is always In a situation because it is always free, it always 
and at each moment has the possibility of producing the unreal. 
"The unreal is produced outside of the world by a consciousness 
which stays in the world and it is because he is tranacendently 
free that man can imagine," It is this position that leads 
Sartre to define the structure of imagination to be "something 
which is nothingness in relation to the world and in relation 
62 to which the world is nothing." 
SARTRE»S INTERPRETATION 
OF 
ART 
Sartre's theory of imagination leads to his interpre-
tation of Art and literature. He starts with the assumption 
that a work of art is a piece of unreality. It implies that 
an object that we enjoy at aesthetic level, for example in 
a painting, is not real but an impression carved out of 
unreality. This unreal becomes an object of art in which 
the imaginary is distinguished frx>m the real object. There 
is, of course, a general idea that the artist at first 
has a clear idea of the image which takes shape on the canvas 
through his creative work. This assumption may lead many 
of us to the belief that there occurs a transition from the 
imaginary to the real in art. But Sartre holds that it 
is not true, because that which is real in a painting is only 
the result of the brush strokes, the texture of the 
The word * artist* includes all those who are engagCKl in 
creative work, viz., poets, musicians, play writers,painters 
and the sculptures etc. 
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canvas and the shades of the colours. These components do 
not constitute the object of our aesthetic appreciation. 
Beauty of an object of art lies somewhere else, as Sartre 
sayst 
"What is beautifial is something 
which cannot be experienced as 
a perception and which by its 
very nature, is out of the world." "^  
The artist does not, therefore, realize any mental 
image through his work. He simply constructs a 'material 
analogue* of such a kind that everyone can grasp the image 
if he looks at the analogue. Imaginary, for Sartre, can 
neither be realized nor objectivized. A work of art is to 
be conceived only as a material thing 'presenting an unreal 
synthetic whole'. While observing a work of art, what 
deceives us most, for instance in a painting, is the real 
and sensuous pleasure produced by certain colours that 
belong to the world of perceptible reality. If a certain 
colour in a painting, such as reds of Matissee, produces 
a sensuous enjoyment in us, that is not an aesthetic enjoyment. 
It is purely sensuous pleasure. Sartre maintainsi 
"But when the red of the painting is 
grasped, it is grasped, inspite of every-
thing, as a part of an unreal whole and 
it is this whole that is beautiful."^^ 
r.*; 
However, the colours of a painting, which are the 
source of our aesthetic enjoyment when grasped as a part of 
an unreal whole are nevertheless unreal as there is no such 
thing as a pure colour. A certain colour is depicted by an 
artist through a certain object; that colour can truely be 
enjoyed only when it is grasped as a constituent element of 
the unreal. Accordingly, it is in the unreal that the 
relationship of colours and forms acquires its aesthetic 
meaning and value. The drawn objects, have a certain density, 
a material quality, depth and thickness, and are placed In 
a perspective that associates them in particular relations 
in a painting. They are, nevertheless, things in themselves, 
though unreal. "And it is precisely in the measure in which 
65 they are things that they are unreal." "^  Sartre holds that 
it would be a grave mistake if we maintain that a painting, 
although devoid of any meaning, is nevertheless a real object 
A painting is in no way an object of nature. A real object 
cannot function as ^ n analogue of any object. But when we 
contemplate it , says Sartre, we never consider it from 
realistic view-point. The painting is still an analogue. 
What is manifested by means of the canvas is an unreal 
collection of things and objects. It is this configuration 
of unreal objects which Sartire designates as beautiful. 
Ihe aesthetic enjoyment, therefore, is *a manner of 
apprehending the unreal object'. Though aesthetic enjoyment 
is In-ltself real, but it is not to be grasped as for-itself, 
as if produced by the real colours €ind objects. "What happens", 
Sartre holds, "is that the aesthetic object is constituted 
and apprehended by an imaginative consciousness which posits 
it as unreal." 
Applying the same principle to all other arts viz., 
fiction, poetry, drama etc., Sartre maintains that the poet 
or the novelist or the dramatist constructs an unreal object 
by means of verbal analogue. For example, an actor, in a 
drama, presents himself as an analogue of an imaginary person. 
He gives expression to his feelings, his gestures, his 
strength as an analogues of the feeling and conduct of the 
character he is enacting. In this way •he lives completely 
in an unreal way*. Even if the actor sheds his actual tears 
or experiences in the depth of his heart the Joy of the 
character he is enacting but these tears or the feelings of 
Joy are the analogue of the unreal tears or the pretended 
Joy. Sartre, therefore, holds thati 
"It is not the character who becomes 
real in the actor, it is the actor 
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who becomes unreal in his character." 
The actor who performs the role of Hamlet transforms 
himself into the character of the Prince of Denmark and 
makes himself unreal. And what holds true in the case of 
an actor is also true of the audience. The audience 
transcends the perceptual consclousneas and visualizes 
the image of Hamlet represented by the actor as real. 
Moreover, a piece of a work of art, which, as maintained 
by Sartre, is unreal, forms 'in-itself' its own space and 
time, Pablo Picasso's Guernica occupies a certain amount of 
space in a museum and Beethovan's symphonies, when played, 
take a certain amount of time. But the space and time of 
these works are not the space and time of the everyday life. 
If, for example, we start to listen to Beethovan's Seventh 
symphony, what exactly happens is that some people shut 
their eyes so as to detach themselves from the visual and 
dated events; others though watching the orchestra which 
plays the seventh symphony, do not see what they are looking 
at. Sartre says, the orchestra, the auditorium and even 
the conductor desappear, and we are 'confronted with the 
seventh symphony'• The symphony does not exist to the 
degree to which we listen to it in the hall. Sartj?e says: 
"It is not here... nor is it in the 
past,.. This is the work that matured 
68 in the mind of Beethoven on such a date." 
It is, therefore, beyond the real. It has its own 
time. It possesses an inner time. What is not in time is 
in no way real. The Seventh symphony is in no way in time, 
and hence is in no way real. It occurs by itself as absent. 
as 'being out of reach'. By virtue of its nature *it is out 
of the world'. We are unable to change even a single note 
of it. It, therefore, follows that the performance of the 
Seventh symphony is only its analogue. "It can manifest 
itself only through analogues which are dated and which 
6Q 
unroll in our lime." 
The same principle is api^licable to the sequences of 
events in other arts, such as novel, drama etc. Such events 
have no relation with the external world. They are, Sartre 
holds, not only outside of space and time, but are also 
outside of the field of existence. Sartre aayst 
"The unreal is produced outside of 
the world by a consciousness which 
stays in the world and it is because 
he is transcendentally free that man 
70 
can imagine." 
What Sartre wants to point out is that we can see, 
hear or read a work of art in an imaginary world, but not 
perceive it in actuality. This also makes clear the difference 
between the reality and the imaginary realm to which one is 
usually transported while perceiving or attending a work of 
art. 
After arriving at the conclusion that a work of art 
is an unreality, the question which immediately arises isj 
in case the work of art is an unreality, why does one create 
i , . 
ar t? Sartre says that we create ar t because a l l creative 
act ivi ty derives i t s impetus from Being-for-other, This 
statement i s clear indicat ion of the ontological foundations 
of Sar t re ' s theory of a r t . I t i s the consciousness of one's 
being that compells one to communicate with other. Art i s 
thus communication, A brief exposition of 'Being-for-ot:iers ' , 
as presented by Sartre in his 'Being and Nothingness* may help 
i n making this point c l ea r . 
For this purpose, we may refer to our previous chapter 
where the discussion was confined to "Being" and i t s two 
modalities, v iz . Being»ln-ilself and •Being-for- i tself ' . To 
th i s , a third medality i s added which Sartre designates as 
•Being-for-others'• 
•Being-in- i tself ' , as elaborated e a r l i e r , i s what i t 
i s . Being subjected to the pr inciple of ident i ty , i t includes 
no negation. I t i s 'as fu l l as an egg ' . 'Being-for- i tself», 
i s what i t i s not and i s not what i t i s . I t i s not at a l l 
but i s always creating i t s i l f , Consequently i t neither coincides 
with i t se l f nor follows the principle of iden t i ty . But the 
real izat ion of our *belng-for-its41f' comes from nowhere except 
through ' the gaze of others* i . e . the being*for-others. I t 
i s through this gaze i . e . through being-for-others that my 
myself i s revealed to me and i t i s through the same 'being-
for-others* that the other person, who seems to be only 'being-
i n - i t s e l f , reveals his ' b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f through th is gaze. 
iv;-, 
The most s t r i k i n g example of t h i s 'gaze* i s depicted 
by Sar t re i n h i s novel , "The Reprieve" through a l e t t e r 
received by i t s main cha rac t e r Mathieu from h i s fr iend Daniel. 
Some excerpts from the novel w i l l s u b s t a n t i a t e , t h i s theory. 
"You must have experienced, i n the 
subway, i n the foyer of a t h e a t r e , 
or i n a t r a i n , the sudden and irksome 
sense tha t you were being looked at 
from b e h i n d . . . we l l , t h a t i s what I 
f e l t for the f i r s t t ime, on September, 
26, a t th ree O'clock i n the afternoon, 
i n the ho te l g a r d e n . . . I became more 
compact and concentrated and opaque, 
I ex is ted i n the presence of a l o o k . . . 
Ah, Mathieu, what a discovery I I was 
aeetif 1 s t ruggled to know myse l f . . . and 
a l l the time I was seen, the inexorable 
look, an i n v i s i b l e s t e e l b l ade , was on 
m e . . . what anguish to d iscover that look 
as a un ive r sa l medium from which I 
cannot escapel But T»rfiat a r e l i e f as 
wellI I know at l a s t t ha t I am. I 
adapt fo r my own use, and to your 
d i s g u s t , your p rophe t ' s f o o l i s h , wicked 
words! "I think the re fo re , I am" . . . I 
say ' I am seen therefore I am*. . . he 
who sees me, causes me to be , 1 am as 
he sees m e . . . " 
But t h i s ' I am seen, the re fo re I am* i s not the ground 
to i n f e r tha t i n order to be ' b e i n g - f o r - i t s e l f • or to r e a l i s e 
17., 
It, the existence of the •other' as an Individual existence 
Is mandatory. Sartre analyses the problem of 'other' In the 
famous chapter of his "Beln^ and Nothingness" entitled 'The 
Look'• It Is out of scope of this work to 
present a detailed analysis of tlie problem of otherj some 
brief references to it, should, however, suffice to serve 
our purpose. Sartre sayst 
"I do not exist first In order that 
subsequently a contingency should 
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mark- me encounter the other." 
'Belng-for-K>thers', for Sartre, is an essential structure 
of our being. This structure is not established fj?om outside. 
"...it is by making explicit the pre-
ontologlcal comprehension which I 
have of myself that I apprehend 
belng-wlth-others as an essential 
characteristic of my being."'^ 
•Making explicit the pre-ontological comprehension' of 
our being implies that there is a transcendental relation 
with others which constitute our being Just as 'being-ln-the-
world is the measure of our hiaman reality.' Though the other 
Is the measure of our being but Sartre holdsJ 
"The other is the ex-centric limit 
which contributes to the constitution 
of my being. He is the test of my 
being inasmuch as he throws me outside 
( , 
of myself towards structures which at 
once both escape me and define mej It 
Is this test which originally reveals 
74 
other to me."' 
Therefore, it follows that since 'being-for-othera' 
is the essential structure of our being that 'at once both 
escapes and defines ourbeing', the creative activity which 
is the most important activity of our being, should invariably 
derive its impetus from •being-for-othera*• Art, for Sartre, 
la an expression language which reveals the others or the 
'being-for-othera*. Being an essential atructure of our being, 
*being-for-others* reveals both myself as well as the other 
and a work of art, which derives its Impetus from being-for* 
others, should therefore reveal the essential atructure of 
our being as well as those of the other. In "what is literature" 
Sartre accordingly holdsi 
"One of the chief reasons for artistic 
creation is certainly the need of feeling 
that we are essential in relationship to 
the world.""^^ 
An artist feels himself essential in relation to the 
world not only because of his inescapable relationship with 
the 'other* but also, the very structure of his being makes 
him to feel so. The feeling of this relationship is beauti-
fully depicted by Sartre in his "Nausea" where its main 
character Antonina Requentin writes about Monsieur de Rellebon 
! (, 
the following words: 
"Monsieur de Rollebon was my partner: 
he needed me in order to be and I 
needed him in order to feel my being, 
I furnished the raw material of which 
I had far too much, which I didnot know 
what to do with: existence, my existence. 
His task was to perform. He stood in 
front of me and had taken possession of 
my life in order to perform his life for 
me. I no longer noticed that I existed, 
I no longer existed in myself, but in 
himj it was for him that I ate, for 
him that I breathed, each of my movements 
had its significance outside, there. 
Just in front of me, in him... I was only 
a means of making him live, he was 
my raison d*etre« he had freed me from 
myself."' 
In addition, while creating a work of art, the artist 
also feels himself essential in relation to his creation. 
But then, Sartre points out, the creation becomes inessential 
in relation to the creative activity. It is mainly because, 
in perception, the object (for example a painting) becomes 
essential while the subject (that is the artist) becomes 
inessential. But while creating, the subject (that is the 
artist) becomes essential and the object (that is the >iork 
of art) becomes inessential. 
This dialectical process, according to Sartre, is 
nowhere so apparent as in the art of writing, "for the 
literary object is a peculiar top which exists only in 
movement." Fbr this literary top to emerge, a concrete 
act, called reading, is necesseiry. The literary top continues 
to exist so long as the reading continues. But the reader 
and the writer are poles apart. Reader is always ahead of 
the sentences he is readingj 'he is in a probable future'. 
But the writer cannot read what he writes, Sartre saysi 
"The operation of writing involves an 
implicit quasi-reading which makes the 
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real reading impossible,"' 
Unlike a reader, the writer makes "neither predictions 
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nor conjucturea. He pro^Jects."'^ The future of the reader 
is constituted of hundred pages filled with words which 
separates him from the end, but the future of the writer is 
absolutely blank, Sartre sayst 
"Thus the writer encounters every\rtiere 
only his knowledge, his will, his plans, 
in short himself. He touches only his 
subjectivity, the object he creates is 
out of reachf he does not create it for 
himself,"^ 
It would then be *the worst frustration* (as Sartre 
calls it), if an artist creates for himself. For Sartre, 
at the root of every creative activity there is always a 
! (^  •) 
•hypothetical audience* to whom the artist communicates. 
The. very attempt at creativity implies an audience as its 
•dialectical correlative'. There is, for Sartre, a certain 
kind of collaboration between the artist and his audience 
which results in the form of a work of art. Sartre saysi 
"It is the conjoint effort of author 
and reader which brings upon the scene, 
that concrete and imaginary object 
which is the work of the mind# There 
81 is no art except for and by others." 
Hence, in itself, a work of art is meaningless, a dead 
sign unless the 'other collaborates. It is the 'other' which 
makes it meaningful as well as purposeful. What the author, 
the poet, the artist or the musician undertakes to discover 
through his respective medium comes into existence only by 
the 'other'. That is vrtiy Sartre maintains thatt 
"To write is to appeal to the reader, 
to bring into objective existence 
the discovery vrtiich I have undertaken 
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by means of language." 
This 'appeal' is not to the reader as such? it is an 
appeal to the freedom of others. An artist appeals to others' 
freedom to collaborate in the creation of his work. When 
the artist as well as the other recognize this freedom, 'the 
work of art becomes an act of confidence in the freedom of 
men'. It implies that unless an artist as well as the other 
' ; . ; 
have a complete common experience of existential freedom, 
the creation of an authentic work of art is not possible. 
And when *a free man addresses a free man', the only-
subject of a work of art becomes the human freedom. Sartre, 
therefore, saysi 
"...the work can be defined as an imaginary 
presentation of the wor] 
demands human freedom*" 
ld insofar as it 
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While th is phenomenological explanation of art i s a 
categorical reject ion of a l l the other theories of a r t , i t 
also paves the way ^ for Sar t re ' s concept of commitment in 
l i t e r a t u r e . And commitment in Sa r t r e ' s whole thought system, 
i s analogous to human freedom. In 'what i s l i t e r a t u r e ' 
Sartre points outi 
"Commitment i s inherent in the act 
of wri t ing. To write i s to ta lk 
and to ta lk i s to reveal an aspect of 
the world in order to change i t . 
Li tera ture i s therefore, the resu l t of an 
a t t i t ude , conscious or unconscious towards 
the world."®^ 
A detailed analysis of Sar t re ' s concept of commitment 
will be given in the next chapter. For the present we can 
conclude that Sa r t r e ' s analysis of c rea t iv i ty does not aim 
at formulating any norms in aes the t ics . He i s basically 
analysing the nature of human consciousness and i t s peculiar 
role of transcendence into the unreal which resul t s in the 
creation of a work of a r t . 
^ ^ , ^ 
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EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTS AND SARTRE•S CREATIVE WRITINGS 
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COMMITMENT 
Consciousness Is in Immediate contact with things-in-
themselves. This view is based on phenomenology's basic 
axiom! Consciousness is conselousness of something that it 
is not of itself. Consequently, understanding involves no 
reference to an absolute in illation to which things would 
appear to be shifting and unreliable manifestation. This 
phenomenological analysis of Husserl leads one to discover 
the possibility of the meaningfulness of things-in-themselves. 
Instead of emphasising the question of structures which 
would make things understandable, existentialists stress upon 
the fact that everything encountered by consciousness exists. 
For existentialists, consciousness is fundamentally emotive; 
its nature is not that which reveals material things. Feeling, 
for example, is one of the most common states of consciousness. 
I' : 
Since consciousness can reflect only what exists, feeling 
co-exista with things and is a subject of philosophical 
enquiry of the same significance that is attached to things. 
Similarly, dread or fear exists as much as does a tree or 
a table and therefore en;ioy3 the status and significance of 
an object existing in the objective world. 
The fundamental problem for Husserl was to explain how 
every object could not only be unique but also comprehensible. 
He held that an object was not a sum total of its interchange-
able qualities. A quality cannot be separated from its object. 
It is the object in itself and not merely the means by which 
the real object is perceived that is hidden from us. 
Existentialists pointed out or rather enlarged this 
view by saying that Just as the quality of an object, for 
example, a particular colour, say red, is never the same in 
relation to another object because of being inseparable from 
its object, so no two existences can ever be identical. 
Existence is not only primary but also every human existence 
is unique. Existence is not a common quality that is added 
to something to produce man. Man is without any essence and 
there Is no universal eisence to which existence is added. 
We cannot define man first, for instance a rational being, 
and then describe him as a professor or an engineer, because 
a professor or an engineer can be described by his existence 
only, apart from them he Is nobody. 
In the view of exiatentlaaists, man is born in a certain 
historical situation and thereby acquires a character comple-
tely different from that of a man born in other ages. There 
is no possibility of conceiving a man apart from his given 
situation. Being conscious of situation and historicity, 
human existence is, therefore, unique. It implies that man 
has a certain historical commitment, a particular role t© play. 
For Sartre, existence precedes essence means that "man 
first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the 
'I 
world-—and defines himself afterwards." It means that he 
encounters his historicity and moulds himself accordingly. 
Thus he plcys a role in shaping his historic situation and 
making himself. "He will not be anything untill later, and 
2 
then he will be what he makes of himself." 
This inescapable decision on the part of man to be 
•what he makes of himself*, makes him not only responsible 
for his own existence but a legislator of the man. Because 
"in choosing what I shall be", Sartre holdsi "I choose what 
man shall be". Sartre aaysi 
"When we say man is responsible for himself 
we do not mean that he is responsible only 
for his own individuality, but that he is 
responsible for all men... If however. 
existence precedes essence, and we wi l l 
to exis t at the same time as we fashion 
our image, that image i s valid for a l l 
and for the ent i re ejjoch in which we 
find ourse lves . . . In fashioning myself, 
I fashion man." 
This c lear ly indicates that man in Sar t re ' s philosophy 
remains consnitted to the ent i re epoche in which he l i v e s . In 
the passages that follow, we wil l develop th is concept of 
commitment as elaborated by Sartre in his l i t e r a r y and philo-
sophical works. 
Commitment as a concept, though widely used and i l l u s t -
rated in l i t e r a t u r e has i t s roots in Sar t re ' s basic philosophy. 
Sar t re ' s concept i s purely a 20th century product, however 
l i t e r a t u r e has been always committed to i t s contemporary era, 
and thus th i s concept in one or the other form has been employed 
in evaluating l i t e r a r y works of a l l ages. In the broadest sense of 
the term, commitment means acceptance of an outlook of l i f e -
a Waltanschuung——that i s represented and defended to the 
best <fcf one's ab i l i t y in everything one undertakes. In a r t 
and l i t e r a t u r e commitment would mean an expression, implicit 
or explici t ,of a specific h i s to r ic experience and a value system 
that such an experience generates. I t forms one's outlook. 
This specific outlook cannot be nairowed down to simple po l i t i ca l 
or social s i tuat ions only. I t i s , in addition to po l i t i ca l 
and social s i tuat ions of a cer ta in e ra , the reco^piition of 
J ; : ) 
specific men in specific relations to specific situations 
and experiences* 
Sartre's stress on commitment in art and literature 
is not only a theoritical outcome of his philosophy as 
expressed in his "Being and Nothingness" but also projects 
his specific relations to his own historic situations and 
the experiences of his era. The specific situation and 
the experiences of the era which Sartre had encountered, 
requires to be examined^ briefly, to understand not only his 
view but also of the spread of existential thought in France 
during German occupation. 
Existential philosophy is fundamentally a philosophy of 
crisis* "It is a philosophy of extreme situations, flourishes 
in extreme situations and produces a literature of these 
extreme situations*"^ The situation of France during German 
occupation was of extreme crisis, or extreme situation* Hence 
the emergence of existential thought during this period was 
the historical outcome of the era. In such situations the 
whole approach of man's consciousness changes and he starts 
asking questions anew Since Sartre wrote during the war 
as well as during the German occupation of France, some critics, 
particularly Marxists, claim that Sartre's philosophy is 
essentially an echo of war—-years and the expression of a 
people's disillusionment and shattering of his dreams and 
ideals. 
( I ' 
I , ) 
To th i s claim, i t can be said that if existentialism 
i s a philosophy which developea and flourishes in extreme 
si tuations then i t i s not only war that could create such 
conditions. Many other conditions can create extreme si tuations, 
"The Plague" by Albert Camus, is one of such examples, where 
an epidamic,and not the war, i s the cause of creating extreme 
s i tua t ions , Alferd Stern has over simplified the issue with 
regard to Kierkegaard's revival ( in the philosophy ot 
Heidegger) In Nazi Germany because of the r i se of Hi t le r . 
Sartre has rejected the view of the exponents of the t rad i t ional 
and dogmatic Marxism tha t : German existentialism became 
activ4,under t he influence of Nazis or that French existentialism 
was a war time reaction of the bourgeois class against the 
occupation forces. Wilfrid Deaan holds that t rad i t ional 
Marxism has provided a framework into which i t s followers 
think that they must Impose his tory upon man Instead of l e t t ing 
the events speak for themselves. He maintains that "if 
Sartre i s a Marxist in his adherence to the Marxist formula 
of History, he i s nevertheless ex i s t en t i a l i s t in his reading 
o 
of that formula," Moreover, Heidegger has never been an 
act ivis t . On the contrary he was c r i t i c i zed for remaining 
s i lent during H i t l e r ' s regime or ra ther supporting i t . " I t 
i s as absurd", says Wilfrid Deaan, "to claim that Heidegger 
was the product of Nazi influence as to say that Sar t re ' s 
Q 
philosophy is an echo of war." Moreover, besides his other 
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philosophical works, Sartre had started writing his philoso-
phical magnum OPUS "Being and Nothingness" in 1930. Though it 
was published in 1943, i.e. during German occupation, he 
might have completed the main portion of this work much 
before war or occupation. 
The situation and the conditions that were created during 
the war could be responsible for the development of existential 
thought, but that Sartre*s philosophy took its specific shape 
during the war years is Just a co-incidence, itcan'tbeconnected 
necessarily with the war. It seems that the con^lexity of 
existential experience is beyond the comprehension of its 
Marxist critics. The blunt fact is that though war could 
provide the situation that was conducive to the development 
of existential thought, but there are- other factors as well 
which could equally help to develop this trend of thought. 
Religion, politics, science, technology, disease and even 
extreme poverty can culminate in situations which may be 
instrumental in the development of existential thought. 
As for the world war II, France was really a place where such 
extreme situation had arisen. In the words of Sartret 
"We had lost all our rights, beginning 
with the right to talk. Elvery day we 
were insulted to our faces and had to 
take it in silence,.. At every instant 
we lived up to the full sense of this 
common place little phrasei 'Man is mortal*," ' 
This historic situation not only helped Sartre to 
develop his philosophy but also made him to stress firmly 
the fundamental requirement of a writer to be committed to 
his era* Sartre aaysi 
"The writer is in a situation in his eraj 
each word has its repercussions. Each 
silence as well. I hold Flaubert and 
Goncourt responsible for the repression 
that followed the commune because they 
12 failed to write a line to prevent it." 
*Each word has its repercussions' means that the very 
act of writing is an act of commitment. Sartre saysi 
"To write is to talk, and to talk is to 
reveal an aspect of the world, in order 
to change it." -^  
In this aeane, the whole literature has been always 
committedt5iajBworld with a resolve to change it. This inter-
pretation of literature does not only reject the notion of 
"Art for Art's sake"——but also reminds writers that they 
have no choice but to commit to the world of men. They 
cannot but portray their existential experience implicitely 
or explicitely, and this portrayal has to be in contemporary 
perspective. A writer who succumbs to social, political or 
even religious forces unconsciously denies his freedom and 
becomes an instrument in their hands instead of changing it. 
Sartre sayst 
"As I talk I reveal the s i t u a t i o n , . , I 
reveal i t to myself and to others in 
order to change i t , " 
Sa r t r e ' s repeated streaa on vrriters ' t o change the 
world' involves two aspects. F i r s t ly , i t i s an assert ion of 
man's c rea t iv i ty and freedom, and freedom is not possible 
unless man encounters his h is tor ic s i tuat ion as a t ruely free 
being. IMless a writer i s comaltted to the l i be r ty of man, 
a truthful representation of human s i tua t ion i s not possible. 
I t i s th i s t ru thful representation of the world that can lead 
writers to change the world' . Secondly th i s dictum, that i s 
' to change the world' immediately reminds us Karl Marx's famous 
pronouncementI 'Philosophers have hitherto interpreted the 
world in various ways—the point however i s to change i t ' . 
Since Sa r t r e ' s philosophy i s closely connected, though not 
ful ly, with Marx's philosophy, his use of the phrase ' t o 
change i t ' should also mean po l i t i ca l and social revolution 
in the Marxian sense of the term, Ofcourse, Sartr ian 
revolution i s for safeguarding individual ' s freedom, while 
Marxian revolution is h i s tor ica l ly determined, not the outcome 
of man's free choice. 
I t i s for th i s reason that almost a l l the characters 
of Sa r t r e ' s novels, s tor ies and plays are not only involved 
i n a par t i cu la r h is tor ic si tuations but are also committed, 
d i rec t ly or ind i rec t ly , to the overall huraaui s i tua t ion of 
t he i r epoch. The most s t r ik ing example of th i s commitment 
i s found in the third novel of his tr iology *Roads to Freedom'. 
The main character of th i s t r iology Mathieu Delarue i s committed 
to his own freedom, but in a par t icu lar h is tor ic set t ing he 
remains p o l i t i c a l l y uncommitted and inact ive in the f i r s t 
two novels, v i z . "The Age of Reason" and "The Reprieve**. 
I t i s mainly because in these two novels a l l the action takes 
place before the ourbi^ak of the second world war. Mathieu»s 
hes i ta t ion to commit himself i s an indication of his miscon-
ception of individual freedom. He considers i t abstract and 
solely personal, though individual freedom i s meaningless i f 
i t i s isolated from h is to r ic s i tua t ion . But in the third novel 
"Iron in Sou l"^ the *die i s caste* with the defeat of France. 
An extreme s i tua t ion prevails under the Nazi occupation. The 
Nazi forces indulge in a t roc i t i e s unheard of in human history—— 
people are driven to concentration camps——dead bodies are 
found everywhere p o l i t i c a l prisoners are tortured brutal ly 
and gas chambers are in operation. Mathieu finds no al ternat ive 
but to commit himself to fight against t h i s unprecedented 
encroachment upon a people's freedom. The ent i re France i s 
transformed into a vast concentration camp, where no one has 
freedom. Even the victors do not behave l ike free human beings. 
Since man in the modern age i s entangled di rect ly or 
indirect ly , in the po l i t i ca l struggle of the era, Sar t re ' s 
characters are also involved in i t . One of the most acute 
p 
expressions of this aspect is presented in "The Reprieve".^^ 
Gross Louis, an innocent and simple man not involved in 
any unlawful activity, always finds himself in touble and is 
finally locked up behind the bars. This is all because of 
the 'Dirty Hands' of politics about which the poor fellow 
knows nothing. That is vrtiy Sartre saysj 
"What is universal.,. is not nature but 
the situations in which man finds himself| 
that is, not the sum total of his psycho-
logical traits but the limits which enclose 
17 him on all sides." ' 
This is the reason why Sartre abandons the 'literature 
of hexis' in favour of 'literature of praxis'. By^literature 
of haxis' he refers to the literature that presents an 
explanatory view of life, while by the 'literature of praxis' 
he means the literature which inspires action. Sartre defines 
the latter further! 
"Through literature the collectively turns 
to reflection and mediation; it acquires 
an unhappy consciousness, an unstable 
image of itself which it forever seeks to 
18 
modify and to improve." 
This literature is called by Sartre as 'total literature' 
Instead of psychological treatment or analysis of characters 
It concersn itself with fundamental situations of man. This 
2 :j 
literature will be inspired by such concerns whose primary 
aim will not be pleasing but irritating and disturbing. 
"•..they offer themselves as tasks to be 
performed; they invite us to quests without 
conclusion; they lead us to share in exper-
iences in which the outcome remains uncertain."''^ 
This position makes writers not only resx>onsible but 
also committed to the era they belong, for, they cannot but 
write for their own time. As a result of the rapid scientific 
development and the disasterouc effects of the two world 
wars in our century, philosophers had to re-examine their 
role in the world, Villiat type of philosophies have been 
responsible for all this. They had to fix responsibility 
somewhere. However man was himself responsible for all the 
disasters. At an international writers congress, Sartre 
made the following statement: 
"In such conditions, it matters little 
whether literature calls itself committed, 
for commitment it is bound to be Inasmuch 
as totality nowadays consists, among other 
things, in the fact that we are all 
threatned with the possibility of dying 
In a nuclear war..• This does not mean 
that the writers must necessarily deal 
with nuclear war; it rather means that a 
man who la afraid of dying like a rat 
cannot be wholly sincere if he confines 
himself to writing poems about birds. 
9 ' 
Some aspect of the times muat> In one 
way or another, be reflected In a work 
of art."^° 
Instead of confining the concept of commitment to his 
ideological view point, Sartre, by using the notion of 
'totality*, makes it an open concept. In *What is Literature*, 
he says: 
"Commitment is Inherent in the act of writing. 
To write is to talk and to talk is to reveal 
an aspect of the world, in order to change 
it. Literature is therefore the result of 
an attitude, conscious or unconscious towards 
the world. The committed writer is different 
from others, not because he is Involved in 
the world, because... he endeavours to acquire 
the most lucid, most complete awareness of 
being Involved, i.e. because he transfers 
his commitment from the level of Immediately 
21 
spontaneous to the level of consciousness." 
What Sartre inqplies by the 'most complete awareness 
of being involved' is that the writers, Mtho are lost in the 
deep slumber of their past, should have a tremendous sense 
of the present. He emphasizes so because the sense of the 
present is the most peculiar characteristic of our era. 
Life will remain a puzzle for a person who remains uncommitted 
to his situation in life. An uninvolved or uncommitted 
2 
person cannot understand the essence of life, Sartre 
says I 
"It Is not in some esoteric haunt that 
we discover ourselves, it is on the 
highway, in town, in the middle of the 
crowd, as a thing among things, a man 
22 
among men," 
Art was considered in the past a self sufficient 
discipline, a'thing apart', because its province was considered 
to be the so called unchangeable human nature. With the 
reiG-ization that man has no fixed natures, but he creates 
himself and his environment by constantly encountering his 
contemporary situation, the writers have to come to grips 
with their era, for, they cannot afford to take re^ fuge in 
eternity. One cannot discover himself, l,e, his 'Being-for-
Itself in some *esoteric haunt', One has to find it in 
the 'middle of the crowd' as ' a mam among men', Sartre 
sayst 
"For us, to write is to commit ourselves, 
for we must live before we can die," -^ 
In this sense writing itself is 'living* one's life. 
Vlhat Sartre wants to emphasize is the Impending danger 
of man's death through warfare. It is our responsibility to 
save mankind from such a death. If the writers do not take 
this aspect of the contemporary situation into account, the 
2 r; 
whole literature as well as philosophy will become absurd. 
It is this situation tJie . expressions of which are 
found in such movements in literature as the revolt of 
* Angry young man*^. the 'theatre of the Absurd*, the 'theatre 
of cruelty* and *the absolute theatre* etc. These movements 
express the anguish of our generation for their pathetic 
search for new values in the background of continuous 
threat of extinction and loss of all meanings and values. 
The culminating point of all these movements is a 
sense of commitment to our predicament. Though the first 
coherent expression of this concept is found in post-war 
French literature but it has acquired greater significance 
in the last three or four decades. Existential commitment 
to our own destiny and man's fate in general has, in-fact 
become more important today then it was earlier. Not only 
has the present day social stresses and strains increased 
complexity of life, the modern technological and scientific 
developments have reduced man into robots. This situation 
demands a stronger commitment to human existence from a 
writer. They have to discover or rather create a new meaning 
of life. That is also the reason why the existential writers 
stress upon sub^Jectivity, which, not only authenticates the 
existence but also helps to unveil the mystery of existence. 
Sartre, declares that 'eternity is the reward of 
those who take sides in the peculiarity of our time.* 
2 '.\ 
Eternity, as we know, does not mean for Sartre, what theologians 
mean ty it» He uses this term for a work of art which will 
be a work of art for all times. This is possible only when 
the artist creates his own age. Greater the artists* commit-
ment to his age, the more profound will be his understanding 
of human existence in all ages. However, Sartre warns ua 
that for the sake of commitment we should not ignore the 
technical and aesthetic values of literature or art, for 
literature as well as other fine arts have their own Justifi-
cation, values and purpose. 
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FREEDOM 
Maurice Natanson in h i s *A Critique of J.P.Sartre*s 
OntolQjgy' > has summarized Sartre •s concept of freedom i n 
the following l ines t 
"Freedom i s the condition of the pour*aoi, 
and since the pour-soi ex i s t s as "lack", 
i t s freedom i s the expression of i t s Nothing-
ness . The pour-soi i s what i t i s not, and 
i s not what i t i s . This i n s t a b i l i t y defines 
i t s freedom. Again, since t h i s i s the 
condition of the pour-soi, man i s condemned 
to t h i s freedom. Man i s condemned to be free 
•1 because man i s freedom." 
Sartre's concept of freedom i s unique. His whole 
philosophy revolves around i t . Like a l l other concepts, the 
concept of freedom i s also grounded in Sartre's d i s t i n c t i o n 
between b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f ( e n - s o i ) , and be ing- for - i t se l f (pour-
so i ) • As elaborated at many places in this d i s ser ta t ion , 
p/i] 
being-in-itself haa no possibility of extension or detaching 
itself from what it isj being-for-itself or consciousness, 
having an absolute possibility of nihilation, is in a 
continuous search of itself which it never attains. This 
continuous search for itself on the part of consciousness 
would not have been possible, had consciousness not been 
fundamentally free. The search, through negation of itself, 
at each and every breath of its existence, is nothing but 
a continuous activity of consciousness. "This activity, 
this necessity of choosing at every instant a perspective for 
2 
viewing the world constitutes freedom." 
Freedom is, therefore, a condition of pour-soi, as 
Natanson has already pointed outj it however constitutes 
nothing other than the negation of itself by for-itaelf. It 
is through this freedom that man is not what he is and is 
what he is not. Only the awareness of freedom forces man to 
surpass towards his possibilities. Sartre sayst 
"To aay that the for:-itself has to be 
what it is, to say that it is what it 
is not while not being what it is, to 
say that in it existence precedes 
essence..» all this is to aay on« and 
the same thingt to be aware that man 
is free."^ 
For Sartre, freedom is without essence. What Heidegger 
said of the Dasein in general can be said about freedom! that 
r> - -J 
h 
l s» "In i t exis tence precedes and commands easence." 
Therefore, the re i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of assigning any essence 
to freedom because essence i s something tha t i s given, a p r i o r i . 
However, freedom always surpasses essences when *man surpasses 
the world towards i t s own p o s s i b i l i t i e s * . Therefore; 
"I am condemned to e x i s t forever beyond 
my essence, beyond the causes and motives 5 
of my a c t . I am condemned to be f r e e . " 
This statement also impl ies tha t no l imi t could be found 
to one ' s freedom except , of course , freedom i t s e l f or as Sar t re 
pu ts i t , 'we are not f r ee to cease being f r e e ' . Only i n 
•bad-fai th* can f o r » i t s e l f hide i t s freedom from i t s e l f . Sar t re 
sayst 
"Thus r e fu sa l of freedom can be conceived 
only by an attempt to apprehend oneself 
as being-»in«»itself •" 
What Sa r t r e wants to e s t a b l i s h i s t ha t the very exis tence 
of man implies tha t he i s fz*ee because freedom i s not something 
t h a t i s given to him| he i s i t | he l i v e s i t from tLJrth t i l l 
death . Freedom, t h e r e f o r e , becomes i n e v i t a b l e to man. I t 
i s ' i n d e f i n a b l e ' and 'unnamable ' . F o r - i t s e l f i s always i n the 
process of 'making ' , hence i t refuses to be confined to 
d e f i n i t i o n . That i s why S a r t r e i d e n t i f i e s consciousness with 
freedom. But 'freedom i s not being but the being of man' tha t 
receives nothing fiK>m outs ide or from i n s i d e . 
2 
"He was free, free for evsfrything, free to 
act like an animal or like a machine, free 
for accepting, free for refusing, free for 
shuffling... He could do what he wanted 
to do, nobody had the right to advise him. 
There would be neither right nor wrong unless 
he Invented them... He was alone In a monstrous 
silence, free and alone, without help, without 
an excuse, condemned to decide without any 
possible recourse, condemned forever to be 
fre«."*^ 
This Is ;)ust one description of freedom given by Sartre 
In his novel "Agg of Reason" through Its main character 
Mathleu. Similarly Orestes, the central character of the 
Pl^y "The Fllea*. exclaimsI 
"Suddenly freedom dashed upon me and 
penetrated me... There was no longer 
anything In heaven, neither "good" nor 
"evil", nor anybody to give me orders... 
I am condemned to have no law other than 
my own... For I am a man and each man has 
to Invent his own way." 
A man, who Is free. Is evidently without any essence, 
as depicted In the above mentioned two passages. In this 
sense man becomes somewhat Inessential entity without smy 
activity or purpose. While depleting this role of conscious-
ness, the characters of Sartre's novels and plays are often 
seen to hesitate to coininlt themselves to any situation, 
Mathieu, (in Age of Reason) when approached by his old 
accomplice, Brunet to Join the Communist Party, finds it not 
only difficult to agree but he rejects the proposal categori-
cally. Brunet criticises the abstract freedom of Mathieu in 
the following words! 
"You live in a void, you have cut your 
bourgeois connexions, you have no tie 
with the proletariat, you are adrift, 
you are an abstraction, a man who is 
not there. It can't be an amusing sort 
of life.•. you renounced everything in 
order to be free. Take one step further 
renounce your freedom and everything 
shall be rendei»ed into you."^ 
Mathieu, unable to renounce his freedom, expresses the 
following view about a man who commits himself to some causex 
"You have chosen to be a man, A man with 
powerful, rather knotted muscles, who 
deals in brief, stern truths, a man errect 
and self enclosed, sure of himself, a man 
of this earth, impervious to the angelical 
allurements of art, psychology, and politics, 
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a whole man, nothing but a man." 
And again, Mathieu thinks about his friend Brunet—— 
who has committed his freedom to a political partyt 
2 'i 
"Brunet was right» his life was a destiny. 
His age, his class, his time——he had 
deliberately assumed them all, he had 
chosen the leaded stick that would strike 
him on the temple, the German shell that 
vrould shatter him to pieces. He had Joined 
up, he had renounced his freedom, he was 
nothing but a soldier... *He is freer than 
I: he is in harmony with himself and with 
the party.* There he was, extremely real... H11 
"Mathieu t Well, you are luckey. 
Brunet t Luckey to be a communist ? 
Mathieu i Yes• 
Brunet t What a thing to say. It is a matter of choice, 
old boy. 
Mathieu t I know you are luckey to have been able to choose. 
Brunet : That means you are not going to be equally 
luckey." 
Mathieu thought! 
"Well an answer must be given. He is waiting. 
Yes or no. Join the party, inject a meaning 
into life, choose to be a man, to act, and to 
believe. That would be a salvation." 
Brunet t You refuse. 
Mathieu : Yes Brunet. I refuse. 
Brunet s If you are counting on an inner inspiration to 
make up your niind, you may have to wait a long 
2 ;; 
time. Do you imagine that I was convinced when 
I Joined the Communist Party? A conviction has 
to be created. 
Mathieui I know that. Go down on your knees and you will 
believe. I daresay you are right. But I want 
to believe first."""^ 
A similar type of human reaction in the same kind of 
situation is found in Sartre's "The Flies'*, where its main 
character Orestes is addressed by his "Tutor* 
"The Tutori ...Your mind is free from prejudice and super-
stition, you have no family ties, no religion 
and no calling| you are free to turn your hand 
to anything... And yet you cavil at your lot! 
Orestest No, I do not cavil... you have left me free... 
I am light as gossamer and walk on air... Some 
men are born bespoken| a certain path has been 
assigned them and at its end there is something 
they must do, a deed alloted... And there are 
others, men of few words, who bear deep down in 
their hearts a lord of dark imagination^ men 
whose whole life was changed because one day... 
when I was seve^, I know I had no home, no 
roots. I let sounds and scents.•• slip past 
my body and fall round mo and I knew these 
2 '^] 
were for others... whereas I — I I am free as 
air, thank God. My mind is my own, gloriously 
aloof."''5 
From the first example, it is already evident that 
sticking to abstract freedom has made the life of Mathieu 
inessential and unbearable. Though Mathieu does not renounce 
his freedom at any stage either in "The Age of Reason", or 
in its second part "Iron in the Soul", yet we see him renouncing 
his freedom when France is defeated in the Second World War, 
in the third novel of Sartre's triology, "The Reprieve". 
Here Mathieu commits himself in a direct action to act against 
the German forces by Joining a resistance movement. 
In a similar way Orestes, fed up with his inessentia-
lism, longs for renouncing his freedom. He exclaims! 
"If there were something I could do, 
something to give me the freedom of 
the cityi if even by a crime, I could 
acquire their memories,, their hopes and 
fears, and fill with these the void 
within me, yosi^ even if I had to kill 
14 
my own mother." 
I t i s not to be Inferred tha t i n par t icular dramatic 
s i tuat ions consciousness of the characters of Sartre 's novels 
and dramas urges for renouncing abstract freedom. What Sartre 
aims at s t ressing i s that human existence l i e s in authentic 
commit««nt. Renunciation of abstract freedom leads one to 
9 
make a free choice by committing oneself to real freedom. 
In "Existentialism and Humanism" Sartre proclaims: 
"What is at the very heart and centre 
of existentialism, is the absolute 
character of the free commitment, by 
which every man realises himself in 
15 
realising a type of humanity." "^  
Hence a man, even if he commits freely to some goal 
does not lose his freedom. He rather enhances its scope. 
By commitment he receives an essence but this essence is not 
inherited it is his own work, his own choosing, which is, 
however, immediately thrown into his past. This choosing 
is his essence which can determine him making him an in-
itself. But since nothingness separates him from his past, 
he remains all the way as empty as for-itself, However, 
this distinction makes man free at two levels. At the first 
level, as being-for-itself, he is in search of total freedom 
or absolute freedon^——it can be called ontological level (we 
borrow if Sabhajit Mishra's terminology because Sartre has 
nowhere used it), the second level may be named as empirical 
level, the level where man commits to some cause and renders 
meaning to his existence. 
The first level marks that state of consciousness which 
is absolutely barren and empty i^t is free in abstract sense, 
it is unable to commit, it is absolute: 
C. () 
"The Church may collapse, I may tumble 
into a shell-hole, or drop back into 
my llfei nothing can rob me of this 
eternal moment* There had been, and 
forever would be, that cold glare 
upon these stones under the black sky; 
the absolute forever, the absolute, with-
out cause or sense or purpose, without 
past or future save a gratutious splendid 
permanence• •I am free»»" " 
But consciousness is not what it isj it is freedom 
itselfI it is always in search of its identity! 
"Outside, Everything is outsidei the trees 
on the guay, the two houses by the bridge 
that lend a pink flush to the darkness, 
the petrified prance of Henri IV'a steed 
above my head; solid objects, all of them. 
Inside——nothing, not even a puff of smoke, 
there is no inside, there is nothing* 
MyselfI nothing. X am free, he said to 
18 himself, and his mouth was dry*" 
Since man is nothing, he has to bej he has to create 
himself: 
"I am nothing, I possess nothing* Aa 
inseparable from the world as light, and 
yet exiled, gliding like light over the 
surface of stones and water, but nothing 
can ever grasp me nor absorb me* Outside 
the world, outside the past, outside myself! 
freedom is exile, and I am condemned to be 
free."''^ 
C 
In a very desperate and precarloua situation of 
indecision, Mathieu even tries to commit suicides 
"Forgotten» unknovm, and utterly alonei 
a defaulters all mobilized men had gone 
two days ago, he had no business now to 
be here. Shall I take the train? What 
did it matter? go, or stay, or run 
away*—-acts of that kind would not call 
his freedom into play. And yet he must 
risk that freedom. He clutched the stone 
with both hands and leaned over the water. 
A plunge, and the water would engulf him, 
his freedom would be transmuted into water. 
...This obseure suicide would also be an 
absolute, a law, a choice, a morality, all 
of them complete... He need only lean a 
little further over, and he would have made 
his choice, for all eternity... But he had 
no special reason for letting himself drop, 
nor any reason for not doing so... here was 
his freedom, and how horrible It waat... his 
legs dangling... suddenly he decided not 
to do it."^ 
This decision of Mathieu, not to commit, is a decision 
at purely ontological level. But if man does not decide, 
choose and accept his responsibility at what we may call, 
empirical level, his existence remains unjustifiable. He 
remains unauthentic so long as he does not attach meaning 
to things, interpret them and thereafter commit himself to 
them. In this light we can understand why at the fall of 
2?n 
France, Mathieu renounces his freedom* He alongwith other 
soldiers wait for the arrival of Germans. Finally they came 
and the 'die is cast*, Mathieu decides to act, he takes 
up a position in a tower and starts firing at the Germans, 
Now he attaches a specific meaning to each of his shott 
"One for Lola, whom I dared not rob, 
one for Mfiurcelle, whom I ought to have ditched, 
one for Odetta, whom I didn't want to screw. 
This for books I never dared to write, 
this for the Journey I never made, this 
for everybody in general whom I wanted to 
hate and tried to understand... He was firing 
on his fellow men, on Virtue, on the whole 
worldj Liberty in > Terror... He firedi he 
was cleansed, he was all-powerful, he was 
free." ' 
2?1 
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AUTHENTICITY 
In lexicographical sense» authentici ty means t r u s t -
worthiness, r e l i a b i l i t y or genuinness. In ex i s t en t i a l i s t 
terminology one's genuine commitment to one's ovm-self i s 
also authentici ty; wholeness, in tegr i ty or unity, in any 
f ie ld , i s also authent ic i ty . All that i s opposite of such 
categories as hypocracy, falsehood, conceit or deceit is 
also called authent ic i ty . An authentic l i f e in i t s broadest 
sense can be said to be one based upon an accurate appraisal 
of the t o t a l i t y of human condition. 
Existent ial philosophers, to some extent , attach 
the same meaning to th i s concept, but t he i r treatment of th i s 
' t o t a l i t y of human condition' i s not only character is t ic of 
the i r philosophy but revealing as well . In the f i r s t instance 
a l l the ex i s ten t ia l philosophers make a categorical dist inct ion 
2'^4 
between human and non-human beings, and reserve the term 
•existence' for human beings only. Heidegger saysx 
"The being that exists is man, Man alone 
exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. 
Horses are, but they do not exist. Angles 
are, but they do not exist. God is, but 
he does not exist. 
The human existence possesses consciousness that 
distinguishes him from other beings and places him higher 
than all beings in the sphere of whole existence. The 
basic categories of this existence, according to Heidegger, 
are feeling, understanding and speech. Dasein, viz. being-
there, is the term, Heidegger has coined for this being, and 
such a being according to him is ontological whereas non-
human beings are ontic. Sartre, in a similar manner, 
distinguishes being-in-itself from being-for-itself. Jaspers 
also likewise distinguishes existence (auj»lan« existence) 
from Existenz, which means to stand out'* 
The purpose of drawing this distinction between human 
and non-human beings is nothing but to show that although 
man is necessarily in the world he should not get lost in the 
world and sink to the level of ontic being. Thus, it is the 
first and foremost characteristic of an authentic existence 
to recognize this duality and realize that 'being-in-the-
world* does not imply »being-in-the-mldst-of-the-wDrld». 
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Sar t r e ' s treatment of "Being" i s an attempt to show 
that in the act of exis t ing, man transcends his past self 
by making i t an object of regard. Throughout his "Being 
and Nothingness* he has made i t abundently c lear that 'man 
i s not what he is and he i s what he i s n o t ' . At the core 
of th i s thes is l i e s the fundamental dichotomy of 'Being-for-
i t s e l f and 'Being-in-i tself•• Being-for-i tself i s human 
consciousness that i s the revelat ion of that which i s . Being-
in - i t s e l f i s the world as revealed to man. Both are inseparably 
intertwined with each other, but one cannot become the other . 
Their inseparabi l i ty i s explained by the fact that since 
consciousness i s always conscious of something, there i s , 
therefore no poss ib i l i ty of conceiving being-for*itself without 
being- in- i tse l f • However, being-for- i tse l f acquires knowledge 
only by negating being- in- i t se l f , which means that i t knows 
an object in the very act of negating . what i t i s not. 
Sartre saysJ 
"Being i s the negation of knowing and 
knowing gets a l l i t s strength from 2 the negating of being." 
In "Being and Nothingness". Sartre explains i t in 
the following words* 
"Man i s not a cafe waiter or a soldier or a 
professor in the same sense as mountain 
i s a mountain. Cafe waiter , soldier or 
22G 
professor is the subject which I 
have to be«.» from which I am separated 
separated by Nothing——which isolates 
me from it so that I cannot be it. I can 
only p^ay at being it,"-^  
In another famous passages of "Being and Nothingness" 
Sartre saysi 
"We both are and are not our past-selves, 
we both are and are not our future 
selves. Absolutely nothing stands between 
past and present. Our past history is what 
it is, we cannot alter it. Our future is 
however, absolutely open, undetermined and 
it is by for-itself that future comes into 
being." 
On the basis of this distinction, Sartre maintains that 
man first of all exists encounters himself, surges up in the 
world and defines himself afteirwards. Man, for Sartre, is 
not definable because he is grounded in nothingness. He 
will not be anything until he creates meaning for himself; 
then only he will be what he makes of himself. Man is not 
what he conceives to be but he is what he wills and makes 
of himself. It is in this sense that Sartre declares that 
man is responsible for what he is. 
On the basis of his analysis of being and unfolding 
its different modalities Sartre develops his theory of 
freedom and authenticity. It is only an authentic existence 
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that can recognize his pas t . Recognition of one's past i s 
essential,1iircMgh knowing his past man transcends the past 
and a t ta ins freedoa. Therefore, in order to be free one 
cannot be otherwise but authentic, 
Sartre c a l l s inauthentici ty *bad f a i t h ' , and what i s 
opposite of 'bad f a i t h ' i s termed by him "the project of 
s incer i ty" , which means authent ic i ty . Sar t re ' s bad-faith 
and Heidegger»s 'Being-in-the-midst-of-the-world' ©^ to use another 
Haidegerian term fal len s ta te of man, are different names 
of the same inauthentic existence. By ' fal lenness*, however, 
Heidegger daes not mean that there i s some sort of 'primitive 
paradise ' from which man has fa l len . He simply means that 
there is a superior mode of being to which we must r i s e in 
order to render authentici ty to our existence. 
Heidegger explains his concept of ' fa l lenness ' with 
the help of two opposite poles, v iz . Pseudo-«ul>dectivity 
and pseudo-objectivity. "Das Man" i s also pseudo-subjectivity. 
Consciousness of an individual i s controlled in th i s s ta te of 
fal lenness, by the public . He is continuously controlled 
and led by some such source which i s neither known to him 
nor does he bother to find i t s Jus t i f ica t ion . Likewise in 
pseudo-objectivity, i t i s not the public but the man-made 
a r t i f i c i a l world, the world transformed into aoul-less 
machine by technology, that controls his actions as well aa 
his thoughts. Gabril Marcil i s of the view that in such a 
2:^8 
s t a t e of affairs man i s reduced to mere functions. He has 
to work s t r i c t l y according to a given timetable. Such a 
world has i t s own space and time and man acts only as a tool 
In i t . A human being lo s t between the poles of pesudo-subjective 
and pseudo-objective can-not rea l ize i t s ontological roots . 
There i s no poss ib i l i ty of any ex is ten t ia l experience in such 
a s t a t e . Man i s l o s t In pet ty fears and neurotic anxiet ies . 
5 He i s an Inauthentlc existence•''^ 
Heidegger's d i s t inc t ion between 'ontological* and the 
'ontic* existence and Sa r t r e ' s d i s t inc t ion between *being-
in-»ltself* and •being«»f6x^ltself* are similar to Jasper 's 
d i s t inc t ion between 'Daseln'and 'Exis tenz ' . Jaspers reserves 
the term 'Exister^z' for authentic existence only, which 
we have already discussed In I I chapter of th is thes i s . 
However, the rea l iza t ion of one's authentici ty, which i s 
germane to Existenz only, la possible through the recognition 
of the basic ex is ten t ia l ca tegor ies . While for Heidegger 
the basic ex is ten t ia l categories are feeling, understanding 
and speech, for Jaspers, these categories are s l tua t lona l l ty , 
phange, gui l t and death* These are the unavoidable and 
uadttalable features of human existence which can neither 
be altered nor transcended. An authentic existence in Jaspers 
does not escape the boundry s i t ua t i ons . He accepts them 
and bears them out. He takas over his guil t and admits his 
responsibi l i ty . He also accepts death as an evident l imit 
2:^9 
of every person. But to realize all these categories 
i.e. to become authentic, Jaspers was aware, is very difficult, 
In many ways this understanding is blocked and inauthenticity 
creeps in. that is why he saysi 
"The wonder of the wonder, the one 
and only true being, I can meet, 
is the man who is himself." 
In their persuit of authenticity, nearly all the 
contemporary existential philosophers have attacked both 
the subjectivistsas well as the objectivists. Objectivists, 
while recognizing that man lives in the external world, 
deny that he can transcend it. Subjectivista, while recognizing 
that man can transcend the world, deny that he lives in it. 
Kierkegaard points out that "despair of the objectivista is 
the despair of necessity... and the despair of aub^Jectivists 
7 
i s the despair of p o s s i b i l i t y . " ' 
Only exis tent ia l thinkers in our age have tr ied to 
understand the basic mode of human existence, which i s 
being-in-the-world, but at the same time transcends the 
world. I t i s not day-to-day being. If one's being i s stuck 
i n the worlds i t becomesinauthentic. For them self i s preaent 
in the worlds but i t can neither be absorbed in the world 
nor can i t be isolated from i t . In the words of R.G.Olsonj 
"The aub;)ectiviat i s no less gui l ty than 
the objec t iv ia t . The aelf cannot breathe 
piare necessity, but neither can i t survive 
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In pure poaslbllity* In one case It la 
Q 
suffocated, in the other It is vaporized.* 
The man who is unable to make distinction between a 
i»eal object and its image loses his connection with the world. 
He lives in a world of his own dreams. He lives an inauthentic 
existence. 
Authenticity can be said to be an ideal which has to 
be attained through continuous existential struggle. Every 
claim to authenticity cannot be an authentic claim. Sometimes 
we misread our real nature and claim that our selfish nature 
is authentic. Kierkegaard has furnished a striking example 
In view of this prima-facie discord. All men, he says, ought 
to cherish and preserve the lives of their children. But 
Ibrahim is called by Grod to sacrifice his son, Issac. This 
calling, Kierkegaard maintains. Is anguish, for Ibrahim is 
suspended between the fear of disobeying God on land, and 
g 
his doubt regarding genuineness of the call.^ 
From ethical point of view Ibrahim's act of sacrificing 
his son was a crime or an evil deed and from the religious 
point of view it was a sin. It could never have been the case 
that Gk>d ordered Ibrahim and he followed it without consulting 
his Inner self. It is possible that the decision of one*s 
lnner-»aelf may sometimes be in conformity with religious or 
ethical norms. But the decision of one*s Inner-self In a 
state of crisis in always an authentic decision of an authentic 
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existence, When one follows such course, it is always the 
right course. It is what Kierkegaard means by this dictum: 
subjectivity is truth and truth is subjectivity. Kierkegaard's 
subjective truth is synonimoua with 'authenticity*. It is 
this subjectivity, the call ol one's inner self, which Ibrahim 
should have, In-fact, followed. 
Sartre cites another example to substantiate his 
conception of authenticity. A man who is the only son of 
an ailing old lady is called upon to defend his motherland 
that is attacked by an enemy. On the one hand he loves his 
mother and does not wish to leave her^ alone to die unattended. 
On the other his patriotism urges him to Join army for the 
defence of his motherland. It is in such a predicament that man 
has to ascertain his true loyalty or stronger passion by 
listening to his inner self. Authentic self is realized in 
10 
such critical situations. 
No rule or cirt4rion has so far been discovered which 
could tell us what is ultimately most dear to man. Sartre 
says that we cannot decide an issue by merely obeying our 
inclinations and feelings, because we can neither measure 
nor verify them. It is ultimately, he maintains, the choice 
of our inner being that can decide the issue. The moment we 
choose we become responsible for our act, because it is our 
being that chooses to become what it has not been till now. 
2:\2 
I f we choose what our most inner being prompts us to do, we 
rea l ize our 'project of s incer i ty*, i . e . authent ic i ty . If 
we choose in 'bad fa i th* , we f a l l in the trap of inauthentici ty. 
Existential 'choice* does not mean to choose among 
various a l te rna t ives , such as my choice of a blue necktie 
from among a number of neckt ies . I t i s rather an a t t i tude 
towards freedom and respons ib i l i ty . I t i s an ontological 
decision and not a description of man's external conditions. 
Freedom, for Sar t re , i s the s ta te of Being of the being-for-
i t s e l f to which i t i s necessarily bound. Sartre saysi 
"We are a freedom which chooses, but 
we do not choose to be f ree . We are 
11 
condemned to be free." 
Thus Sartre's distinction between authenticity and 
inauthenticity of our existence is rooted in our attitude 
towards freedom. Recognition of one's freedom as the source 
of all values and accepting responsibility arising out of 
tliis freedom is authenticity and its denial is inauthenticity. 
In Anti»Semite and Jew , Sartre applies his concept of 
authenticity to a definite and concrete situation. He sayss 
"If it is agreed that man may be defined 
as a being having freedom within the 
limits of a situation, then it is easy 
to see that the exercise of this freedom 
may be considered as authentic or un» 
authentic according to the choices made 
2:][] 
in the situation... And the Jew does 
not escape this rulei authenticity for 
him is to live to the full of his con-
dition as a Jew| unauthenticity is to 
deny it or to attempt to escape from 
it.' «12 
Anti-Semite is inauthentic, because* 
"He is a man who is afraid. Not of the 
Jewsj to be sure, but of himself, of 
his own consciousness, of his liberty, 
of his instincts, of his responsibilities... 
of everjrthing except the Jews. He is a 
coward who does not want to admit his 
cowardice to himself."'-'^  
If inauthenticity is an attempt to flee from one's 
self, its mode of operation, in Sartre's terminology, is 
•bad faith*. Sartre's characters in his novels and plays 
are often seen expressing this dread i.e. a desire to flee 
into bad faith and inauthenticity from their human condition 
and freedom. In "The Reprieve" Daniel sayst 
"If I had been eui insensible stone figure, 
uncapable of sound and movement, blind 
and deaf-flies and earwigs and ladybirds 
would run up and down me, and I should 
stand, a fantastic, white eyed statue, 
devoid of purpose, impervious to p a i n — 
I might then have coincided with myself. 
Not so as to accept myself, heaven forbidI 
but thus become the pure object of my hatred... 
Just to be.""*^ 
2;M 
*Juat to be' what ? Does he want to be rock l i ke 
being*in-i taelf . Sartre haa explained three modalitiea of 
being. Aa a being i t ia what i t ia not and ia not >*iat i t 
i a | alwaya trying to project i t ae l f aa being-for-i taelf• 
Aa a consciouaneas i t wanta to have the impentrable denaity 
of being-in-i taelf• Aa nothingneas i t wanta to have i t a 
own foundation bynaughting the being- in- i tae l f . 
In view of these three medalitiea, man does not want 
to return to aimple being- in- i tse l f , nor to a s t a t e of being 
thinghood. His fundamental project , as Alfred Stern haa 
r ight ly observed, »is to be at the same time in - i t ae l f , l ike 
a thing, and fo r - i t ae l f , l ike a consciousness| determined 
l ike a thing, but free l ike a man| aolid and eternal l ike 
15 a rock, but consciouaneaa and aenaible l ike a s o u l . " ^ To 
be more precise , man*a fundamental project i s to become 
"in-itself-for-i tself"——*a self-conscious cosmos*. And 
that i s what Sartre means by authentici ty of human existence. 
A similar type of conception i s emotionally found in 
Iqbal*s philosophy, nevertheless he has not analysed the 
diversi ty of *being* in such a way* But Iqbal*a treatment 
of almost a l l the concepts, which are cent ra l to exis tent ia l 
philosophy, par t icu la r ly authenticity (which i s called in 
his terminology egohood or khudi) i s akin to that of 
ex is ten t ia l i s t ptiiloaophera, Iqbal 'a conception pf khudi la 
alao s imilar to Kierkegaardlan 8Ul?;Jectivlty. Dr. Waheed 
Akhtar has r igh t ly concluded in his paper, en t i t led 
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"Existential ELementa In Iqbal's Thought*! 
"Iqbal'fl philosophy reconciles existentialism 
with a radically new Idealism. He made an 
attempt to reconstruct religious thought in 
Islam from existential viev point before the 
advent of new Existentialist philosophy of 
religion. It would not be Justifiable to 
regard Iqbal aa an existentialist in the 
technical sense of the term* But it would 
not be unjustifiable to study and analyse 
his thought from existentialist view-point. 
Iqbal combined together the religious insight 
of theistic existentialism with the social 
and historical awareness of the humanistic 
exiatentlallam."' 
All existential philosophers accept Kierkegaard's 
principle that 'truth is subjectivity——and that it is authen-
ticity. Kierkegaard, as we know, saw in the tyranny of the 
church the danger of an all embracing pantheism, Iqbal was 
also averse to all forms of pantheism. This aversion of 
Kierkegaard and Iqbal was based on their desire to save 
individuality of human being. In other words it was aimed 
at preserving man's authentic existence. In our society, man 
has become merely a tool, a negligible part of the gigantic 
social machinary. Man la lost and deprived of his individuality. 
In such a world, which is totally computerized, individual 
is neither able nor la he allowed to see what is revealed 
to him through his inner experience. 
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i t i s aimost an inqwaaible task to define th i s inner-
self . Psychologists maintain that there are layers in our 
self which represent our feel ings , emotions and impulses. 
Freud divided these layers into Id, Ego and sup erf go, i»e« sub-
conscious, conscious and unconscious. Id, according to Freud, 
i s the depth of man, Sartre has rejected Freudian analysis 
of human personality dividing i t into such layers , and he 
called i t a •material ist mythology*. 
However, Freudian notions are not meaningless. Some 
of them are even relevant to our present discussion. What i s 
Id in Fredud*s psycho-analysis i s subject ivi ty in Kierkegaard's 
philosophy. Dread in Heidegger's term, Jaspers ca l l i t 
"Existenz" and 8ar t re names i t to be "Being-in-itself-being-
f o r - i t s e l f . All these concepts, v iz . "Id", "Dread", subjectivity 
Existenz, or "Being-in-i tself-being-for- i tself" mainly point 
to the achievement of that stage of existence which i s called 
authent ic i ty . One who rea l izes and faces death, according 
to Heidegger, i s an authentic being. Similarly one who 
real izes a boundry s i tua t ion , in Jasperts term or subjectivity 
in Kierkegaard.*s term, and i n - i t s e l f - f o r - i t s e l f in Sar t re ' s 
term at ta ins the level of authent ici ty . 
But authentici ty i s not to be understood as a stage 
which one a t t a ins once for a l l . Sartre has explained that 
man i s always in the process of becoming, Jaspers has fully 
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Justif ied that Existenz i s not def ini te there i s always a 
sort of f luctuation i n i t . 
Authenticity thus conceived i s one's capacity to hear 
the ca l l of his inner most being in the s t i l l ness of sol i tude. 
"I t wells forth from the depths of man's consciousness Just 
l ike true love. The inoments of authenticity are usually 
limited and in such moments one may even weep... but the 
17 tears he sheds are f i t for pufifying the a n g e l s . " " 
Authenticity,commitment and freedom are in ter - re la ted 
concepts that are actual ly dependent upon and complementary 
to each other . Besides Sar t re ' s philosophy, these conception 
occupy very important place in Sar t re ' s theory of a r t . Accord-
ing to his analysis of a r t , and par t icular ly l i t e r a t u r e , ar t 
i s the expression of one's authentic existence and a quest 
for freedom, or freedom i t s e l f . Authenticity and freedom 
have no meaning without commitn»nt to man's h is tor ic s i tuat ion. 
This commitment, in i t s deepest analysis , i s nothing but 
commitment to one's authentic tip%e being* Thus a l l ar t i s 
quest for authenticity and freedom with a profound and firm 
sense of commitment to one's self and one's h is tor ic s i tuat ion. 
This sense i s rooted in concern for man's freedom. 
Thesesartrian notions may appear exercise in philosophical 
Jargon unless one studies Sar t re ' s own l i t e r a r y works in the 
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l igh t of these notions. These Sartr ian conception may also 
prove to be of immense value if one studies a l l a r t and 
l i t e r a tu r e in th i s l i g h t . Sar t re , in developing his theory 
of a r t , did not only provide tools of a r t - c r i t i c i sm, but 
also provided an insight into the s p i r i t of a r t , that i s man*s 
most inner being. 
# * * 
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ARTISTIC WORK SARTRE'S ANALYSIS 
Many other issues of human concern apart, Sartre, 
consistant with his theory of art, had yery definite views 
about the position of art and the artist in the human 
situation. He remained more pre-occupied with artists and 
their activities than with any other intellectual activity 
throughout his career. He often refers to artists lives 
and their works for clarifying his philosophical or literary 
concepts. His deep involvement in artists and their creative 
activity is also evident from the fact that some of the 
characters of his novels and plays are themselves artists, 
writers, reseaiMhers and political activists. 
Wade Baskin's selection and translation of Sartre's^ 
essays on four artists——which is our primary source of 
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reference la not arbitrary. It Is rational/ conceived 
because the contradictions and the * enigma*, present In 
all the four artists, provides an opportunity to Sartre 
td Illustrate his own views about works of art. These four 
artists arei (1) Tintoretto, (2) Giacomettl, (3) Calder 
and (4) Lapou;)ade, Our aim here la to concentrate on only 
one form of art viz, palntlngi we will have to exclude 
Calder from the present discussion because he Is a sculpture, 
(1). Jaco pe Robua t i'^ Tlnt oret to i 
The Renaissance period (1A00 • 1520) In art Is 
represented by artists like Leonardo da vlnci, MicheLangelo, 
Titian and Raphael, Liberation of art from the clutches 
of the church and to reassert humanistic world outlook of 
classical Greek art with its secular and rational ideas 
was the main object of the artists and thinkers of this 
period. This new outlook and approach, however, appealed to 
the Popes and the church also, for Michelangelo, Leonardo da 
Vinci, Raphael and other painters and sculptures were commi-
ssioned by the church to paint certain chappies. Thus a 
reconciliation between the official church's attitude to art 
in the Renaissance spirit was brought about. Whether the 
artists compromised with the churchy or the Christianity found 
it convenient to project its teachings through humanistic 
works of the artists of the age, Is a matter that is outside 
the scope of present work. 
Ui 
In all the fields of intellectual activity the Renaissance 
spirit started to decline during the 16th century. Fall of 
Rome in 1527» the Reformation and the general political upheavals 
of the era, gave birth to such a movement in Art which is 
knovm as Mannerist painting—-a movement which developed in 
Italy in the I6th century. 
Jacope Robusti, generally known as Tinteritto represents 
the Venetian school of mannerism. Till the arrival of Tintoretto, 
Vonfttiaw school was fully dominated by Titian. Sartre explains 
at length main causes of the popularity and appeal of Renai-
ssance painters in general and Titian in particular among the 
ruling monarchs. Titian*s paintings, according to- Sartre, are 
'pure opera*• He painted nothing that could not please the 
monai'chs and their aesthetic a ens a» 
Mannerism, the chief exponent of which is Tintoretto, 
is characterised by its enti--clas3ical attitude, particularly 
that of the Renaissance. A certain type of i*estles3ness 
is always depicted in mannerist paintings. "Most of its 
devices—-crowded composition, ambiguous proportion and space, 
exaggerated poses, and complex action and meaning—-create a 
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fee l ing of obscu r i ty and i n s e c u r i t y . " The c l a s s i c a l mono-
toneous p a i n t i n g s , s t r e s s i n g on l i n s and form, were re jec ted 
i n favour of a mannerism i n which colour becomes ^• a r b i t r a r y , 
l i g h t broken up and movements charged with emotions. Since 
a l l these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s could be assumed i n an e x i s t e n t i a l 
P l l 
work of art, the paintings of Tintoretto, therefore, became 
the inevitable choice of Sartre for his critical analysis of 
artistic creativity and its expression. 
The creative genius of Tintoretto is portrayed by 
Sartre through a detailed analysis of the life of the artist. 
At the young age of twelve the artist is said to have been 
thrown out by Titian from his studio. There is, however, no 
authentic record available to confirm wherefrom Tintoretto 
learned the skill of painting but the most crucial moments in 
the life of the artist came when he departed from the prevalent 
tradition of stylistic and ideological representation, Tintoretto, 
deviating from the Titian tradition of creating the myth of 
the divine rights of the monarchs, presented in his own style, 
the innermost self of man and his experience of the Infinite 
through his painting "The Miracle of the Slave", Not only the 
wealthy Rialtans of Venice but the entire city populace 
turned against him for thxs revelation. They preferred the 
reassuring style of his rival, Titian| because: 
",,,they wanted a certain style that appealed 
to the senses, trifles, inoffensive and har* 
monious pompi they knew a trade mark, a 
slogan,"' 
Painting was his only means of livelihood. Rejection of 
his paintings by the rich and the influential deprived him of 
receiving any commissions from officialdom. The force of 
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circumstance waa so Inunense that Tintoretto was forced to 
paint In the same s tyle with the same themes that were acceptable 
to the ruling e l i t e . In th i s way only could he have the offers. 
But s t i l l his creat ive genius could express i t s e l f authentically. 
Each of his great works had two layers of meaning one appealing 
to popular t ^ s t e , and the other expressing his own revolt . 
Sartre writes! 
" • • • I t s s t r i c t u t l l i t a r in i sm d i s ^ i s e s an 
unedning quest. F i t t ing his research into 
the frame of paid commission, he i s obliged 
to revolutionize painting even while respecting 
the s t ipulat ions of h is c l i e n t . " 
The a r t i s t s whith whome Tintoretto had to compete were 
such giants of Renaissance as Michelangelo, Titian and Raphael. 
Eugenic Ba t t i s t a describes the s p i r i t and style of the 
Renaissance a r t in the following passage that i s quoted by 
Sartrei 
"The Renaissance a t t r ibu ted to the a r t i s t 
the t r a i t s which Antiquity reserved for 
the man of action and which the Middle 
Ages had used to adorn i t s saints."-
Sartre adds to th is his own remarks! 
"llXiring the sixteenth century | painting 
and sculpture were s t i l l looked upon as 
mannual a r t s ; a l l the honours were 
reserved for poet iy ."^ 
2iG 
Almost all the painters of Renalssancet according to 
Sartre, were frustated in their role for being treated as 
craftsman only. They grudgingly saw poets receiving the 
highest honours. Sartre says that Titian was honoured because 
of his friendship with the officialdom, though he could never 
enjoy the same honour as those of poets. Michelangelo and 
Raphael were commissioned by the church or feudal lords to 
paint palaces, public buildings and chappies. They enjoyed 
the highest honours, Qt vhicOj^they were<-proud«."^ ttt tti^ iiad 
no freedom. Their fame was guaranteed by the feudal system. 
Sartre satarizes this asj>ect of their lives in the following 
wordst 
"...the glory of his throne falls upon 
them like a ray of sunshine, and they 
reflect it upon the people| the divine 
right of kings gives painters divine 
rights."^ 
The result is that the 'daubers* change into 'Supermen*, 
the heroes. For Sartre they were ordinary n»n groomed to look 
larger t}r[8n their actual statue. They have falsely been 
raised above humanity by the monarchs. "Even today, nostalgic 
republicans worship them in the name of genius." 
But Tintoretto was a man of different stuff. He accepted 
the challange of his trade. Unlike Michelangelo, Titian and 
Raphael, he did not indulge in poetry or any other literary 
activity. The artist, for Tintoretto, is the supren» workeri 
Plate No. J* «The Miracle of the Slave" 
by Tintoretto 
Plate No.TT" "Assumption of the Virgin" (1516-18) 
•*-'- by Titian 
Plate No. ^ "Annette Por t ra i t of the Ar t i s t ' s wife" (1954) 
by Alberto Giacometti 
P l a t e No A xf\ (Tiires ond a Head composition with seven Figures (The F o r e s t ) , ^950, by Al t e r t t o Giacometti 
P l a t e No. ^ "The Conversion of by Caravagglo 
S t . Paul" (1600-01) 
Plate No. b "Guernica" (1937) 
by Pablo Picasso 
Plat No. 7 "Triptych on Torture" (1961) 
by Albert Lopoujade 
Plate No, 2 "Free Form" (1946) by Jackson Pollock 
Plate No. 9 "Composition" (1921) 
by Dutchman Piet Mondrian 
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"he exhausts himself and his material in order to produce 
and sell visions," 
That does not, however, imply that he should not work 
for the princes if he liked them, "He does not (like princes)" 
Sartre says "and that is the crux of the matter. They frighten 
him without inspiring him. He never tries to approach them 
9 
or to make himself known to them," 
No doubt his 'clientle* of the Venice, for whom he 
paints, is unable to 'crown* him but he is not prepared to 
have this * crown* at the cost of his artistic freedom. His 
creative genius requires freedom to express himself to please 
the people of Vience, who too, desire and aspire for freedom, 
"The Miracle of the Slave" and his works of the Scuola San 
Roc CO are some of the Tintoretto's works that are not only 
in the stylistic and contextual opposition to Titian and 
Renaissance heritage but also expresses his freedom in 
creativityC See plate No, I and II), 
These works, if placed in the perspective of the general 
awakening of the era, reveal that art has passed from the 
sacred to secular role. The artist, in this general awakening 
finds himself in a situation in which the light of Gtod, 
which guaranteed his divinity, disappears. Laws of perspective 
did no more allow to the artist represent God with nan's 
body. Referring to this historical development, Sartre sayst 
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"perspective is a violence which human weakness is forcing 
upon God»s little world." For Sartre, the crisis in 
painting in that era issued from portrayal of fragility of 
human existence. It was this sense of human fragility which 
forced Tintoretto to work furiously so as to conquire the 
•darkness and emptiness of human existence*. "The infinite", 
for Sartre, "is the emptiness, the darkness, within the 
11 
creature and without." The character of Tintoretto, as 
drawn by Sartre, highlights the artist*s passion to reveal 
to his fellow citizens the daricness and emptiness of human 
existence within or without. 
(2). Alberto Giacomettlt 
Sartre's first aatarical remark about the portraits of 
Mon&rchs was made through protogonist Antoine Roquentin, 
the main character of Nausea. On his visit to the Bouville 
museum Roquentine reflects as under! 
"The power of art is truly admirable »©f this 
shrill-voiced little man, nothing would go 
down to posteriety except a threatening face 
a superb gesture, and the bloodshot eyes of 
a bull."''^ 
Reflecting on 'how man is re-thought by man» he saysi 
"They had been painted with minute care, and 
yet, underthe brush, their features had been 
stripped of the mysterious weakness of men's 
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faces... with the help of Rena«iias and 
Bordurln, they had enalUved the whole of 
Natures outside themselves and in them* 
selves* Vhat these dark canvases offered 
to my gaze was man re-thought by man, 
withy as his sole adornment» a man*s 
first conquestI the bouquet of the Right 
of Man and Citizen. Without any mental 
reservation, I admired the reign of man." 
Disgusted with the sign of official portraits, Roquentin 
leaves the museum with the following remarks8 
••I walked along the long gallery, greeting 
in passing, without stopping, the disting-
uished faces which emerged from the shadows". 
(quoting the names of some fifteen members of the ruling 
monarch). 
".•.I walked the whole length of the 
Bordurin-Renandas Room. I turned round. 
Farewell, you beautiful lilies, elegant in 
your little painted sanctuaries, farewell, 
you beautiful lilies, our pride and raisen 
d'etre, farewell, you Bastards." 
For Sartre, these paintings contain the idealized human 
figures which create the myth of the divine rights of 
monarchs to rule the plebions. These idealized human figures 
are the portraits of the monarchs and their families which 
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depict not only the superiori ty and the super-human status 
of the select minority^ but also helps in widening the gulf 
in the social and p o l i t i c a l re la t ions between the monarch 
and the i r subjects . In other words, these paintings cont r i -
bute only to the belief in the s ta tus based merit and worth 
of the monarchy, rendering human existence meaningless* 
A.Glacometti i s , according to Sartire, one of those 
painters of our century who have ruthless ly injected painting 
o f f i c ia l p o r t r a i t s . Not only t h i s , he opposes a i l those who 
t ry to conceal man behind the abstract concepts of right and 
privi lege thereby coming closer to ex is ten t ia l thought• Being 
interested in the concrete human existence, Sartre , i s not 
at t racted to any representational painting, e .g . , the landscape 
the s t i l l l i f e or any abstract composition. He attaches 
importance to those paintings only which are anthropomorphic 
in nature. We wil l l a t e r op see, while discussing Lopoujade, 
that Sartre does not s t ick to th is posit ion in a consistent 
manner. However, Sa r t r e ' s appx^eciation of Giacometti was 
mainly due to the a r t i s t ' s representation of man as so l i t a ry , 
elongated and d i s t i nc t , not being- in- i tse l f , a stone l ike 
form but active l ike f o r - i t s e l f with a complete aenae of human 
despair, t e r ro r , dread and doom. Sar t re ' s l iking for these 
paintings seems to be an ex i s ten t ia l presentation of human 
existence in them (see p la te No. 3) , 
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Being-for-others, as discussed In a previous chapter, 
forms the ontological foundation of Sar t re ' s theory of art* 
For Sartre a l l the creat ive ac t iv i ty derives i t s impetus from 
being-for-othera. But th i s 'other* i s always at a distance, 
leaving an empty space between my being and the being of 
the other . I t i s th is space which i s not only the subject 
of Giacometti's paintings but he conceives th is distance from 
a purely ex is ten t ia l point of view. 
Sartre t r ied to narrow down this distance by saying 
that the other i s "an essent ia l s t ructure of our being, which 
15 
at once both escapes and defines our being."'-^ The other, 
for Sar t re , i s the ®c->centric l imi t which contributes to the 
const i tut ion of our being. But th i s does not imply, as can 
be Inferred from the l i t e r a r y works of Sartre also, that the 
distance between me and the other can be obli terated altogether. 
Because being-for- i tself can never coincide with i t s being? 
i t i s always in the process of becoming; the moment th is 
distance i s overcome, there wi l l be no existence. Distance 
i s the tension that makes the l i f e possible. And Giacometti 
says: 
"Distance, far from being an accident, 
is part and parcel of every object."^^ 
Giacometti paints the objects as he observes them from 
distance. All the figures of his paintings, Sartre observes a 
^^r)2 
have an arrest ing presence, ready to drop at any moment. 
Sartre says that when I r« t r«at from his painting the figures 
advance towards me and when I advance, they are farthest 
from me* Hence moving towards or away from his work, is of no 
avail because the distance cannot be traversed. 
This distance has, however, no meaning outside the 
hiMan space. I t i s meaningful in a human s i tuat ion only, 
'•Distance can separate Marathen from Athens but not one pebble 
from another.* I t means that distance i s possible for being-
fo r - i t s e l f only. I t does not exist for being-in-i tself which 
i s closed and compact. 
Giacometti» holds that "distance i s not a voluntary 
i so la t ion , nor even a withdrawal. I t i s something required 
by circumstances» a ceremony, a recognition of d i f f i cu l t i e s . 
I t i s the product of forces of a t t rac t ion and r«pultion.» ' 
Sar t re ' s statement that the essent ia l structure of our 
being at once both escapes and defines our being can be applied 
to Giacomett*s sculpture 'Crowd'——in which people are crossing 
a public place without seeing each otherj ' they pass hopelessly 
alone and yet together . ' Sartre says that Giacometti has 
defined his universe be t t e r than he possibly could, when 
Giacometti wrote concerning one of his paint ings. The a r t i s t ' s 
own description i s as follows: 
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"a part of a forest observed during 
the course of many years.•• a forest 
in which trees with barren^ slender 
trunks seemed like people who had 
stopped in their tracks and were 
speaking to each other."''®(see plate No. 4). 
This distance, this va&xume is found by Geacommeti 
everywhere. From Sartre's philosophical view point it is 
simply and purely Nothingness or negation that is projected 
by a sense of vacuum. It is present everywhere in all men. 
Giacom«tti wants to explain all the facets and dimensions of 
this vacuum through his worksj 
"Between things, between men lie broken 
bridges, the vacuum infiltrates everything; 
each creature creates its own vacuum."^ 
Sartre sees his own concept of existence in the 
paintings of Giacometti. In comparison to other artists, 
he sees in him, 'being* treated as in the form of becoming 
and not in its fixity. In his paintings Sartre finds a 
representation of man that is similar to his own reflections 
of individual man in his solitude, despair and doom. Giacometti 
had understood that artist's main work in the realm of 
imaginary lies in ci*eating illusions. This brings Giacometti 
very close to what Sartre said about art and its function. 
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(3). Robert Lapou.iadet 
Before reflecting upon the abstract paintings of 
Lapoujade, Sartre, once again explains how the older art 
has negated the very purpose and aim of painting, Titian, 
to quote only one example, exploits the beauty of human body 
in such a grand style with Lijxuriant use of colours that the 
real torment of an individual existence is totally hidden 
from our eyes. Even if presenting a massacre, the gripping 
style makes one to forget the horrifying content. Colours are 
so adjusted with his craftsmanship that the horrifying sense 
of "torture is eliminated from the canvas Just as its scent 
20 is eliminated from a painted rose," All those artists who 
were commissioned by monarchs were, in Sartre's view, the 
traitors, "for, they forced their brushes to paint comforting 
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t e r r o r s , painless suffering and l iving corpses." Sartre 
says further; 
"For a self-willed man in a room with 
windows overlooking a concentration camp 
to paint a compote i s not ser ious; h is 
s in i s one of negligence. The real crime 
would be in painting the concentration 
camp as if i t were a compote.* (see plate No.5) 
A painting which depicts horroip, ai^ttr and torture in 
a grand s tyle can have, according to Sar t re , only one of the 
two reactions on the part of the viewer! the viewer may ei ther 
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be lost in the admiration of the style of the painting or he 
may feel the horror as too real to be viewed for long. In 
the whole history of art Sartre could locate only two exceptions 
to this generalization. These are Goya and Picasso, Goya 
failed or lost all desire to communicate the horrors of war. 
He assimilated these horrors in himself and "finally transJormed 
the horrors of battles and mass murders into the naked horror 
of being Goya." '^ 
Gurnica, Picasso's master work (pained in 1935) is 
absolutely a different thing. At a particular historical 
moment when the society, art and the artist worked together 
to respond to the historic situation Gurnica was created. It 
is a complete departure from the traditional representation 
of human situation in painting. It (Gurnica) is an act of 
violence in art. Sartre sayst 
"There was no need for violence to be 
hidden or transformed? it was simply 
identified with the disintegration of 
men brought about by their own bombs." 
(see plate No. 6) 
It was, thus, the historical moment in art which led 
Picasso to derive from art Itself his style for portrayal of 
such an event. Hence, Picasso belonged to a generation for 
which the figurative art seemed to be in a process of disinte-
gration. And all that was left for the emerging generations 
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was a "medley of colours and rhythms, of crumbled remnants. 
They had no choice but to make use of these refined ductile 
materials for re-integrating shattered existence into new 
"wholes? Lapoujade belonged to this generation. 
In almost all the fields of creativity, freedom of 
expression explored new horizones in the works of this 
generation. In painting, the presence of human figure Imposed 
external conditions on the free expression of the artist. 
Artist wanted freedom from academic tradition; he wanted 
to cultivate his garden thoroughly; He wanted Ho eliminate 
tolls and duties, barriers, detours and the restrictions 
imposed by the tradition. While reaffirming unity of a work 
of art, artist wanted to expand the scope of art. Now the 
artist is not in search of a new style in painting but he 
is trying to give it a meaning yet hidden and unexplored. 
Picasso's period according to historical changes^required 
total disintegration, total distortion of figurative painting. 
The period that followed and to which belonged Lapoujade 
demanded tots! elimination of the figure. Thus the abstract 
painting came into being. 
The abstract artist does not want to negate or nihilate 
or even to make us experience the distorted or abstract 
meanijig of the world. He wanted to create new meaning in 
r) r" '^  25 
the world that had never existed before. Sartre sayai 
"At the end of this long crisis in which 
the artist's creativity was submerged in 
disillusionment through failure to under-
stand that the imaginary is the sole 
absolute, the figures had the good sense 
to disintegrate." (see plate No. 7) 
Did this abstract painting mean nothing, as some critics 
might have claimed ? Sartre says that the case is 'Quite the 
opposite'. As elaborated above, it gave new meaning to the 
world. It set the artist free to chose. For Sartre, freedom 
to choose implies commitment. When a creative artist chooses 
in his freedom, he commits himself to the whole mankind. Now 
the artist becomes more responsible than ever he has been for 
his creative act. The elimination of figures from the canvases 
is, therefore, a new dimension introduced with a view unfolding 
the depths of human existence. Sartre says that it becomes 
essential for an abstract artist. 
"to preserve the rhythm of «cplosive space, 
to prolong the vibration of its colors, to 
exploit in depths the strange, terrifying 
disintegration of being and its vrtiirling 
movement, the artist must use his brush to 
impose meaning on his canvases and on us." 
(see plate No. 6 & 9). 
The use of such terms as 'explosive', 'vibrant', 
'terrifying' and 'whirling' is only meant to suggest that 
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artist has to paint on his canvas with extreme force. The 
intense experiences of human existence without the aid of any 
figure, symbol or sign. 
Being one of the real representatives of our era, 
Lapoujade has already understood what Sartre conceived philoso-
phically as the duty of an artist in our era. 
"man, seen by an unprivileged eye, is 
today neither great nor small, beautiful 
or ugly. His art challanges him to place 
on canvases a true portrait of the human 
kingdom, and the truth about this kingdom, 
today, is that the human species includes 
torturers, their accomplices and myrtyrs. 
...That is our portrait! we must look at it 
realistically, later one can decide to 
28 preserve it or to modify it." 
?fl9 
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CONCLUSION 
In the present chapter, we propose to draw some conclu-
sions from the earlier discussions to estimate critically 
Sartre's theory of art. But it may be mentioned at the very 
outset that the absolute Judgements in philosophy are consi-
dered preposterous; it is more so in aesthetic criticism 
due to its subjective nature. In art, objectivity in scientific 
sense, holds no ground. 
Some critical remarks on artistic activity, creativity 
and different theories of art may help us in evaluating Sartre's 
theory of art. 
(I). From existential point of view, the universe as 
a whole, being absurd, has no order, no plan, no meaning and 
no purpose. It is human existence (^ Dasein or Being-for-itself) 
with which, meaning and a sense of purpose, enter in the universe. 
?()2 
All a r t i s t i c c r ea t i ons are aimed a t c rea t ing some meaning in 
apparently absurd ex i s t ence . Existence i n the vrords of Marcel 
i s a mystery. Art , on the one hand, seeks to unvei l t h i s 
mystery e x i s t e n t i a l l y , and on the o ther to know t h e hidden 
meaning behind the chaot ic phenomena. 
A r t i s t i c quest for meaning i s an odyssey through unknown 
worlds t ha t manifests man's a s p i r a t i o n to seek a response i n 
the awful s i l ence of the meaningless. From t h i s point of 
view, a l l the works of a r t are at tempts to transcend the 
appearances and the absurd. Plight from pre-Socra t ic philosophers 
upto a l l the ideologies of a r t In our age, a r t i s t i c experience, 
i t s c r e a t i v e process and i t s products a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n 
of th inkers who have been i n t e r e s t e d i n the mystery of being 
and i t s a r t i s t i c eatpressions embodied In the works of a r t . 
While d iscuss ing some major t heo r i e s of a r t , we have 
come to the conclusion t h a t a l l t heor i e s or I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , 
though s ign i f i can t with regard to a p a r t i c u l a r period or 
school of a r t , emphasize only a p a r t i a l view of a r t . For 
exan^le, how can we say t h a t Beethovan*8 n in th symphony had 
only rhythm and no content or Leonardo's Mona Lisa had only 
form and no emotion ? None of the major c l a s s i c a l or modern 
theo r i e s of a r t i s capable to offer a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer 
tha t may embrace a l l the aspects of a r t i s t i c experience. 
Although Wit tgens t ien '8 ana lys is of the basic elements of 
a work of a r t he lp us to overcome the basic discord between 
2G3 
different interpretations of art, it, however, lacks existential 
import. We can accordingly conclude that since all these 
theories emphasize only a particular aspect of creative experience 
neglecting other aspects of its totally, therefore none of them 
is adequate enough to interpret artistic creativity and its 
product. 
In the light of our discussion of art and artistic activity 
it may safely be concluded that art has various dimensions and 
the best way for appreciating, understanding and evaluating 
it may be provided by a multidimensional approach to art* In 
other words, only such interpretations of art can serve the 
purpose of illuminating the depths of an artists non^manifest 
attitudes, clK>ices and responses that unveil the mystery of 
human existence and its creativity. An existential interpre-
tation of art, because of its emphasis on the expression of 
totality of human existence^takes all the modalities of human 
existence and its creative process into account. 
¥e have already discussed a few first hand accounts of 
creative artists and their own creative process. Nevertheless 
* 
these accounts of different writers and artists do not provide 
us any common denomenator so as to form a general theory about 
artistic creativity. We may^ therefore, arrive at the conclusion 
that any generalization about artistic creativity is simply a 
misleading and futile exercise. But one thing, which seems 
common in all the accounts of artists and writers is that. 
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regardless of the sphere or medium, there is a peculiar and 
mysterious pattern that constitutes this activity, It is 
the artist's deep Involvement in his aspiration to express 
himself that consciously or unconsciously shapes his work. 
In other words artistic creation is an urge to find creative 
expression for his existential experience. 
There are, however, raany theories about artistic creativity, 
which, as already discussed, provide nothing but hypothetical 
or psychological explanations of creativity. They all can be 
regarded as one dimensional theories because they lack existen-
tial import. They have strayed away from the real issue. All 
these theories have failed to unfathom the depth of the mystery 
that is creativity. 
We have tried to find out an answer to our problem in 
two existential philosophers, viz, Heidegger and Jaspers. 
In Heidegger's thought, the whole structure of human existence 
revolves around his concept of freedom '-. and creativity. 
Freedom, for Heidegger, is a leap into unknown and creativity 
is the expression of freedom! freedom lies in creating oneself 
and one's environment unceasingly. Expression and assertion 
of freedom is inherent in Dasein. It is only througli creativity 
that man's being attains authenticity. Heidegger has emphasized 
the contribution of art to man's realization of authenticity. 
The most important and vital function of a work of art, 
according to Heidegger, is to unwrap the hiddenness of being. 
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The *ralson d'etre* of a work of art is not only what it shows 
but also reveals how the existent feels and imagines its own 
existence. It is authentic because it has an existential 
import• 
For Jaspers, art originates in the elucidation of Existenz 
only. Since Existenz demarcates a boundary situation and that 
the main characteristic of a boundary situation is its lack 
of historicity, a work of art, therefore, while trying to 
show a boundary situation in a historic context, actually 
distracts the viewer from itself. This leads Jaspers to hold 
that while philosophizing means to think through the reality 
of life itself, art separates reality from contemplative 
enthrallment. Though the substance of a work, in the case of 
both the philosopher as well as the artist, comes firom Existenz 
alone, yet the possibility of communication comes from creative 
faculty only, What an artist produces is not only impervtrable 
and infinite in its origin, it is also new like every mystery 
unfolding itself. The truth of creative ability, for Jaspers 
lies in its service to the Existenz that unfolds itself thrx)ugh 
creation, 
(II), After a thorough analysis of Sartre's philosophy 
it can be maintained that through his penetrating phenomenolo-
gical analysis, he has brought to our notice some of the 
unique modes and regions of human existence. One of the 
stricking results of his analysis is the transcending character 
of human consciousness. And the most important role of human 
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consciousness is, according to Sartre, its transcendence into 
the unreal. This is the key to understand and appreciate art, 
After a detailed analysis of art and artistic activity 
in his "Psychology of Imagination". Sartre arrives at the 
conclusion that a work of art is imaginary, and therefore, 
unreal. -We have accordingly tried to thread together various 
elements that distinguish the imaginary from its historicity. 
While discussing Greek philosophers, we have come to 
the conclusion that although their era is marked with purely 
metaphysical speculation, their interpretation of imagination 
was rather epistemological. This led them to see the cognitive 
value of the mental process only and ignore the intrinsic value 
of such a vital process. 
Platonic-Aristotalian tradition dominated all the fields 
of knowledge upto the 15th century A.D« Descartes, despite 
his claim to liberate philosophy from the Greek tradition 
was unable to free himself from scholastic influences. He 
dealt with imagination and artistic creativity from the epistemo* 
logical point of view only obviously the Greek influence. If 
the Greeks had Intentionally regarded Imagination as a somewhat 
lower mental activity, the rationalists did it unintentionally. 
Imagination, in Hume's philosophy, is not only a free 
mental activity but also a creative faculty of mind. In a 
way Hume anticipates Sartre in maintaining that without fX'eedom 
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nei ther imagination nor i s c rea t iv i ty possible. Inspite 
of many loop-holes, Hume's view seems to have provided 
basic model to Sartre* 
Unlike the Greeks, the r a t i o n a l i s t s and the empiricists, 
Kant while reconciling the empirical and transcendental 
elements of imagination, elevates imagination so high tha t , 
in his view, experience of the world i s not possible without 
i t , Coleridge's d is t inc t ion between primary and secondary 
imagination i s more or less akin to Kant's d is t inc t ion between 
the empirical and the transcendental* )iford3o\^th is radical ly 
opposed to Hume and Kant on the role of perception in imagina-
t ion . He holds that imagination i s possible even \«.thout 
perception. 
( i l l ) . Sar t re ' s theory of a r t i s not free from defects. 
If we compare i t with other theories of a r t , both c lass ical 
and modern, we may say that i t i s determined by Sar t re ' s 
philosophy of human existence. According to Sartre human exist-
ence is being-for- i tself , which is grounded in nothingness. 
Freedom enters into the world of being with being-for-i tself , 
hence nothingness is freedom and freedom i s notliingness. 
Here nothingness should not be taken in i t s l i t e r a l sense, 
i t i s , in Sar t re ' s philosophy synonirnous with 
freedom. I t may become what i t i s not. This capacity to 
become what i t i s not guarantees freedom of human existence, 
through which i t creates i t s e l f , i t s environment i t s values 
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and ultimately its meaning. Nothingness is a category of 
being-for-itself in Sartre^s philosophy. It indicates creativity 
of man. Art, being the most powerful expression of human creati-
vity, is of particular interest to Sartre, who besides being a 
philosopher and a political activist, is first of all a creative 
writer, i.e. an artist. In Sartre's view art is aimed at 
creating nothingness i»e. bringing into existence what does not 
exist. This is the ultimate meaning of creativity. When 
Aristotle, refuting Plato's theory of art, i,e, art copies 
the copy of the real, asserts that art or rather poetry is 
not an act of mere copying of the copy of the real but it is 
an attempt to arrange in a new way the chaotic world of 
physical things. Though Aristotle elevated the place of art 
by assigning it the function of arranging in a new way the 
existing things, he failed to realize the very meaning of 
creativity. Creativity, whether attributed to the Ultimate 
Creator or to a human being, is something more than the rearrange 
ment of the already existing things. The function that Aristotle 
assigns to art is pseudo-creativity, Aristotle's theory 
of poetry had dominated most of the theories of art in the 
western world as well as in the Eastern Muslim World, All the 
theories that were opposed to Aristotle, despite their refutation 
of Aristotle, failed to realize the true meaning of creativity. 
It was Sartre who for the first time realized the true meaning 
of creativity. In the context of his philosophy of being, 
creativity has its ground in nothingness and freedom. Creativity 
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brings into that being, which is not, out of nothingness. This 
power is possessed by human being only, whose being is gzx)unded 
in nothingness, and, therefore, is freedom itself. Of course 
this ontological view is an extreme position that Jiay be 
controverted by those who do not subscribe to the existential 
approach to human existence and creativity. However, it is 
very significant to understand the nature of artistic creativity 
and the function of art. 
At the very outset it is to be accepted that Sartre's 
theory of art is not a comprehensive one. Despite emphasizing 
the real meaning of creativity, it ignores other aspects of 
art and the factors that give birth to a work of art. Sartre 
has seldom dealt with the technical constituents of art. His 
main concern has been the very spirit of art and not those 
extrinsic elements that give artistic form to a product of 
human creativity. In order to understand the dimensions 
ignored by Sartre one can refer to more technical theories of 
art that emphasize an inseparable relation between art form and 
its content, and the craftsmanship that makes a product art. 
In this respect Sartre's theory of art lacks a very significant 
aspect. Nevertheless Sartre has succeeded to a large extent 
to unfold the mystery of man's artistic creativity. 
In order to understand Sartre's theory of art one has to 
fall back on his ontological analysis of human psyche. Sartre's 
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i n t e r e s t in the nature of imagination and i t s role in human 
l i f e and a r t has been fominant from the beginning of his 
philosophical career . His two works on imagination, one 
belongs to his early phase and the other to his l a t t e r phase, 
provide a secure ground for his theory of a r t . 
Sa r t re ' s d is t inc t ion between being- in- i t se l f and being-
fo r - i t s e l f i s pertinent to the understanding of his conception 
of imagination, Being-in-i tself i s pure being, f i l l ed to 
the fu l l with no room for nothingness. I t can not become 
what i t i s not. On the other hand belng-for- i tse l f , which 
i s human existence, contains nothingness and freedom within 
i t s e l f . I t i s at the same time being-in-the-world. Other 
beings also exist in the world, but as they are not aware of 
being-in-the-world, they have no consciousness ofliieirbeing. I t 
i s only human existence that has v . consciousness, which 
enables i t to confront the world, to communicate with i t , to 
give a meaning to i t and to recreate i t . For Sartre the 
external world acquires meaning only in terms of human conscious-
ness that projects i t s e l f towards i t . I t i s not something 
given, but i t is something to be at ta ined. In the words of 
Sar t re , consciousness exists in terms of the givenf this 
does not mean that the given conditions const i tute consciousness. 
Consciousness i s something that i s pure and negates what i s 
given. Consciousness i s i t s e l f nothing; i t i s freedom to 
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negate. Human r e a l i t y i s consciousness| I t enjoys fu l l 
freedom In I t s process from disengagement to engagement, 
which I t never a t t a i n s . This unat ta lnabl l l ty ol what Is 
aimed at Is marred by the creat ive process^l .e . unceasing 
and ever Incomplete, If c rea t iv i ty a t ta ins I t s end I t Is 
finished. But c rea t iv i ty Is a process that Is never complete; 
I t Is unceasing effort to become what I t Is not. And possibi-
l i t i e s that can be brought into existence are Immense and 
ul t imate. In th i s px<oces3 man chooses himself, i . e . he creates 
himself. He does not merely receive the external world. I t 
I s , therefore, that human c rea t iv i ty surpasses perceptual and 
conceptual consciousness, both of which are receptive and 
passive to a large extent . Sartre has distinguished between 
three types of consciousness J v i z . perceptual, conceptual and 
imaginative consciousness. The third one Is creative consciouaneas. 
Imaginative consciousness does not receive or form an 
image of a r ea l i t y that e x i s t s . I t i s an attempt to create 
in consciousness what i s absent,ori3^aewherecrla- nothingness, 
Sartre says that the image i s a new act of conscious-
ness called ref lect ion, .in which the at tention i s turned 
from the object and is directed to the manner in which the 
object i s projected in consciousneas. He holds that the 
imaginative consciousness becomes re f l ec t ive . Reflection in 
c lass ica l theories ol knowledge and in Marx's theory of 
epist'.mology means an act of consciousneas that presents or 
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represents things as they BLT^ to the mind, Sartre explains 
our ref lec t ive act in terms of the following four character-
i s t i cs} 
(1) , An image I t s e l f i s consciousness it . is not merely a 
copy of the external world. Things in the external world 
exist in space and time. Image i s beyond space and time and 
i t i s consciousness. He holds that object i s not in consciousrESs 
I t i s consciousness i t s e l f . 
(2 ) . An image indicates a re la t ion of consciousness to 
the object, hence i t i s not ident ical with or a copy of a 
thing which i t refers t o . 
(3) . I t i s a sort of quasi*observation. In perception 
the object enters in one's consciousness. In conception one 
can abstract the concrete essence of a thing. The object of 
the image neither exis ts in the world nor can 
i t be conceived a sanessence . l t la ent i rely certain and 
concrete. 
(4 ) . No externikl c r i t e r i a can be assigned to imaginative 
consciousness but i t pos i ts i t s object as nothing, for i t i s 
a creation of human consciousness, i . e . what human consciousness 
wants a thing to be. Hence i t i s always non-existent, absent^ 
existing elsewhere and self-negation. This i s spontaneous 
and transversal in nature. I t i s not knowledge. I t i s a 
dlfused l ight which consciousness real ises for I t se l f . 
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All the above mentioned four charac te r i s t i cs of image, 
the basis and means of creat ive a r t , dis t inguish and separate 
i t from the world of be ing- in - i t se l f . However, Sartre holds 
that there i s no cleavage between the world of images and the 
world of objects, for the r ea l and imeiginary are composed of 
the same stuff. I t i s only the a t t i t ude of consciousness which 
defines the imaginary and the rea l world. And i t i s this 
a t t i tude of consciousness which i s responsible for the creation 
of every authentic work of a r t . For Sartre to objectify mental 
image i s to create i t s surroundings. These suiTroundings are 
not existent but are imagined as they ought to be. I t i s 
human consciousness which gives a peculiar meaning to an 
image. An image i s , therefore, something that is created by 
human consciousness. 
Sartre holds that the r e a l nature of consciousness can 
be revealed only when phenomenological method i s applied to 
i t . But th is method confronts us with the transcendental 
consciousness. An image i s , therefore, transcendence. A thing 
i s imagined to be what i t i s not . Sartre emphasizes that an act 
of consciousness i s the reverse of the act of r ea l i ty ; i t 
must have the poss ib i l i ty of j)08±t±ng an hypothesis of unreali ty. 
The imaginary object can be posited e i ther as no-existent or 
as absent or as not posited as exist ing or as existing e l s e ^ e r e . 
I t projects a"certaln point of view." 
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Sartre holds that th is cer ta in point of view Indicate 
belng-ln-the-world. I t Is a par t i cu la r s i tua t ion In the 
world which motivates consciousness for the construction of 
any unreal object. He holds that imaginative consciousness 
must be free from the specific r e a l i t y . But i t i s to be 
defined in terms of being in a par t i cu la r h i s to r ic s i tuat ion. 
Every his tor ic s i tuat ion creates i t s own image. That is why 
the image of a par t icular age i s different from the Images 
of other eras . 
In Sar t re ' s view ar t i s an ac t iv i ty that creates 
through Images an i l l u s ion . In th i s respect Sar t re ' s theory 
of ar t is not a theory that regards a r t as the mere 
ref lect ion of an age, nor i s i t confined to the sp i r i t of 
a par t icular age, but in his view a r t transcends a l l eiges*^  
I t i s this character is t ic of ar t that bestows upon i t s . 
beauty, which cannot b« experlienced through conception or percep-
tion, for i t i s out of the world* He maintains that an 
a r t i s t constructs a material analogue that every one can grasp. 
The Imaginary can not be real ized or object i f ied. I t always 
remains an uni^al synthetic whole. I t s beauty can not be 
analysed. I t at tains a new meaning in every age, for i t i s 
determined by the human a t t i tude in every age. I t i s an unreal 
object or in other words an object that human consciousness 
wishes to create. I t i s t h i s aspect of the work of ar t that 
gives us aesthetic enjoyment. The unreal i ty or i l lusory 
character of a work of ar t i s the source of aesthetic enjoyment. 
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Therefore, the aesthetic value of a work of a r t i s something 
tha t transcends what i t depic ts . 
In a l l his analysis and eatlmation of various works 
of ar t in the forms of poetry, paint ing, drama, f ic t ion, 
sculpture e tc , Sartre maintains that i t i s the creation of 
unreal i ty, i . e . what i s not, that inspires«3.This dimension of 
a work of a r t makes i t valuable and signif icant for us . In 
shor t , Sartre maintains that a work of a r t i s an attempt to 
create a world that does not exist s t i l l . However, this 
creat ion i s always In a specific h i s t o r i c a l s i tua t ion. 
Ihe fundamental mode of human exis tence, in Sar t re ' s view. 
I s being-in-the-world that requires consciousness of man*a 
h i s t o r i c i t y , fac t ic i ty and f in i tude . Being-in-the-world means 
to be in communication with other beings existing in a part icular 
h i s tor ic s i tuat ion in the world. This i s possible only when 
one does not f a l l down from his s t a t e of human existence into 
the day-to-day-being which Heidegger described as the fallen 
s t a t e of man. In order to become authentic one has to face 
one's h is tor ic s i tuat ion and his ult imate end , i . e . death. 
Being-ittito-death inspires dread in. man, from which he seeks 
to escape. Human existence becomes inauthentic when i t seeks 
to escape from dea th , i . e . nothingness. Authenticity of human 
existence implies facing nothingness. A r t . i . e . creation of 
nothingness, i s an attempt to posit i t s e l f in the face of 
nothingness. Hence a r t i s always an expression of authentic 
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human existence. Inauthenticity and art are incompatible 
According to this view o± art there are certain factors 
that are essential to art, which, in the view of Sartre, are 
commitment and engagement. Sartre has written much about engaged 
literature. The engaged literature is committed to human fate 
and destiny in a particular historic age. As human existence 
creates itself, its own values and meanings as well as its 
environment, it has also to create a world that is conducive 
to all these. Sartre's view of art has overtones of social 
and political commitments, which means that the main function 
of art is to create meaning in human life and society and to 
fight against all those factors^ • which make it meaningless. 
Sartre's view that world is absurd Implies that it is human 
existence only which can bestow meaning upon it. This meaning 
is conferred upon the world through man's creativity, which 
is man's artistic activity. 
A concrete example of how art creates an unreality is 
provided by Sartre himself in his biography of Jean Genet. 
The outcast, the evil one, the thief, the murderer, the clown 
and the knight errant, who spent first thirty years of his 
life in the European underworld, undergoes a metamorphosis 
in Sartre's work, "SAINT GENET", and emerges as an aesthete 
and a writer. He is an incarnation of St. Genetus^ known 
in French as Genest, or Genet, the Roman actor and martyr 
and the patron saiH* of actors. V/hat Sartre aims at in writing 
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the biography of Jean Genet is to depict the brutality, betrayal 
and absurdity of the world that transformed a genius, a humanist 
and a saint into a crimnal. Genet had to create himself anew 
and to transcend the jaan that was made a thief by the world, 
What is unreal and evil in Jean Genet, in the view of Sartre, 
is marked by his escape from his own s elf j, resulting in his fall into 
day-to-day-being. And what is real and good in Jean Genet is 
his act of freely choosing and creating himself. Jean Genet 
was not a saint In any sense of the word, but the saint created 
by Sartre is actually the result of an exercise in myth-making, 
in creating an illusion. All the constituent elements of 
artistic creativity, viz. historicity, commitment, authenticity 
«nd freedom, are at play in the creation of the image ol Jean 
Genet by Sartre, 
Jean Genet is a real man of flesh and bone, bom a 
foundling and raised in reformatories and prisons, and finally 
emerging as one of the great contemporary writers of France. 
Sartre's account of his life. Saint Genet. Is an unreality, 
but more real than the real one. Though this work of Sartre 
is not a work of fiction, yet Sartre created such an Image of 
the real man with unprecedented artistic skill and Insight 
Into human existence and psyche that the real Genet receded 
Into the background and the stage of action was occupied by 
his image, which is his being-for-itself that transcends what 
he actually is. 
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Saint Genet is a successful attempt to concretize the 
fundamental modes of human existence, conceived philosophically, 
and to substantiate the notions evolved by Sartre in developing 
an existential psycho-analysis. It is a work of art committed 
to human existence as well as a piece of literary criticism 
of the highest order. This work of Sartre is, therefore, 
significant for understanding his theory of art. It provides 
an example how to apply the basic principles of Sartre's 
theory to the creative personality of a writer and his works. 
Taking into consideration various aspects of Sartre's 
theory of art, it may be concluded that despite being one-
sided to a large extent it is relevant to our age. It is 
also applicable to the understanding of various works of 
arts in different forms produced in various ages. In Sartre's 
view a work of art acquire4i meaning with reference to a 
particular historic situation in which man is placed. But at 
the same time a work of art transcends all ages, for it 
creates an unreality that has to be realized in the world to 
make human existence valuable and meaningful. 
Sairtre's view of art and literature is the product of an 
age which is dominated by political upheavals and ideological 
conflicts. Sartre's commitments are well known but, what 
makes his theory of art universal is his emphasis on human 
frecKlom, creativity and authenticity. His views have been 
criticised vehemently by both Marxist© and antl-Marxiets, 
27n 
though his theory of engaged l i t e r a t u r e and committed ar t 
i s closer to Marxist theory of a r t . All cr i t ic ism of Sar t re ' s 
theory of ar t i s actually directed against his emphasis on 
individual freedom. In Sar t re ' s view a r t i s the most authentic 
expression of man's commitment to freedom. Despite a l l the 
claims tha t are made by our contemporary \*orld with regard to 
human r ights and freedom, i t i s human freedom that i s being 
methodically denied to man. Sartre asser ts man's r ight to 
freedom in his philosophy and thaory of a r t emphatically. I t 
i s th is aspect of his theory of a r t which makes him relevant 
not only to our age but also to a l l creat ive and a r t i s t i c 
ac t iv i ty . 
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